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Chapter 1  Introduction 
We communicate.  
What is communicated is a series of symbols or sound patterns between two humans. 
Fortunately, both parties involved in communication to some degree experience similar 
meanings attached to these symbols and sound patterns.  
It is noticed that the patterns of these symbols and sounds are compositional. Simpler 
elements are organized into larger units, and complex meanings emerge from the 
combination of simpler elements. Using language as an example, complex meanings 
emerge from the combination of simpler linguistic elements such as words or phrases. 
How is it possible that we can mentally construct complex meanings from the smaller 
elements? What is the process of this meaning construction? With the hope to shed some 
light on these very fundamental issues in human communication, this research tackles the 
question: “how do conceptual representations of single words interact in a two-word 
combination to construct meaning in human communication?” 
It is widely accepted that meaning is built out of concepts. Humans experience the 
world through the conceptual structure of the mind. This experience is the meaning of the 
world in the mind. In communication, if symbols or sound patterns activate their conceptual 
structures reflecting what they represent in the world, then meaning construction becomes 
the interactions of these conceptual structures in order to form a larger one with a more 
complicated structure to reflect a more complicated world.  The current research will 
explore the cognitive processes of this conceptual interaction for meaning construction. 
This research is built on a rich literature on meaning and concepts. Meaning 
construction through conceptual interaction is treated as conceptual combination in current 
literature. The last 40 years have witnessed a growing interest in the area of conceptual 
combination. Roughly nine models and theories have been proposed to explain the 
phenomenon of conceptual combination (Chapter 2). Most of the models have a common 
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characteristic of assuming a schematic representation of our knowledge of concepts. 
Concepts are represented as having dimensions or slots with features or properties as the 
values in the dimension or fillers of the slot. Based on this assumption, conceptual 
combination is understood as the combination of these two sets of properties along certain 
dimensions. However, it is possible that our minds represent knowledge in less structured 
ways and that schematic structure may not necessarily play a role in making sense of 
conceptual combinations. 
In essence, our knowledge of concepts is represented in terms of associations. These 
associations might assume a schematic structure, or might not. The framework that I will 
propose to explain conceptual interactions (Chapter 3) assumes that concepts are related to 
other concepts and knowledge can be represented by associations among concepts. Based 
on this assumption, meanings of conceptual combinations are constructed through 
interactions between these associated concepts. It is proposed that the cognitive processes 
involved in meaning construction start from a distinction between different roles each 
component concept plays (head or modifier) and then a system of associations are activated 
contingently, prototypically, and efficiently with the goal of forming a cognitive field 
(analytically represented as a closed cycle) to connect head and modifier in a balanced way. 
The balanced system of concepts is strengthened further by reconciling remaining tensions 
in the field.  
Based on the proposed cognitive processes on constructing meaning for conceptual 
combinations, a series of hypotheses were extracted (Chapter 3). Experiments were 
designed and conducted (Chapter 4) to test these hypotheses with satisfactory results 
(Chapter 5).  
In the last chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 6), some difficulties, issues and 
contributions of the current research are explored and discussed. 
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Chapter 2   Literature Review 
Conceptual combination is approached mainly by a discipline called the psychology 
of concepts. However, relevant work has also been conducted in linguistics, cognitive 
sciences, AI and philosophy.  Roughly, nine models or theories have been proposed in 
recent years to explain the phenomenon of conceptual combination. These models or 
theories are: Fuzzy Sets (Zadeh 1965, 1976, 1982; Osherson and Smith 1981, 1982); 
Selective Modification model (Smith, Osherson 1984; Smith, Osherson, Rips and Keane, 
1988); Amalgam theory (Thagard, 1984); Concept Specialization model (Cohen & 
Murphy, 1984; Murphy, 1988, 1990, 2002); Composite Prototype Model (Hampton 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991); Dual-Process model (Wisniewski, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; 
Wisniewski & Love, 1998), Constraint model (Costello & Keane, 2000, 2001), CARIN 
model (Gagné, 2000, 2001; Gagné & Shoben, 1997), and Coherence Theory (Thagard 
1989; 1997). While each model offers some insight on the problem of how people 
understand combinations of words or concepts, they each have their own theoretical 
weaknesses. In the following section, I will review each of them critically. The sequence of 
this review is roughly based on the year that each model was first proposed in literature. 
2.1 Conceptual Combination as the Intersection of (Fuzzy) Sets 
The earliest attempt to describe the phenomenon of conceptual combination was 
conducted by mathematicians known as (fuzzy) set theorists. 
2.1.1  The Model 
The attempt to formulate a theory of conceptual combination based on set theory 
(Osherson and Smith 1981, 1982; Zadeh 1965, 1976, 1982) generated some formalized 
explanations on how humans combine smaller conceptual units into more complex ones. 
Referential semantics holds the idea that the concept represented by a word equates to the 
set of things it denotes (its extension). For example, the meaning of the concept bird refers 
to the set of all birds. When two concepts are combined, the resulting concept is the 
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intersection of their extensional sets. Thus, if X and Y are the extensional sets of the 
concept x and y respectively, the conceptual combination xy is understood as the 
intersection of the set X and the set Y, that is, things that are both X and Y. For example, 
the meaning of pet fish is the intersection of pets and fish, i.e., the set of things that are both 
pet and fish. More formally, in classic set theory, the conceptual combination of XY is 
defined as follows: (Let X, Y be sets) the intersection of X and Y (denoted X∩Y) is the set 
{z : z∈X, z∈Y}. In fuzzy set theory, the intersection of two fuzzy sets A and B with 
respective membership functions fA (x) and fB(x) is a fuzzy set C, written as C =A∩B, 
whose membership function is related to those of A and B by f C(x) = Min [fA (x), fB(x)], x 
∈ X, or, in abbreviated form fC = fA∧fB (Zadeh 1965). 
Both classic set theory and fuzzy set theory provide a formalized way to describe 
conceptual structure. Set theory quite accurately describes the classic view of categories 
(Lakoff 1987, Osherson and Smith, 1982) and fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965, 1982) has 
been used to model the prototype structure of categories with predictions that could be 
empirically tested. Conceptual combination as the intersection of sets is described clearly, 
logically, and parsimoniously by this theory.  
However, as a description of conceptual structure, (fuzzy) set theory was strongly 
criticized by psychologists. Their major criticisms are summarized as follows. 
2.1.2  Criticisms of the Model 
The first criticism relates to whether set theory is an appropriate theory for concept 
representation. For example, the applicability of set theory in concept representation is 
limited. Osherson and Smith pointed out that the extensional view of concepts “is best 
suited to ‘kind’ notions (such as dog, tree and animal), to ‘artifact’ notions (like tool and 
clothing), and to simple descriptive notions (like triangular and red) where the extensional 
sets are easier to define. More difficult to describe are intentional or intricate concepts such 
as belief, desire, and justice” (Osherson and Smith, 1981 p.38). The diversity of different 
kinds of concepts imposes difficulties on how set theory formally describes their structure. 
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Non-kind or non-natural concepts are thus very difficult to be described using sets and 
whenever non-kind or non-natural concepts are combined, the intersection of those sets is 
very difficult to describe or formalize. Murphy also noticed that the nature of set theory is 
not psychological (Murphy, 1988, 2002). “It is very difficult to interpret it as a 
psychological theory at all. Even if all pet fish fall into the intersection of pets and fish, this 
does not tell us what people do with their concepts pet and fish in order to create a new 
concept” (Murphy 1988, p.531). Set theory does not provide an intensional explanation of 
why people combine concepts in order to be a psychological model.  
The second criticism relates to what are known as conjunction effects: fuzzy set 
theory will lead to a contradiction in its calculation whenever an object is more prototypical 
of a conjunction set than of its constituent sets (Osherson and Smith, 1981). For example, it 
can be shown empirically that a guppie is more prototypical of the conjunctive concept pet 
fish than it is of either pet or fish. That is, C pet fish (guppie) > C pet (guppy) or C fish (guppy). 
However, the intersection of the fuzzy sets is defined as:  
(∀x ∈ F)  (C pet fish (guppy)) = min (C pet (guppy), C fish (guppy))  
which implies: C pet fish (guppy) < C pet (guppy) or C fish (guppy).  
In other words, “it is possible, contrary to fuzzy-set theory, for the characteristicness 
of an instantiation of a conjunctive concept to be greater than either of the 
characteristicnesses of its constituent simple concepts” (Jones, 1982 p.284). This apparent 
contradiction shows that intersection is not an appropriate tool to describe conceptual 
combination. 
The third criticism is related to concepts that are not intersective. For example, 
Murphy (1988) noticed that intersection of sets does not account for non-intersective 
concepts such as apartment dog or typewriter table. They do not correspond to the 
intersection of the sets apartments and dogs or the intersection of typewriters and tables. 
Moreover, nonpredicating adjectives, when combined with nouns, do not produce 
meaningful intersections. “The intersection of atomic engineer as someone who runs 
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equipment to make atomic energy is not the intersection of atomic things (whatever they 
are) and engineers. …. the intersection of the two sets does not define the combined 
concept” (Murphy, 2002 p.445). 
The last criticism is related to the symmetric property of set intersection which 
contradicts our intuitive understanding of the meaning of a conceptual combination. Set 
theory predicts that noun-noun combinations are symmetric, because X∩Y is the same as 
Y∩X. However, our intuitive understanding of the combination XY usually has very 
different meanings than their YX counterparts. For example, “a desk lamp is a kind of 
lamp, but a lamp desk is a kind of desk” (Murphy, 2002 p.445). 
The criticisms by Osherson, Smith and Murphy are important and quite convincing 
intuitively. As a mathematician, Zadeh wrote his responses regarding the psychology of 
concepts and categories in 1982 to address those concerns raised by Osherson and Smith 
(1981, 1982). Unfortunately, Zadeh’s 1982 paper was never seriously treated in the field of 
psychology of concepts. Thus, it is worth re-visiting Zadeh’s anti-criticism to get a 
balanced view on the applicability of fuzzy set theory in describing conceptual structure 
and, in particular, on the appropriateness of intersection as the description of conceptual 
combination. 
2.1.3  The Response of Zadeh (1982) and my comments 
Zadeh responded to the first criticism in his 1982 paper in a very detailed way by 
reformulating the definition of the concept of prototype (Zadeh, 1982 pp.293 –297). I will 
not review all of Zadeh’s responses here but rather comment briefly regarding this 
criticism. In general, it could be noted that what makes an explanation truly ‘psychological’ 
is still under debate and none of the current theories on conceptual combination are fully 
immune from the criticisms of applicability and intentionality. For example, the way 
schema theory describes the conceptual structure experiences the same problems. What is a 
schematic representation for belief, desire, or justice? How would schema theory “provide 
an intentional explanation of some kind in order to be a psychological model”?  
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To address the second criticism on the conjunction effect, Zadeh (1982, pp.291 – 
292) pointed out that “when (a) the intersection of A and B is a subnormal fuzzy set (i.e., a 
fuzzy set whose maximal grade of membership is less than unity); and (b) we focus our 
attention on A ∩ B by giving it a label, say C, we are, in effect, tacitly normalizing C by 
relativizing the grades of membership in C with respect to the maximal grade of 
membership in A ∩ B. By so doing, we are generating a normalized fuzzy set Norm (A ∩ 
B) which is not a subset of A and B. Consequently, an object, u, may have a higher grade of 
membership in Norm (A ∩ B) than in A or B.” That is, the intersection of two fuzzy sets A 
and B is a fuzzy set C in itself. When we normalize this intersection set C, it is not a subset 
of A and B anymore. Thus, it is quite possible that an object is more prototypical of C than 
of A or B, leading to the conjunction effect. 
To address the remaining criticisms, Zadeh pointed out that in natural language, “the 
denotation of a phrase of the form AN, where N is a noun (e.g., apple) and A is a descriptor 
of N, (e.g., striped), is not, in general, the intersection of the denotations of N and A, no 
matter how the intersection is defined. The reason for it is that in many cases A is not a 
descriptor of N but an operator which transforms the denotation of N into the denotation of 
AN” (1982, p.292).  This is a very insightful observation that not all conceptual 
combinations of the form XY (where X and Y are two concepts) are truly conjunctives. In 
our research, we have encountered a large number of spurious conjunctions despite their 
syntactic similarity to genuinely conjunctive concepts and these conjunctions do not denote 
intersections. The intersection logic about genuinely conjunctive concepts (such as pet fish 
vs. fish pet) ought not to be faulted for its failure to account for such spurious conjunctions. 
Using Murphy’s example, in the combination apartment dog, apartment is an operator 
functioning on the concept of dog. The concept of dog is sub-classified along the dimension 
of apartment, forming a modification + noun structure, where the modifier specifies the 
relevant dimension that the noun concept is sub-categorized. It is erroneous to treat 
apartment as equally denoting something as dog. As well, it is clear that relative adjectives 
should not be treated as nouns denoting a set of things as in the case of atomic in the 
combination atomic engineer. Based on the same logic, quite often, phrases of the sort XY 
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are not true conjunctives thus do not follow the symmetric property of set intersection. That 
is, XY and YX have different meanings because they have different central concepts and 
different operators functioning on these central concepts. 
Although Zadeh addressed psychologists’ concerns, there are still some further issues 
that I feel fuzzy-set theorists should address before this view can be accepted in the 
psychology of concepts. 
First, the assumption of genuinely conjunctive concepts is questionable. Zadeh 
assumes the existence of genuinely conjunctive concepts that are distinguishable from 
spurious conjunctions and that fuzzy set intersection is applicable only to genuinely 
conjunctive concepts. However, are there any genuinely conjunctive concepts? 
Psychologically, there might be genuine conjunctives when we stay at the cognitive level of 
concepts to represent something that is both in category A and B. However, whenever we 
move to the linguistic level and use words to denote concepts and conceptual combinations, 
syntactic constraints function, by which one word sub-consciously functions as an operator 
(syntactically termed as modifier) while the other word functions as a denotation 
(syntactically termed as noun or head noun). Thus, it seems that whenever conceptual 
combinations are represented at the linguistic level, there are no genuine conjunctives. All 
the conceptual combinations XY become so-called spurious conjunctives characterized by 
the logical operator X that transforms the denotation of Y into the denotation of XY. 
Second, the assumption of defining fuzzy intersection using the “min” operator for 
conjunctive concepts is questionable. Several researchers including Zadeh himself have 
pointed out that no single formula for conjunction can model the wide variety of ways in 
which conjunction enters into concept formation and meaning representation (Dubois and 
Prade, 1980; Zadeh, 1978, 1982). Thus, if intersection of fuzzy sets is used to explain the 
conceptual conjunctions, the specific operator for this intersection is worthy of more 
research. 
Third, with respect to conceptual categories, the assumption that there is a single 
dimension along which two fuzzy sets are compared and intersected is questionable. “A 
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fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a set is 
characterized by a membership characteristic function which assigns to each object a grade 
of membership ranging between zero and one” (Zadeh, 1965 p.338). This definition 
assumes the existence of one particular dimension on which the objects’ membership is 
evaluated and described by its membership characteristic function. However, when two 
fuzzy sets are taken into consideration, the existence of one single dimension that 
differentiates members in both sets is questionable. Moreover, the existence of one single 
dimension along which the operation of sets (such as union, intersection, complement) is 
performed is also questionable. For example, while the conjunctive concept young and 
middle aged is calculated as the intersection of the fuzzy concepts young and middle aged 
along the dimension of age, what would be the dimension along which two concepts such 
as apartment and dog or striped and apple are compared and intersected?  
Last, the assumption of the independence of sets is questionable. When dealing with 
concept combination, fuzzy set theory assumes the independence of the two fuzzy sets. So 
the understanding of the conjunctive concept is a calculation (here, intersection) of two 
independent sets. However, although a single concept denotes a set of its extensions that is 
more or less independent from other concepts, when we combine two such sets, are they 
still independent of each other? I believe the meaning of the conceptual combination is a 
function of its constituent concepts, and moreover, the meaning of each constituent concept 
is a function of the other constituent. For example, the meaning of the conceptual 
combination bird furniture depends on our understanding of bird and furniture, and more 
importantly, the meanings of the constituents influence one another, i.e., the meaning of 
bird in the combination bird furniture will largely depend on the meaning of furniture and 
vice versa.  Thus, the meaning of a combination is not just an intersection or other set 
operands of two independent sets; on the contrary, it is a dynamic combination of 
constituent sets that are highly interactive and interdependent for its meaning in this 
combination.   
In summary, as the first and last formal logic model of conceptual representation, 
(fuzzy) set theory provides a strong tool to describe and analyze conceptual phenomena 
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such as conceptual combination. However, this theoretical approach has some weaknesses 
that need to be addressed before it can be fully accepted in the psychology of concepts.  
2.2 Selective Modification Model 
As an alternative to Fuzzy set theory in explaining the process of conceptual 
combination, Smith and Osherson proposed the selective modification model (Smith, 
Osherson 1984; Smith, Osherson, Rips and Keane, 1988).  
2.2.1  The Model 
The model has two parts: the first part provides a claim about how concepts are 
mentally represented and the second part explains how these mental representations are 
combined.  
Smith and Osherson start their model by describing a schematic representation of the 
concept (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). In this representation, concepts are 
represented by attribute-value pairs. For example, apple is represented by color-red, shape-
round, taste-sweet etc. Each value is associated with a certain weight to indicate its 
salience. For example red is more salient than round in the apple concept (e.g., Glass & 
Holyoak, 1975; Halff, Ortony, & Anderson, 1976). Each attribute is associated with a 
certain weight as well, which Smith & Osherson termed as diagnosticity.  It is “a measure 
of how useful the attribute is in discriminating instances of the concept from instances of 
contrasting concepts” (Smith et al. 1988 p.487). For example, when mentally representing 
the concept apple, humans are said to have a set of relevant attributes such as color, shape, 
and texture. The diagnosticity of each attribute for the concept is indicated by a certain 
numerical value decided empirically. For each attribute, there is a set of possible values that 
apple can assume (such as for the attribute color, the possible values include red, green, and 
brown). The salience of each value of an attribute is decided by "votes" for the value by 
subjects. This kind of representation is essentially a frame or a schema (e.g., Minsky, 1975; 
Rumelhart, 1980; Winston & Horn, 1981), with attributes being slot-names, features being 
values, and most-likely features being default values. 
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The second part in the selective modification model is called “adjective modification” 
in which, an adjective modifies the noun. More specifically, “Each attribute in the adjective 
concept selects the corresponding attribute in the noun concept; then, for each selected 
attribute in the noun, there is an increase in the salience (or votes) of the value given in the 
adjective, as well as an increase in the diagnosticity of the attribute. Consider shrivelled 
apple as an example. Presumably shrivelled contains attributes pertaining to shape and 
texture; accordingly, it would select these attributes in the apple prototype, boost their 
diagnosticities, and shift their votes away from round and smooth and toward irregular and 
bumpy” (Smith, et al. 1988  p.492). 
2.2.2 Some Comments on this Model 
Smith and Osherson’s selective modification model is regarded as the first 
‘psychological’ model of conceptual combination. The main contribution of this model is 
that it documented a number of phenomena in conceptual combination that their own and 
later models have tried to account for. These include typicality effects (the typicality of a 
combination is not a simple function of the typicality of the component concepts) and the 
conjunction effect (when an item is well described by a conceptual combination, it is 
usually more typical of that concept than of the two components). 
However, the model suffers from several drawbacks. First, the scope of the model is 
quite limited. Smith et al. realized that the selective modification model only deals with one 
kind of conceptual combination, namely, adjective-noun phrases such as red apple or long 
vegetable. They did not consider many other types of conceptual combination such as 
noun-noun combinations (bird dog, telephone television) or nonpredicating adjective noun 
combination like Murphy’s atomic engineer or musical clock examples. 
Second, the way that concepts are represented in the model is problematic. More 
specifically, only nouns are represented schematically in the model while adjectives are not 
represented using the similar schematic representation, as if only nouns correspond to 
concepts and adjectives are just values of certain attributes of the concept. The implicit 
 12
assumption that the parts of speech that are not nouns (i.e., adjectives, adverbials, verbs 
etc.) do not correspond to concepts is problematic. A suitable theory of concepts should 
include other linguistic forms than just nouns. Adjectives (such as red, musical or 
comfortable), verbs (such as go, run, sleep), prepositions (such as in, at, on) and adverbs 
(such as luckily, almost, quickly) etc. also correspond to certain concepts and deserve an 
equal status in terms of describing their conceptual representation. 
Third, the assumption that in order to explain the process of conceptual combination, 
we need a level in our conceptual structure called dimension / slot1 that summarizes or 
organizes values is problematic. In the model, concepts are represented by certain 
dimensions that have certain values forming dimension-value pair. For example, apple is 
represented by color-red, color-green, shape-round, texture-smooth pairs. In this 
representation, the color dimension is a summation or organization of all possible ‘features’ 
such as red, green, brown, etc. Organizing features into dimensions (color, taste) in this 
way allows a clearer picture of the relation between features. So red and green are in the 
dimension of color, while sweet and sour are in the dimension of taste.  Features such as 
red and sweet are organized at a lower conceptual level relative to the superordinate 
dimensions of color and taste respectively. It is clear that when we logically think about the 
concept, we may summarize and organize their features (values) into dimensions. 
Analytically, there is nothing wrong with it. However, when we actually use concepts to 
communicate, the function of this additional layer of dimension or slot is not clear. That is, 
whether or not the meaning of red apple is understood as red-apple or as red-color-apple is 
unclear. From our viewpoint, the latter understanding is redundant, i.e., color is a redundant 
level that does not necessarily function in our understanding of conceptual combinations. 
Fourth, the assumption of pre-existing dimensions (slots) is problematic. The model 
assumes that in our mind, we have a system of pre-stored dimensions / slots for each 
concept. This schematic representation uses a structured list of slots and fillers to represent 
                                                     
1 Smith et al. actually used of the term attribute, but their usage is consistent with what is called 
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a concept’s properties and the potential values of each property. For example, the concept 
apple has a system of pre-stored dimensions such as color, shape and texture. However, it 
is not clear that these dimensions are pre-stored regardless of the communicative context, 
or are created in response to the communicative context. For example, how should one 
understand the meaning of the novel conceptual combination tasty computer?  It is hard to 
imagine that a computer has a dimension / slot of taste or that tasty has a dimension of 
computer. 
Fifth, the assumption about the exhaustiveness and the completeness of the set of 
dimensions / slots stored in our mind is problematic. In the concept representation part of 
the selective modification model, the dimensions are complete in terms of how many are 
necessary and sufficient to represent the concept. However, the number of dimensions as a 
pre-determined feature of concepts is very question begging. How could we know that a 
limited number of dimensions such as color, shape and texture etc. is capable of 
representing complete knowledge of the concept apple? How many slots are needed to 
describe all the possible knowledge that we have regarding a concept? And indeed, what 
are slots / dimensions anyway? Dimension such as shape or color organizes our knowledge 
of physical things. They describe the physical or chemical properties of physical objects. 
Then how about social entities such as country, suicide or conceptual entities such as love 
or hate?  What will be the slots / dimensions representing these kinds of concepts?  
Lastly, the process of conceptual combination described by this model is problematic. 
Murphy pointed out: “The main problem with this theory that latter writers have criticized 
is its assumptions about modification. Consider the way modification works for the concept 
red apple. The adjective red finds its match in the schema: There is a feature with the same 
name. That feature now gets all the votes, and its dimension gets a higher diagnosticity 
rating. However, there are more complex cases that aren’t so easily accommodated. It has 
been argued that sometimes, the exact feature would not be present in the concept already, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
‘dimension’ or ‘slot’ in the rest of the literature. 
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and yet people can figure out how to modify it. Indeed, there may not be an obvious 
dimension for the modifier to affect. Furthermore, sometimes more than one dimension is 
altered. Thus, the modification process itself has been argued to be much more complex 
than Smith et al. let on” (Murphy, 2002 pp.449-450). Just as Murphy explained, conceptual 
combination process is much more complex than what the selective modification model 
proposed. Adjectives may not easily find a corresponding dimension to modify, and nouns 
may not have a single ready-made dimension waiting for the adjective.  
In summary, although the selective modification model contributes to the conceptual 
combination literature by documenting some interesting phenomena such as typicality 
effects and the conjunction effect, it suffers from some serious theoretical shortcomings. 
The model oversimplifies the complex process of conceptual combination and the 
underlying assumptions on how concepts are represented are question begging. 
2.3 Amalgam Theory 
In the early 1980s, Thagard (1984) proposed a theory of conceptual combination 
within the context of philosophical investigations on the phenomenon of scientific concept 
development. Thagard proposed “a theory of how new concepts can arise, not by 
abstraction from experience or by definition, but by conceptual combination. Such 
combination produces a new concept as a non-linear, non-definitional amalgam of existing 
concepts” (Thagard, 1984 p.3).  I will refer to this approach as amalgam theory. 
2.3.1  The Theory 
Amalgam theory starts from the basic observation that “conceptual combination 
requires mechanisms for reconciling the conflicting expectations contained in the candidate 
concepts” (Thagard, 1984 p.4). A description of procedural mechanisms is thus needed “by 
which aspects of existing concepts can be used to construct new ones, with greater 
flexibility than a definitional approach would produce” (Thagard, 1984 p.4). 
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The amalgam theory assumes a schematic representation of concepts (the paper 
adopted the term “frame” from Minsky 1975) with slots and values (i.e., each concept Ci 
has slots, Ci,1 ... Ci,n), and proposes that a new concept C3 is formed from initial concepts C1 
and C2 by selecting from C1,j and C2,k, a subset of slots which will constitute the C3,m. Six 
procedural rules are proposed to regulate the process of slots and value selection (Thagard, 
1984 pp. 6-8). For example, “a concept concerning a kind of physical object which has a 
value for size is also likely to have a value for weight. Conceptual combination should 
preserve such linkages” (p.7). Other rules propose that if a slot is chosen by conceptual 
combination, the value of the slot will depend on the adjectival concept, the variability of 
the concept, specific examples of the combination, or representativeness of the given 
instances of the combination. Specifically, the theory proposed that when we try to 
reconcile conflicting slots, we usually favor those that contribute to desired problem 
solutions. For example, “suppose that in forming the combined concept of a Canadian 
violinist you notice that your friend the Canadian violinist prefers hamburgers to classical 
French cuisine. In order to explain this preference, you may add the default expectation 
about Canadians to your frame for Canadian violinist, overruling the expectation derived 
from the frame for violinists” (Thagard, 1984 p.9). To reconcile the conflicting preference 
of food by Canadian violinist, we favor the connotation that “Canadians usually prefer 
hamburgers” to resolve the conflict that was brought in by Canadian and violinist (who 
supposedly prefers classical French cuisine).  
2.3.2  Some Comment on this Theory 
The treatment of conceptual combination as a problem solving process of reconciling 
conflicting expectations contained in the candidate concepts is the contribution of this 
approach. This general line of thinking is consistent with Thagard’s later theorizing of 
coherence on this problem (1997, to be discussed later in this chapter). Moreover, the basic 
theoretical claim that a description is needed of procedural mechanisms by which aspects of 
existing concepts can be used to construct new ones is a helpful observation. This model 
proposed several procedural mechanisms that could be tested empirically.  
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However, the proposed rules are still in need of more empirical examination. These 
rules are intended as guiding principles for the process of reconciling features from 
candidate concepts and instances into a non-conflicting set for the new, combined concept. 
However, how these rules might be implemented cognitively remains a question that needs 
to be addressed.  
This theory assumes that the slots of the conceptual combination and its values come 
from the amalgam of component concepts and examples. However, later researchers have 
noted that many conceptual combinations have emergent features that are not derivable 
from their components. Thus, amalgam theory may need to address why there are emergent 
features and how these features emerge. 
The theory also proposes that specific examples may be used to resolve the 
conflicting expectations contained in our component concept schema. However, some 
conceptual combinations do not have ready made examples, especially novel combinations 
such as triangular basketball or tasty computer. How conflicting expectations are 
reconciled for such novel combinations needs more theoretical exploration.   
2.4  Concept Specialization Model 
Murphy proposed the concept specialization model (Cohen & Murphy, 1984; 
Murphy, 1988, 1990, 2002) in the mid 80s to deal with “complex concepts” (e.g., noun-
noun compounds) and to address the weaknesses in Smith & Osherson’s selective 
modification model. 
2.4.1 The Model 
Similar to the selective modification model and amalgam theory, the concept 
specialization model assumes a schematic representation of concepts where nouns are 
represented as schemata with slots (dimensions) and fillers (values for each dimension). For 
example, the concept dog has slots such as Habitat and Functions, which provide a general 
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organization of knowledge about dog, with fillers being specific values that occupy these 
slots (e.g., “home” or “street” being fillers to the slot of Habitat). 
Based on this representation, “conceptual combination is a process in which a head 
noun concept was specialized by one or more of its slots being filled by the modifying 
concept” (Murphy, 2002 p.453). In this process, “knowledge is involved in choosing the 
best-fitting slot” (Murphy, 2002 p.453). For example, to understand the combination 
apartment dog, the modifier apartment is used to fill some slot in the head concept dog. 
What dimension or slot of dog is picked by the modifier apartment? Our background 
knowledge will guide us to choose the slot of dog that makes the most sense with 
apartment as the filler. In this case, apartment is classified as a type of “Habitat” and so 
fills the Habitat slot in the head concept dog. This provides the interpretation of “a dog that 
lives in an apartment”.   
After this slot-filling process, the model proposes that further interpretation and 
elaboration occurs in which we use world knowledge or background knowledge to expand 
our initial interpretation. This process seeks to make an interpretation more coherent and 
complete by retrieving information from our background knowledge that is relevant to the 
interpretation. For example, people might elaborate that an apartment dog is cleaner, 
smaller and quieter than other dogs. This elaboration generates a rich conceptual 
combination with features that were not part of the original concepts and these features are 
considered to be emergent. 
2.4.2  Some Comments on this Model 
Murphy’s conceptual specialization model is very similar to Smith & Osherson’s 
selective modification model. As Murphy explained: “one way to relate these two models is 
to think of the feature weighting model (selective modification model) as a simpler version 
or subset of the specialization model. That is, the specialization model is very similar in the 
way it deals with simple features, but it adds another layer of conceptual operations – the 
elaboration based on world knowledge” (Murphy 1988 p.535). Thus, most of the preceding 
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comments about the selective modification model apply to this model as well. For example, 
the concept specialization model relies on slots / dimensions as the level of the explanation. 
As pointed out previously, it is not fully clear that slot, as an additional layer to organize 
values into a system, is the only level for us to explain the cognitive process of conceptual 
combination. Similarly, concept specialization model also assumes that slots are pre-
existing and we have a system of pre-stored slots that is always ready to be used, and this 
set of slots is necessary, sufficient and exhaustive in that whenever a concept combines 
with any other concept, there is always a certain slot ready to be filled.  
Both the selective modification model and the concept specialization model 
overemphasize one component of the combination: the head noun. The head noun concept 
is treated as the central concept with a complex schematic structure, while the other 
component – modifier is treated only as a value to modify or specialize the head noun. This 
might be due to an implicit assumption about the relation between parts-of-speech and 
concept. As I pointed out, concepts are not represented only by nouns.  Adjectives, verbs, 
adverbs, prepositions etc have a conceptual structure as complex as nouns, rather than just 
serving as values to fill the slots of noun concepts. If modifiers in a conceptual combination 
do not just serve as values for slots of the head noun concept, what might be the schematic 
representation of the modifier concept? How do these two schemata of head and modifier 
concepts interact and influence each other in a conceptual combination?  The two models 
do not address this issue. 
Some researchers (Costello & Keane, 2000; Wisniewski & Gentner, 1993) pointed 
out that the biggest shortcoming of the concept specialization model lies in the limited 
types of interpretations it can account for. The model can only account for conceptual 
combinations where the head and modifier concepts are linked by some kind of thematic 
relation and ignore the possibility of property-based interpretation.  For example, 
Wisniewski used robin hawk to explain the weakness. Robin hawk could be interpreted as 
“a hawk that preys on robins”, by filling the Preys slot in the schema representation of 
hawk with the modifier name. The meaning generated this way explains the thematic 
relation between hawk and robin. However, it does not allow for properties of the modifier 
 19
to be transferred into the head representation. This means that an interpretation such as “a 
hawk with a red breast” cannot be explained by this model.  
Murphy argues that the biggest contribution of the concept specialization model was 
to bring in background knowledge to explain conceptual combination, especially why there 
are emergent features for a combination. However, it should be pointed out that in the 
selective modification model, Smith & Osherson implicitly assumed the existence of 
background knowledge as well. At least, we must ‘know’ that red is a color before we can 
modify the noun selectively. Regarding the role of the background knowledge in 
conceptual specialization model, I have a few concerns. 
The first concern I have regards the nature of background knowledge in this model. 
The model analyzed two functions that knowledge serves: “first, outside knowledge must 
often be consulted in order to decide which slot is the appropriate one to specialize… the 
second reason for consulting outside knowledge is to elaborate or clean up the concept in 
order to make it more coherent and complete” (Murphy 1988 p.533). Although it is a 
central concept in the model, the nature of ‘outside knowledge’ is not clearly defined and is 
treated as a kind of black box in which the cognitive mechanisms that guide its function are 
unknown. For example, when we construct the meaning of apartment dog, our background 
knowledge allows us to choose the slot of dog that makes the most sense with apartment. 
But how knowledge helps us choose the best slot is not clear. Undoubtedly, knowledge 
plays an important role in the process of conceptual combination, but a model using this 
concept should explain or define in detail the denotation and the connotation of this 
concept. 
A related question deals with the process of concept specialization. The model 
explains that people attempt to place the modifier into the best fitting slot in the head 
noun’s schema. It explains which slot is chosen by its appeal to world knowledge. 
However, after choosing the best fitting slot, how to fill the slot, i.e., how to specialize a 
head concept is not specified. That is, what does it mean cognitively to “fill a slot”? For 
example, the model states that a combined concept is created by filling a slot of the head 
 20
concept with the modifier concept. However, it is not the whole modifier concept that fills 
in the slot of the head concept. Intuitively, it should be some part of the modifier that fills 
in. For example, the meaning of apartment dog is not derived from the fact that the whole 
concept of apartment fills in the habitat slot of dog. It is some aspects of the concept 
apartment that fill in dog’s habitat for the obvious reason: apartment is a concept with its 
own complex ‘schematic’ structure that might include, rent, size, storey, apartment number, 
landlord, etc. It is hard to imagine that such a rich concept could be filled into dog’s habitat 
slot easily and it is hard to imagine how these rich aspects of the concept apartment are 
filtered so quickly in our cognition in order to be able to fill into dog concept. Besides a 
metaphorical description, what mechanisms are involved in filling a slot? I think this 
apparent gap in the explanation comes from the confidence that schema, as the 
representation of conceptual structure, is the level of the explanation for conceptual 
combinations. Certainly, slot as a static representation of human knowledge has its 
theoretical and explanatory power; however, there is little empirical evidence that cognitive 
processes of conceptual combination is carried on the level of slots as compared to other 
potential concept representational structures. Thus, an over-confidence in the slot 
explanation may hinder researchers from exploring the deeper cognitive processes that 
might lead to the phenomenon of slot.    
The next concern I have is related to the over-restriction of the applicability of a 
model on the conceptual combination. For Murphy, a model of conceptual combination 
should only explain the “correct” meaning of the combination, in which, “correct” means 
that most people would generate such a meaning and would see such a meaning as 
appropriate. For him, a model that is capable of explaining all the possible meanings 
(“correct” or “incorrect”) of a combination will “come up with interpretations that are too 
remote. For example, what is to stop such a model from claiming that a tiger squirrel is a 
statue of a squirrel that is made from a tiger, or a kind of toy squirrel that tigers like to play 
with? Once one allows the modifier and head noun to be construed as meaning different 
things, and if one allows many different relations to connect the two concepts, the model 
may generate more different interpretations for a phrase than people would accept” 
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(Murphy, 2002 p.469). However, I believe that a model should be descriptive and able to 
explain why people are capable of generating these many different meanings for a 
combination and how our cognition functions to generate these different meanings, rather 
than being prescriptive in terms of judging the “correct” meaning of a combination. A 
model of human cognition should describe the phenomenon whenever there is such a 
phenomenon. If people understand the meaning of tiger squirrel as “statue of a squirrel that 
is made from a tiger”, the model should have the capability to explain why and how there is 
such an understanding. It seems quite apparent that people are capable of understanding 
very strange conceptual combinations without too much difficulty. For instance, the 
meaning of furniture bird appears to have been understood by most of the participants in 
my pilot experiments. And the very fact that Murphy is able to generate a few diverse 
meanings for tiger squirrel shows that people have the cognitive ability to easily construct 
various meanings for a conceptual combination. Then what is this ability and how this 
ability functions in conceptual combination should be taken into the scope of a 
psychological model of conceptual combination.  
Lastly, Murphy and later researchers treat the grammatical distinction between head 
noun and modifier (typically nouns and adjectives) as equivalent to the psychological head 
and modifier concepts in a conceptual combination. For example, Murphy defines: “a final 
bit of terminology is that the first word (in a two-word combination) is called the modifier, 
and the final word, the head noun (because it is the head of the noun phrase in syntactic 
terms)” (Murphy, 2002 p.444). Grammatically, if a segment of language exhibits the 
endocentric structure (i.e., the meaning of the whole structure is functionally equivalent to 
that of one or more of its constituents), a distinction between head word and modifier is 
necessary.  However, the psychological basis for this distinction is not clear. Will this 
grammatical distinction always equate to a psychological distinction? It is worth studying 
in more detail how closely grammatical head and modifier correspond to psychological 
head and modifier.  
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2.5  Composite Prototype Model 
Hampton proposed the composite prototype model (Hampton 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1991) at about the same time as Murphy proposed the concept specialization model.  
2.5.1  The Model 
Similar to other models, the composite prototype model has two parts: how concepts 
are represented and how concepts are combined (Hampton 1991 pp.105-108). The model 
assumes that concepts are represented as sets of attributes that are interconnected by higher-
level theory-driven relations. For example, we all know that birds have wings and can fly 
(attributes) and that having wings is an enabling condition for flight. The attributes have a 
quantitative "degree of definingness" which Hampton termed as Importance2. “At the top 
end of the scale of attribute importance there may be some attributes which are so 
important as to be necessary for category membership. For example HAS GILLS may be 
treated as a necessary attribute of FISH” (Hampton 1991 p.106 emphasis in original). 
Hampton further assumes that “attributes are organized in such a way that at least some of 
them are represented as particular sets of values on particular dimensions. Obvious 
examples would be dimensions such as COLOR and SIZE... For example the fact that Pets 
are domesticated may be represented as a dimension (or frame-slot) labelled HABITAT 
taking a particular value [DOMESTIC]” (Hampton 1991 p.106). 
Based on these assumptions about concept representation, Hampton proposed that “a 
conjunctive concept is then represented semantically by a composite prototype… which is 
formed as the union of the sets of attributes from both ‘parent’ (constituent) concepts. Thus 
initially the concept PET FISH will have all the attributes of both PET and FISH 
prototypes” (Hampton 1991 p.107). This new union of attributes is then modified based on 
                                                     
2 The notion of importance has been proposed as definingness (Smith, Shoben, and Rips, 1974), cue 
validity (Murphy, 1982), diagnosticity (Smith & Osherson 1984) or centrality (Barsalou & Billman, 
1989). It reflects the relative likelihood of an item belonging to a category given that it does or does 
not have the particular attribute. 
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a necessity constraint. A necessary attribute of one constituent concept will also be a 
necessary attribute for the conjunctive. “For example if HAS GILLS is necessary for FISH, 
then it will also be necessary for PET FISH. This places a Necessity Constraint on attribute 
inheritance” (Hampton 1991 pp.107). For other attributes, the importance of them is 
determined as a monotonic positive function3 of importance for each parent (constituent 
concept). For example, “LOVABLE is fairly important for PETS and irrelevant for FISH, it 
will be of intermediate importance for PET FISH” (Hampton 1991 pp.107). The attributes 
with low average importance will be dropped from the conjunctive set (or filtered out in the 
process of constructing meaning for conjunctive). “Thus, if LOVABLE is now of relatively 
low importance, a subject may simply exclude it from the prototype for PET FISH” 
(Hampton 1991 pp.107). 
After forming the set of attributes for conjunctives, a consistency checking procedure 
is applied to this new set of attributes. “Where there are incompatible attributes, a choice 
has to be made to delete certain attributes” (Hampton 1991 pp.107). This consistency 
constraint follows the following rules. When a non-necessary attribute of a constituent 
concept has a conflict with the necessary attribute of the other constituent concept, it will 
not be used by the conjunctive. “For example, if PETS typically breathe air, but this is 
inconsistent with living underwater, which itself is necessary for the concept FISH, then 
breathing air will not be possible for PET FISH” (Hampton 1991 pp.108). When the 
conflict is between two necessary attributes of two constituents, then the conjunction is an 
empty set - a "logical impossibility." For example, “if asked to describe a FISH that is also 
a BIRD, subjects may say that such a creature is not possible since FISH must have GILLS, 
while BIRDS must have LUNGS. If the subject is pressed to continue into the realm of 
science fiction, or if the linguistic context is supportive of a nonliteral interpretation, then 
one or other of the necessary attributes will be deleted” (Hampton 1991 pp.108). “When the 
conflict involves two non-necessary attributes, then the choice of which to delete will 
                                                     
3 A function which is either entirely nonincreasing or nondecreasing. A function is monotonic if its 
first derivative (which need not be continuous) does not change sign. Monotonic positive function is 
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depend on their relative importance, on the overall consistency that can be achieved with 
respect to the other inherited attributes, and on the context in which the phrase is being 
used” (Hampton 1991 pp.108). 
2.5.2  Some Comments on the Model 
The composite prototype model has a few advantages over previous models. In this 
model, concepts are represented by a set of attributes with a weighting factor associated 
with each attribute. This type of representation not only allows the model to deal with the 
question of sequence of attribute activation in the combination process, but also allows a 
more flexible representation of the meaning of a concept than a static schema. The 
necessity constraint and the consistency constraint are very important in the model for both 
concept representation and concept combination, which I believe are the contribution of 
this model. As Hampton explained, by applying these two constraints, “the proposed model 
could (also) be applied to the conjunction of well-defined concepts with a core of common 
element defining features, with the desired results. The necessity constraint would ensure 
that all defining features of each concept remain critical for the conjunctive concept, and 
the consistency constraint would ensure the correct identification of nonoverlapping sets. 
Well-defined concepts would therefore require no different treatment in the model” 
(Hampton 1991, p.108). Besides these advantages, this model, similar to the amalgam 
theory, also proposes underlying mechanisms that generate testable predictions. For 
example, the model predicts that necessary feature will show up in the combination when 
competing with non-necessary features, which is empirically testable.  
The model also makes a few problematic claims. First of all, the claim of the 
necessary attributes is question begging. The necessary attribute is defined as an attribute 
that is so important as to be necessary for category membership. For example, if has gills 
was treated as a necessary attribute of fish, then any fish should have gills. If they don’t 
have gills, they are not fish. This claim is potentially in conflict with the prototype theory 
                                                                                                                                                                 
always increasing; never remaining constant or decreasing.  
 25
(Rosch 1978). The problem is that the necessary attribute guaranties the category 
membership and a crisp boundary is drawn for the category membership (e.g. the animal is 
either a fish or not a fish), which contradicted with what Rosch demonstrated in terms of 
degree of category membership. Moreover, for many categories, it is almost impossible to 
identify such necessary features. To use Wittgenstein’s (1953) well-known example, what 
would be the necessary feature for the category “game”?  
In relation to the claim of necessary attributes, Hampton proposed the inheritance 
principle that a necessary attribute of one constituent concept will also be a necessary 
attribute for the conjunctive. There are some obvious mistakes in this claim. For example, 
chocolate fish might be understood as “a chocolate shaped like a fish”, but it is not a real 
fish thus does not have the necessary attributes of a fish. Moreover, Hampton proposed that 
when a non-necessary attribute of a constituent concept has a conflict with the necessary 
attribute of the other constituent concept, it will not be used by the conjunctive. Hampton 
used example pet fish to show this point. “For example, if PETS typically breathe air, but 
this is inconsistent with living underwater, which itself is necessary for the concept FISH, 
then breathing air will not be possible for PET FISH” (Hampton 1991 pp.108). My 
questions are: why breathe air is a non-necessary attribute of pet? Who decide breath air is 
necessary or non-necessary? If both breathe air and live underwater are necessary 
attributes for pet and fish respectively, then based on Hampton, “when the conflict is 
between two necessary attributes of two constituents, then the conjunction is an empty set - 
a "logical impossibility”. Clearly this is wrong because bird fish is not a logical 
impossibility. For the same reason, Hampton’s model can not explain any conceptual 
combinations that are composed of two antonyms with opposite and non-reconcilable 
necessary attributes such as lively mummy, true lies etc.  This analysis shows the weakness 
of treating some attributes as necessary and others as non-necessary and of trying to 
combine them in a consistent way. 
Secondly, the way that attribute importance and necessity are evaluated is quite 
questionable. In this model, the importance of an attribute is evaluated within the concept 
itself. Thus, if certain attributes are most central for category membership, they will be 
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assigned a higher importance score and those that are least relevant will be assigned a lower 
score. This score will be carried over to the conjunction. However, the importance of an 
attribute is not just related to individual concepts alone and should not be evaluated just 
within a single concept. Often, when a concept is combined with another concept, the 
importance of attributes of the concepts changes because of this pairing. For example, when 
the meaning of the combination tasty computer is understood as “a chocolate shaped like a 
computer”, most of the important attributes of computer are dropped regardless of how 
important they might be for the concept of computer, and the importance of the feature 
shape increases from a low value for computer to the much higher value for the 
combination. It seems that a necessary attribute or a highly important attribute is decided by 
the combination, not by composite concept alone (e.g. even though shape is not important 
for the concept dog, it is a highly important attribute for toy dog). Because of the 
combination, certain attributes gain the importance where they may not be important at all 
for a component concept alone. 
Thirdly, the model needs a more detailed description on how consistency is checked. 
What are the cognitive processes of assessing the features and what are the bases for 
evaluating consistency? The model relies on an intuitive understanding of the idea of 
consistency and this naïve understanding of consistency hinders it from proposing a more 
detailed description of the mechanisms functioning in consistency checking. 
2.6  Dual-Process Model 
Proposed by Wisniewski (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999), the dual-process model may be 
considered as a successor to the concept specialization model. In this model, Wisniewski 
provides certain extensions to Murphy’s model so that the new model is capable of 
explaining more empirical data than the concept specialization model.   
2.6.1  The Model 
The dual-process model assumes that concepts are represented by a schematic 
structure, and proposes that conceptual combinations are associated with three general 
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types of understanding: property-based, relation-based and hybrid understandings. 
“Relation-linking interpretations involve a relation between the referents of the modifier 
and head concepts. For example, people sometimes interpret robin snake as ‘a snake that 
eats robins’. In property interpretations, people assert that one or more properties of the 
modifier concept apply in some way to the head concept, as in ‘snake with a red 
underbelly’, for robin snake. A third, less frequent type of interpretation is hybridization. 
These interpretations refer to a combination of the constituents (e.g., a robin canary is ‘a 
bird that is a cross between the two – half robin and half canary’) or to a conjunction of the 
constituents (e.g., a musician painter could refer to someone who is both a musician and a 
painter)” (Wisniewski 1997 pp.168-169). The dual process model proposes that these 
different understandings arise from different distinct cognitive processes: relational 
combinations result from integration, while property combinations result from comparison 
and construction (hybridization may be considered as both). Thus, conceptual combination 
may involve dual processes of integration and comparison-construction. Accordingly, the 
dual-process model proposes two primary mechanisms to describe the understanding of a 
conceptual combination: Scenario Creation and Comparison & Construction.  
Scenario Creation generates a relation-based interpretation which amounts to 
“…creating a plausible scenario involving the constituents of the combination. … For 
example, a plausible interpretation of truck soap is ‘soap for cleaning a truck’, because 
truck can be bound to the recipient role of cleaning (i.e., the thing being cleaned), while 
soap to the instrument role (what is used to do the cleaning)” (Wisniewski, 1997 p.174). 
Comparison & Construction describe a process by which people can arrive at property-
based interpretations. Property-based interpretations start from comparing the 
commonalities and differences between head and modifier concepts. On the basis of this 
comparison, a property is selected from modifier to apply to the head.  Wisniewski used 
zebra horse to demonstrate this process: the schematic structures of the two concepts zebra 
and horse are aligned along commonalties (such as body parts) and differences (such as 
having vs. not having stripes, solid tail with tufts of hair vs. all-hair tail). When multiple 
differences are found, several factors such as the communicative context, the salience of the 
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property, cue and category validity, and plausibility regulate the choice of the best property 
to be transferred to the head concept. For example in the interpretation of zebra horse,  
“having stripes” is selected to be transferred rather than “solid tail with tufts of hair”, 
because while both are differences and both are plausible, “having stripes” is higher in 
category validity and more salient for the concept zebra.  
After comparison, the selected property is not just copied over to the head concept. 
“Rather, a property in the modifier acts as a source of information for constructing a new 
version of that property in the head noun concept” (Wisniewski, 1997 p.176). This 
construction process is similar to the elaboration process of the concept specialization 
model with a slightly different focus: elaboration in the concept specialization model is 
applied to relation-based understanding, while construction is applied to property-based 
interpretation. Construction “is an interactive process, in which the new property is a 
function of constraints specified by both the modifier and head noun concepts” 
(Wisniewski, 1997 p.176). It is proposed that “the new property must bear enough 
resemblance to its source in the modifier so that people can determine how the modifier 
contributes to the meaning of the combination… at the same time, the construction of the 
new property must not alter the head noun concept in such a way that it destroys its 
integrity” (Wisniewski 1997, p.176).   For example, “in interpreting fork spoon, people 
could begin by aligning the handle of fork with the handle of spoon, and the end of fork 
with the end of spoon and note an important difference: forks have prongs on their ends but 
spoons have ‘little bowls’ on their ends… the comparison process identifies where in the 
representation of spoon the property “has prong” can be incorporated (on the end of spoon). 
However, there is a conflict between mentally connecting this property to the end of spoon 
and staying within the referential scope of spoon… People can resolve this conflict by 
mentally attaching the prongs to the end of the little bowl and shortening them or by 
mentally attaching the prongs to the top of the spoon” (Wisniewski, 1997 pp.176 - 177).    
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2.6.2  Some Comments on this Model 
The dual-process model extends the concept specialization model in some important 
ways:  it provides an explanation of different types of interpretations (i.e., property-based, 
relation-based, and hybrid), provides an explanation of processes involved in property-
based conceptual combinations (i.e., comparison and construction) and synthesizes schema 
based theories of conceptual combination into one model.  
However, researchers suggest that the dual-process model lacks a detailed 
explanation of the underlying cognitive mechanisms to achieve these processes. For 
example, Costello and Keane noted that “the elaboration or construction process is to be 
singled out in this respect, as it is clearly a very complex process that is, as yet, 
unspecified” (Costello & Keane 2000, p.334). In line with this observation, some specific 
comments could be made. The first process in the model is scenario creation, which is 
intended to explain the cognitive process of generating a relation-based meaning for a 
conceptual combination. However, the mechanisms involved in creating a scenario and 
selecting from among various feasible scenarios so that a variety of acceptable meanings 
could be constructed are in need of more detailed specification. The second process of the 
model is about comparison / construction, which is intended to explain the cognitive 
process of generating property-based meaning for a combination. However, there are still a 
few issues remain unclear, such as how many properties should be generated for each 
component concept in order to finalize the comparison process.  
Murphy pointed out that this weakness is not just for the dual-process model. Rather, 
most of the current theories on conceptual combination have this issue:  
“What is not yet known is the online process by which one of these 
interpretations is constructed / selected. It is clear that people do not always 
prefer to use a slot-filling interpretation whenever it is possible to do so, since 
they will choose feature-mapping interpretations for similar concepts that 
would have made sensible slot-filling concepts (see Wisniewski and Love 
1998). But given that these ways of combining concepts are so different, it is 
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not clear how they could be carried out in parallel. The feature-mapping process 
involves comparing the two concepts, identifying a feature of the modifier that 
could be plausibly transferred over to the head noun, and carrying out that 
transfer. The slot-filling process involves seeing whether there is a relation 
available in the head noun that the entire modifier could fill, and then 
constructing that relation. Furthermore, both of these are complicated by the 
possibility of construal (e.g., interpreting skunk as referring to a bad smell), 
which allows many more ways of possibly relating the concepts. How all these 
alternatives are considered (or if they aren't, how they are ruled out) is at this 
point not clear” (Murphy, 2002 pp.458 - 459). 
2.7 Constraint Model 
The constraint model was proposed by AI scholars Costello and Keane (1997a, 
1997b, 1998, 2000, 2001).   This model focuses on the efficiency of the conceptual 
combination process with pragmatic principles that have been implemented as a 
computational model called C3. In the following paragraphs, I will focus on the theoretical 
part of the model and ignore the technical details for computational implementation of the 
model. 
2.7.1  The Model 
Similar to other models, the constraint model starts with an assumption that concepts 
are represented in a schematic structure and describes conceptual combination as a process 
of constructing interpretations that satisfy three constraints: diagnosticity, plausibility and 
informativeness which were abstracted from several sources, primarily from pragmatics 
(Grice 1975). For this reason Costello describes his model as a pragmatics of combination. 
The general idea of the model is that when people understand a novel combination, 
they construct a combined concept to represent that combination. In the process of 
combining, people assume that everyone involved in the communication follows the 
cooperative principle as theorized by Grice (1975). “Three constraints of plausibility, 
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diagnosticity, and informativeness follow from this assumption. By following these 
constraints the listener can construct the correct concept as intended by the speaker” 
(Costello 2004 PowerPoint presentation).  
The first constraint is called plausibility. Because it is assumed that everyone in the 
communication is cooperating, the intended combined concept should be something the 
listener already somewhat knows. Thus the listener knows the new combined concept must 
describe something plausible (similar to things the listener has seen before). 
The second constraint is called diagnosticity. Since the speaker is cooperating, the 
intended combined concept is one best identified by the two words in the phrase (otherwise 
the speaker would have selected other words). Thus the listener knows that the new 
combined concept must contain some properties which are best identified by (that is, are 
diagnostic of) each word in the phrase. 
The third constraint is called informativeness. Since the speaker is cooperating, the 
intended combination is one for which both words in the phrase are necessary (otherwise 
the speaker would have used fewer words). Thus the new combined concept must be more 
informative than either of the constituent words. 
For instance, Costello considers the example of shovel bird understood as “a bird that 
has a flat, wide beak like a shovel, for digging worms”. In this understanding, the listener 
constructs an understanding with the diagnostic properties of shovel (flat, wide, and used 
for digging) that is something plausible (bird digging worms) and informative (flat, wide 
beak).  
2.7.2  Some Comments on this Model 
The constraint model explicitly addresses the possibility of multiple interpretations 
for novel combinations and how different interpretations are selected. By adopting Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle, the model assumes that communication is a cooperative process 
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between speaker and listener. The three constraints used to guide the process of selecting 
from among potential meanings are quite reasonable.  
However, Costello & Keane did not justify the selection of these three constraints 
from among many other communicative and cognitive factors that might influence how 
conceptual combinations are understood. For example, Thagard (1997) proposed a 
coherence theory of conceptual combination that might well be added to the list of 
constraints. In 1986, two cognitive linguists Sperber & Wilson proposed a theory of 
Relevance trying to integrate Grice’s four principles of communication into one – the 
principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995). It is easy to argue that this principle 
should be added as constraints as well. The point here is that there are many constraints 
regulating human cognition, then why these particular three are chosen is not clear.  
Diagnosticity in this model is basically identical to Smith & Osherson’s diagnosticity 
and Hampton’s Importance, i.e., degree of definingness.  Similar to my comments on 
Hampton’s Importance, diagnosticity of a feature is treated as an absolute value in all these 
models whereas it seems to vary relatively based on the context in which the concept is 
used. In other words, diagnostic features of a certain concept depend on the set of other 
concepts that are salient at the time of use, as my example tasty computer shows (that the 
diagnostic feature of computer changes when paired with tasty).  
The other two constraints “plausibility” and “informativeness” are vague concepts 
which have face validity, but it is very difficult to describe the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms associated with these two constraints. That is to say, how plausibility and 
informativeness are implemented cognitively is not clear at all. (In computer simulations, 
Costello and Keane implemented these two constructs as a degree of overlap with stored 
instances and as the appearance of a new predicate that was not contained in the prototype 
of the head concept respectively. However, this kind of implementation in computer 
simulation has its own problems such as the quantity of the instances that need to be stored 
in computer memory and the calculation efficiency etc, which are not the focus of the 
current discussion). Moreover, these two constraints seem to function well when people 
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interpret novel combinations, but might not predict the process of comprehending familiar 
or analogically related compounds such as red apple or lion heart. That is, it does not 
address the difference when people interpret common combinations or completely novel 
combinations. 
2.8  CARIN Model 
The Competition Among Relations In Nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné, 2000, 
2001; Gagné & Shoben, 1997, 2002) provides a model of conceptual combination that uses 
our prior experience of the kinds of relations that words have in compounds to predict what 
interpretations people will produce, and what compounds people will find easiest to 
understand. 
2.8.1  The Model 
The CARIN model draws on arguments from early linguistic work on the thematic 
relations of compound words (Kay & Zimmer, 1976; Gleitman & Gleitman, 1970; 
Downing 1977; Levi, 1978).  In linguistics, the thematic relations between two component 
words in a compound have often been examined by developing taxonomies of relations 
required for interpreting combinations. For example, Levi (1978) identified 15 relations 
(thematic relations) that can be used to classify the meanings of many familiar 
combinations, such as a mountain brook is a brook in the mountain, but a mountain 
magazine is a magazine about mountains (Table 2-1). These 15 relations were used by 
Gagne in the CARIN model. 
Table 2-1: List of thematic relations used by the CARIN model (Gagne & Shoben, 1997) 
1. Noun causes Modifier Flu virus 
2. Modifier causes Noun College headache 
3. Noun has Modifier Picture book 
4. Modifier has Noun Lemon peel 
5. Noun makes Modifier Milk cow 
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6. Noun made of Modifier Chocolate bird 
7. Noun for Modifier Cooking toy 
8. Modifier is Noun Dessert food 
9. Noun uses Modifier Gas antiques 
10. Noun about Modifier Mountain magazine 
11. Noun located in Modifier Mountain cloud 
12. Noun used by Modifier Servant language 
13. Modifier located in Noun Murder town 
14. Noun derived from Modifier Oil money 
15. Noun during Modifier Morning prayers 
 
Different from all the other models where a feature based schematic representation is 
used to represent a concept, the CARIN model assumes a schematic representation of the 
relations between concepts. That is to say, it assumes a slot-type structure where slots are 
not features of the concept but the kinds of relations it can have with other concepts. Based 
on this model, how concepts are represented internally is irrelevant to the goal of 
conceptual combination - to fit all compounds into existing relational templates (slots). The 
general argument is that people historically possess distributional knowledge about how 
often particular relations have been used (strength of a relation) with particular concepts, 
and these relations “compete for the interpretation of the combined concept and that the 
difficulty of interpretation is a function of the relative strength of the selected relation” 
(Gagné & Shoben, 1997 p.81). For example, “interpretations are easier if the required 
relation is of high strength than if the thematic relation is of low strength. Other things 
being equal, it is easier to arrive at the correct interpretation for mountain stream than it is 
for mountain magazine because the locative relation has a greater strength relation than 
does the about relation” (Gagné & Shoben, 1997 p.81).  
Based on empirical studies, Gagné proposed that “the modifier exerts a greater 
influence on determining whether a phrase has a plausible meaning of a combined concept 
than does the head noun” (Gagné & Shoben, 1997 p.83). For example, “we examined the 
effects of the number of dominant relations for the modifier and head noun and the effects 
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of ranked frequency of the relation for the modifier and head noun on response times for 
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 3. In no case did the correlations between variables 
based on the head noun and response time differ reliably from zero” (Shoben & Gagné, 
1997 p.83). The model thus proposes that it is the modifying concept that guides the 
selection of the thematic relation. Moreover, the CARIN model claims that property-based 
interpretation is a secondary strategy for subjects. Only after they have failed to find an 
appropriate relation between the compound’s constituents, they would go to property-based 
interpretation. Shoben and Gagné explained that “overall, there is little evidence to support 
the use of property mapping as a common strategy during the interpretation of noun-noun 
phrases. Instead, the interpretation of such phrases is heavily biased toward the use of 
relations” (Gagné, 2000 p.383). She also suggested one more thematic relation to interpret 
property-based understanding: “In some cases, participants provided interpretations that 
clearly show the use of the Resembles / LIKE relation. For example, coat shirt was 
interpreted as ‘a shirt that looks like a coat.’  Magazine newspaper was interpreted as ‘a 
newspaper that is like a magazine’” (Gagné, 2000 p.385).  
2.8.2  Some Comments on this Model 
CARIN is proposed based on a linguistic taxonomy of the thematic relations between 
component words. By paying attention to the kinds of relations that words assume and 
adding weights to these relations, the model predicts the priority between different relations 
when constructing an interpretation for a compound, which was supported by their 
empirical analysis. The most interesting finding of their research is the observation that 
modifier actually plays more important role than head noun in terms of selecting a relation 
between head and modifier during the process of construction. This result provides 
evidence of different functions associated with the modifier and head in contributing 
relations or properties for the combination.  
However, there are a few problems that need to be addressed.  
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First of all, are these 15 relations necessarily exhaustive? This is a natural question 
for any taxonomy-based explanation. For example, the recent addition of the “Resembles” 
relation (Gagné, 2000) hints that the proposed taxonomy is not necessarily comprehensive 
and complete. 
If we carefully examine the 16 relations, it is easy to conclude that these relations are 
so high level and abstract that they cannot capture the real meaning between words, thus 
cannot provide meaningful interpretations. For example, the combinations birthday cake 
and bravery medal share the FOR relation between their constituents. However, the FOR 
relation cannot capture the crucial differences between the interpretations of these 
combinations: a birthday cake is a cake used for the purpose of celebrating birthday while a 
bravery medal is a medal rewarded because of bravery. That is to say, our intuitive 
understanding of the meaning of these relational words “cause, has, make, for, is, use, 
located” etc. cannot guarantee a meaningful interpretation, and the interpretations drawn 
from these high level relations cannot really represent the intended meaning. Moreover, the 
relations denoted by these simple words such as “make”, “for” usually imply very complex 
meanings corresponding to a very complex conceptual structure. Using this complex 
conceptual structure to link two concepts will inevitably end up with a very vague 
interpretation.  
Essentially, the models based on feature-schema and the models based on thematic 
relations are quite similar, in that the thematic relations of concepts function as connectors, 
where another concept could fit in this relation, similar to the slot filling idea in schema 
based models. Undoubtedly, our knowledge of concepts not only involves the dimensions 
where features are organized, but also the connecting relations that this concept usually has 
with other concepts. The questions that I have regarding the weaknesses of “dimension” or 
“slot” in explaining novel combinations could also be raised here. For example, it is not 
fully clear that the thematic relations, as one part of our conceptual structure to organize our 
knowledge, are the appropriate level for us to explain the cognitive process of conceptual 
combination. Similar to the assumptions of slot-filling, CARIN model also assumes that 
thematic relations are pre-existing and we have a system of pre-stored relations that is 
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always ready to be used. This assumption is based on the confidence that proposed thematic 
relations are complete in terms of how many are necessary and sufficient and exhaustive in 
terms of whenever a concept combines with any other concept, there is always a pre-stored 
relation ready to be used. However, it is not clear that human mind pre-stores a complete 
set of thematic relations that are necessary, sufficient and exhaustive.  
In the CARIN model, Gagné claimed property-based interpretations are a secondary 
strategy, used when subjects fail to find an appropriate relation between the compound’s 
constituents. From their corpus analyses (Gagné, 2000; Gagné & Shoben, 1997), they 
concluded that property-based interpretations rarely occur and so relational interpretations 
are made by preference. They analyzed data from Warren (1978) and found that only 1.6% 
of interpretations were property-based compared to 86% relational interpretations. In her 
analysis of her own corpora, Gagné (2000) found only 0.6% of meanings involved property 
transfer. Interestingly, the proponents of property-based interpretation approaches found 
contradictory results. For example, Wisniewski & Love found that “the property mapping 
… characterized almost 30% of our sample. This finding does not agree with Downing’s 
(1977) or Shoben and Gagne’s (1997) claim that property meanings are not present in 
combinations that people produce” (Wisniewski & Love, 1998 p.197). How to decode these 
contradictory findings is another interesting topic that I will not get into in this thesis. 
2.9 Coherence Theory 
In 1997, Thagard proposed a coherence theory of conceptual combination (Thagard 
P. 1997) following the basic line of thinking in his 1984 paper that conceptual combination 
is to solve a problem of reconciling the conflicting expectations contained in the candidate 
concepts.  
2.9.1  The Theory 
The coherence theory of conceptual combination is based on Coherence theory 
proposed by Thagard (1989, 1997, 1998). The basic argument of Coherence theory is that 
elements in a system (concepts, propositions, parts of images, goals, actions etc.) can 
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cohere (fit together) or incohere (resist fitting together). If two elements cohere, there is a 
positive constraint between them. Otherwise, there is a negative constraint between them. 
“A positive constraint between two elements can be satisfied either by accepting both of the 
elements or by rejecting both of the elements. A negative constraint between two elements 
can be satisfied only by accepting one element and rejecting the other. The coherence 
problem consists of dividing a set of elements into accepted and rejected sets in a way that 
satisfies the most constraints” (Thagard & Verbeurgt 1998 pp.2-3).  
The coherence problem is solved by parallelly propagating the weights of the 
associations between elements to satisfy the constraints until all elements achieve 
unchanging activation values and then partitioning elements into accepted sets and rejected 
sets in such a way that maximizes coherence. 
Based on this theory, the conceptual combination phenomenon is explained as a 
“instance of coherence conceived of as maximization of constraint satisfaction” which 
“requiries us to apply some concepts to a situation and withhold other concepts in such a 
way as to maximize the overall satisfaction of the constraints determined by the positive 
and negative associations between the concepts” (Thagard 1997 online version). More 
specifically, we need to construct a constraint network with elements of all possible 
inferences of the head concept and modifier concept, and with all constraints based on 
frequencies of association between the elements. Then, we need to use certain connectionist 
algorithms to do a parallel calculation that maximizes coherence by accepting some 
elements and rejecting others. The output of the network is “an interpretation of the relation 
between the head and modifier, as well as a collection of inferences about the object 
denoted by the head as characterized by the modifier. If the most coherent interpretation is 
nevertheless not very coherent, then move to other mechanisms such as analogy and 
explanation that produce the incoherence-driven conceptual combinations” (Thagard 1997 
online version). 
Thagard used the conceptual combination well-dressed black to demonstrate these 
mechanisms. When people understand this combination, they would activate a network of 
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associated concepts. For example, black might activate aggressive or poor ghetto 
inhabitant. Contrastingly, well-dressed might activate businessman, not poor and not 
aggressive. The positive constraints in this network include the associations that ghetto 
blacks are aggressive, while negative constraints include the negative association that 
ghetto blacks tend not to be businessmen. Apparently, this is not a coherent network. To 
understand the meaning of this combination, we need to come up with the most coherent 
interpretation (the interpretation that best satisfies the constraints). A connectionist 
algorithm is used to maximize coherence by the rejection of aggressiveness. The final 
interpretation of the combination well-dressed black is “a black businessman who is not an 
aggressive ghetto black”. 
2.9.2 Some Comments on the Theory 
Coherence theory is not proposed just to explain the conceptual combination 
problem. It has a much wider application area. The basic assumption of the coherence 
theory is that a conceptual system or network tends to evolve toward a more stable and 
harmonious state. By applying the coherence logic to the conceptual combination problem, 
the theory explains not only the specific mechanisms of conceptual combination, but also 
why there are such mechanisms. However, as explained by Thagard, the current coherence-
driven constraint-satisfying model has difficulties explaining non-predicting combinations 
such as apartment dog and incoherence-driven combinations such as web potato. For such 
cases, networks of associations are involved and quite often, for novel combinations, the 
meaning is motivated not by coherence but by the failure to find coherence. Moreover, the 
connectionist algorithms used in coherence theory are not a direct reflection of mental 
activity, but rather, a simulated approximation of the mind.  
Coherence theory stems from what is known as connectionism that started in 1980s 
and 1990s in the field of artificial intelligence. Connectionist theories try to understand 
cognition by viewing the brain as a network of interconnected neurons (Rumelhart et al. 
1986). Connectionist models consist of interconnected processing units or nodes that 
perform simple computations transforming inputs into outputs to its neighboring nodes. 
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The system has two characteristics: one is that computations are carried out concurrently 
(parallel processing); the other is that knowledge is represented by patterns of network 
activations across multiple nodes (distributed) in the system; hence this computational 
approach is also called “parallel distributed processing (PDP)”. Coherence theory adopts 
the computational mechanisms from this intellectual tradition.  
As theorized by Thagard, coherence is understood as “the maximal satisfaction of 
multiple positive and negative constraints that is achieved by some parallel constraint 
satisfaction algorithms” (Thagard & Verbeurgt 1998 p.1). As such defined, coherence 
theory exhibits a strong connectionist orientation in terms of the basic assumptions of 
goodness-of-fit or harmony. The basic idea of harmony in connectionist approaches is very 
similar to what has been historically called cognitive balance or consistency in the 
psychological literature of consistency theories, and a few researchers have investigated 
relationships between these two groups of theories and used connectionist approaches to 
model certain consistency problems. For example, Simon and Holyoak (2002) used parallel 
constraint satisfaction to explain principles underlying consistency theories, and Shultz and 
Lepper (1996) used such approaches to simulate results from classic cognitive dissonance 
experiments. In this research, I draw on consistency theory, particular Heider’s balance 
theory to analyze aspects of the conceptual combination process. Before I review balance 
theory at the end of this chapter, however, it is necessary to summarize the current theories 
of conceptual combination. 
2.10 A Brief Summary 
Most of the preceding models have a common characteristic of assuming a schematic 
representation of our knowledge of concepts, in which concepts are represented as having 
dimensions or slots, and each dimension or slot has features or properties as the values of 
the dimension or fillers of the slot. From this assumption, conceptual combinations are 
understood as the combination of these two sets of properties along certain dimensions. 
Some models emphasize thematic relations between the two constituent concepts, but if 
thematic relations are understood as a kind of dimension reflecting how concepts connect 
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with one another, then, there is not too much difference between feature-based schema 
models and thematic relation models.  
Schema theory describes “how knowledge is represented and about how that 
representation facilitates the use of the knowledge in particular ways” (Rumelhart 1980 p. 
34). Schema theory assumes a logical structure to organize knowledge in the human mind, 
which seems to match our intuitive experience. When we think about a concept, we may 
feel that it is logically related to other concepts in a manner similar to the dimensions or 
slots proposed by schema theory. For example, we may know that apples are typically red 
or green, which are colors, so the concept apple, red, green, and color have a logic 
relationship that could be described by an apple schema consisting of a dimension / slot 
color with values red and green. However, the fact that we understand these concepts as 
being logically related to one another does not necessarily imply that our minds represent 
these concepts in such an organized manner. It is possible that our minds represent 
knowledge in less structured ways and logical structure is imposed after the fact, as an 
outcome of the process of thinking about these concepts and the logical relations between 
them. Moreover, even if our minds store information in such structured ways, is it 
necessarily the case that this structure plays a direct role in making sense of conceptual 
combination as proposed by theories of slot-filling? The fact that we can make sense of 
novel combinations quite easily would counter such a view. For example, the combination 
smart apple has the same structure as a red apple, but our knowledge of apple is unlikely to 
include a pre-existing dimension / slot for intelligence with different values in smartness.  
An alternative view could be proposed on the cognitive processes of combining 
concepts. Rather than assuming that schematic structure has a causal role in the cognitive 
processes of making sense of conceptual combinations, in this thesis, I will try to make as 
few assumptions as possible about how knowledge is represented, and attempt to propose 
an explanation based on few assumptions. We know that concepts are related to other 
concepts. For example, the concept apple might be associated with the concept red if we 
know many apples are red. Thus, I will assume that knowledge can be represented by 
associations among concepts. When we try to make sense of a conceptual combination, our 
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cognitive processing starts from the processing of the associations that were activated by 
component concepts. Thus, the meaning of a conceptual combination basically equates to a 
system of associated concepts drawn from component concepts that fit together 
consistently.  
In psychology and cognitive sciences, there are two closely related groups of 
theories: consistency theories and connectionist theories that are focused on the harmonious 
state of a system of conceptual entities, hence could be used to describe the phenomenon of 
conceptual combination, as exemplified by Thagard’s coherence theory on conceptual 
combination. My theory specifically will look at the harmony in a triad between two 
component concepts in a combination with a given association, a triad typically as a basic 
unit of what a combination means. Various consistency theories, Heider’s balance theory in 
particular, use a triad as the unit of analysis, thus will be reviewed in the next section. 
2.11 Balance Theory 
Consistency theories began in 1940s and include a group of theories that were 
proposed in attempt to “uncover the structural-dynamic characteristics of human cognition” 
(Simon & Holyoak 2002, p.283) towards consistency. There are many theories proposed in 
this tradition, such as Heider’s balance theory (1946, 1958); Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance theory (1957); Osgood & Tannenbaum’s congruence theory (1955); Abelson & 
Rosenberg’s symbolic psycho-logic theory (1958); Newcomb’s strain towards symmetry 
theory (1953); Cartwright & Harary’s structural balance theory (1956).  
“These conceptions, symmetry, consonance, balance, and simplicity, are, 
of course, implied in that idea with which Gestalt theory started and which 
always was central to it, namely, the idea of a ‘good’ figure… this model 
implies a number of different entities with certain properties and standing in 
certain relations, which make up a constellation of factors tending toward a 
standard (consistent) state” (Heider, 1960 p.168). 
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The basic assumption of these theories is that the cognitive elements tend to form 
stable structures, whereas inconsistent elements would operate towards a re-establishment 
of stability or harmony. “The reasoning behind (the consistency position) relates to the 
organism’s presumed need to apprehend and comprehend things and events about him. In 
monitoring, processing and interpreting information from the environment, some degree of 
consistency and equilibrium is seen as essential for reasons of parsimony and economy of 
effort, as well as to allow for the predictability of, and hence adaptability to, subsequent 
encounters… most assume a universal value for the organism in his having a stable 
predictable view of his environment” (Tannenbaum, 1968 p.346).  
It is noted that “these theories have another feature in common. They all cite Heider’s 
principle of cognitive balance as an approach either similar or parallel to their approach and 
admit to its historical priority. (Heider explicitly discussed cognitive balance in a paper 
published in 1946 and it was adumbrated even earlier, in a paper published in 1944). Some, 
particularly Cartwright and Harary, and Abelson and Rosenberg, also admit their 
intellectual debt to Heider as having influenced them directly” (Jordan N. 1968 p.169). 
Thus, it is necessary to review the basic ideas in the balance theory proposed by Heider 
(1958). 
With a Gestalt perspective, Heider (1944, 1946, 1958, 1960) had studied certain 
aspects of cognitive fields that tend to be organized in a harmonious and balanced manner 
and, if not, will generate a tendency to reach balanced cognitive states. Heider proposed the 
concept of cognitive balance based on the distinction between two types of relations: unit 
relations and sentiment relations. Unit relation between entities refers to the fact that 
“separate entities comprise a unit when they are perceived as belonging together. For 
example, members of a family are seen as a unit; a person and his deed belong together” 
(Heider, 1958 p. 176). “This unit formation includes such specific relations as similarity, 
possession, causality, proximity or belonging” (Cartwright et al. 1956 p.278). A sentiment 
relation between entities refers to the positive or negative feelings or valuation that one 
gives to an entity, such as a person, activity, or object. These relations may be for dyads, 
triads, or more complex cases, but all relations are from the perceiver’s subjective point of 
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view. These relations are described by a concept called valence: there is a unit / sentimental 
relation (positive valence) or there isn’t (negative valence). Based on this distinction, a 
balanced state is defined as: “by a balanced state (or situation) is meant a harmonious state, 
one in which the entities comprising the situation and the feelings about them fit together 
without stress” (Heider 1958 p. 180). More specifically, “A dyad is balanced if the relations 
between the two entities are all positive (L and U) or all negative (DL and notU). 
Disharmony results when relations of different sign character exist.  A triad is balanced 
when all three of the relations are positive or when two of the relations are negative and one 
is positive. Imbalance occurs when two of the relations are positive and one is negative” 
(Heider 1958 pp.202 – 203). Briefly, in the case of three entities, balance means the 
positive product of signs of the relations.  
The basic hypothesis of Balance Theory is that there is a tendency for cognitive units 
to achieve a balanced state, i.e., “if a balanced state does not exist, then forces toward this 
state will arise… If a change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce tension” 
(Heider, 1958, p. 201). When tension caused by imbalance arises in the mind of the 
individual, the individual is likely to exercise some mental effort to eliminate the tension. 
For example, in the case of two entities, it is balanced if Person 1 likes something he 
made (Figure 2-1). In the case of three entities, if Person 1 has a relation of affection for 
Person 2 and if Person 2 is seen as responsible for Object 3, then there will be a tendency 
for Person 1 to like or approve of Object 3 so that the system is balanced, i.e., the product 
of signs is positive (Figure 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-1: A balanced system of two entities 
Person 1 Object +
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Figure 2-2: A balanced system of three entities 
If balance does not exist in a system, the situation will tend to change in the direction 
of balance. For example, if Person 1 is a friend of Person 2 (positive valence), and Person 2 
likes a movie (positive valence), but Person 1 dislikes the movie (negative valence). Then 
the system composed of Person 1, Person 2 and the Movie is not balanced. That is, the 
system contains two positive relations (Person 1 – Person 2; Person 2 – Movie) and one 
negative relation (Person 1 – Movie). This is an unpleasant situation for Person 1 from his 
perspective. Tension will arise and forces will appear to annul the tension. This situation is 
made harmonious by a valence change in one of the relations. For example, Person 1 could 
try to appreciate or even start to like the Movie, so that now the system contains 3 positive 
relations, thus balanced. Alternatively, Person 1 could start to dislike Person 2, so that now 
the system contains 2 negative relations and 1 positive relation and the product of signs is 
positive, thus balanced. Alternatively if Person 2 starts to dislike the Movie, so that the 
system contains 2 negative relations and 1 positive relation, it could also become a 
balanced system.  
The attractiveness of balance theory is in its simplicity and explanatory power. 
Unfortunately, the impact of balance theory has mainly been in the field of social 
psychology, apparently due to a misunderstanding that this theory deals only with 
interpersonal or social situations. This misunderstanding is partially due to the fact that 
Heider himself used interpersonal examples to demonstrate his theory and following 
researchers mainly applied balance theory to interpersonal or social situations. However, it 
should be noted that balance theory treats interpersonal or social situations from the 
Object 3 
Person 1 Person 2 
+ +  
+ 
 46
viewpoint of an individual, from how a particular individual make sense of his cognitions. 
That is, balance theory is proposed as a pure cognitive theory, but the object of the person’s 
cognition happens to be a social situation in Heider’s original book. Unfortunately, when 
later researchers applied and extended the theory, they basically ignored the fact that 
Heider’s logic works from the cognition of a single person. Cartwright and Harary stated: 
“Although Heider’s theory was originally intended to refer only to cognitive structures of 
an individual person, we propose that the definition of balance may be used generally in 
describing configurations of many different sorts, such as communication networks, power 
systems, sociometric structures, systems of orientations, or perhaps neural networks” (1956 
p.292). Undoubtedly, balance theory could be extended logically to all these situations, but 
the perspective of looking at situations should be based on the individual’s view of the 
situation rather than assuming an objective view that oversees the situation.  
It is observed that connectionist theories and consistency theories are quite consistent 
in terms of the basic theoretical assumptions on the tendency towards a harmonious state. It 
could be predicted that if applying a connectionist model to any Heider’s graph, it should 
give the same prediction of how that graph might change towards the direction of 
“harmony” as what Heider proposed. The reason is simple: a connectionist model defines a 
group of constraints that are implemented by the relations between nodes, which is what 
Heider did in the balance model. For example, “a likes b, b likes c” etc are set of constraints 
and the valence change is to maximize the consistency level of the system and 
simultaneously satisfy these constraints to a great extent. These two theories seem to 
predict very similar outcome, and although they use different underlying logics, they 
certainly bear some similarity in terms of how the system is defined in the first place, and 
how the system is likely to end up after either balancing in one model or the oscillation 
settling down in the other model.  
There are also some important differences between these two theories. First of all, 
connectionist models are used mainly to deal with complex networks while balance model 
was applied mainly in simpler networks. However, it should be noted that both theories are 
applicable to either large scale networks or small scale simpler networks. Second, the 
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underlying algorithm logic of most connectionist models is mainly weight propagation 
while balance model only deals with multiplication of signs and valence reversal. That is to 
say, connectionist theories accounts more for the fine difference of weights between 
associations while balance theory accounts more for the sudden Gestalt shifts in valence. 
Third, most connectionist theories use parallel processing algorithms where nodes and links 
are processed concurrently, while balance theory emphasizes the sequential processing 
where one closed cycle is processed after another one finished processing. Since balance 
theory is using a triad as the unit of analysis and computationally simpler, in the next 
chapter, I will mainly adapt balance theory to explain the phenomenon of conceptual 
combination in meaning construction.  
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Chapter 3   Theoretical Framework 
Remarkably, we can communicate complex thoughts through simple combinations of 
words because of our ability to build very complex meanings from smaller linguistic units 
(such as words) or conceptual units (such as single concepts). How is it possible that we 
can mentally construct complex meanings from smaller conceptual units? What is the 
process of this meaning construction? With the hope to shed some light on these 
fundamental issues in human communication, this research tackles the question: “how do 
conceptual interactions influence meaning construction in human communication?” 
In this research, a theoretical framework for understanding conceptual interaction in 
meaning construction is proposed. This framework is composed of two parts: the 
assumptions and the processes. 
3.1  The assumptions of conceptual interaction in meaning construction 
This research starts with a close observation of the function of language in human 
communication. Human language is a complex system composed lexicogrammatically of 
different elements: words, phrases, sentences, and discourses as a hierarchy. Single words 
and two-word combinations are fundamental to all the other elements, hence are the focus 
of the current research. Based on assumptions on how the meaning of a single word is 
conceptually represented, this research will focus on meaning construction of two-word 
combinations. More specifically, the research question of the current study can be 
reformulated as: how do conceptual representations of single words interact in a two-word 
combination to construct meaning? By addressing this question, this research will provide a 
foundation for understanding the meaning construction by other elements of language.  
The research question proposed here deals with a three-way relationship among 
language, meaning and human mind. Meaning is a function of the human mind. When we 
talk about the meanings of “table”, “democracy”, “go”, “beautiful”, or “above”, we 
psychologically experience them as mental images, or other forms of mental 
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representations, i.e., meaning is mentally represented. Unfortunately, these mental 
representations can only be experienced by a particular individual (the meaning-holder). 
They are not directly accessible to others. Language partially removes this barrier by 
allowing us to verbally describe as closely as possible our mental representations. The 
verbal description expresses a set of associations that the meaning triggers in our mind. 
Obviously, the verbal description does not equate to the mental representation: not all 
aspects in the mental representation are expressible verbally, and what is expressed verbally 
may not necessarily correspond to the form of the mental representation. Nevertheless, this 
verbal description is the only means by which people have access to the thoughts of others.  
It is important to note that the individual’s verbal description is an idiosyncratic 
version of the meaning particular to that individual at that time in that location. Then, how 
could we understand each other if the expressed meaning is so idiosyncratic? Meaningful 
communication is possible because words are associated with a relatively stable consensus 
meaning across population that historically has been formed across population. For 
example, for each one of us, the word4 “bird” might have slightly different meaning. Each 
one of us attributes to the word “bird” some idiosyncratic understanding that might be 
different from, contradictory, or complementary to another person’s understanding. 
However, in our speaking community, “bird” is associated with a consensus meaning that is 
relatively stable as a flying animal with wings, feathers and a beak (Figure 3-1 &Figure 3-
2). It should be noted that the two figures are not a representation of the individuals’ 
understanding of “bird”, but are at best empirical approximation to the consensus 
understanding of “bird”.  
Two basic questions need to be addressed when studying meaning: how meaning is 
represented and how meaning is constructed. The next two sections will discuss some basic 
assumptions about these two issues. 
                                                     
4 Words and concepts are closely related. Like much of the literature, this thesis will use these two 
terms interchangeably most of the time. 
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3.1.1 Assumptions about meaning representation 
This research starts from some basic assumptions regarding how meaning is 
represented mentally and extends this representation to knowledge and context. 
3.1.1.1  Meaning is mentally represented in the form of associations 
Meaning is mentally represented in the form of associations. For example, when we 
attribute certain meaning to the word “bird”, our mind triggers a lot of associations. 
Associations have many different forms such as images or concepts. Associative concepts 
are particularly relevant to human verbal communication, because these associative 
concepts are potentially expressible by some symbolic expressions such as words. In this 
thesis, I will call associative concepts as “associations”.  
The following figures are examples of associations we have when we interpret the 
meaning of “bird”. A set of associations is abstracted, and each association has a certain 
probability of appearing in the set, suggesting the degree of consensus of this association 
and the strength of its activation. (The number on the linking line is the strength of the 
association calculated as the percentage of the number of a particular association mentioned 
over the total number of associations mentioned by participants5). 
 
 
                                                     
5 These data were acquired from our pilot studies, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3-1: Associations of the concept bird: features.  
 
Figure 3-2: Associations of the concept bird: members of the bird category 
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Associations usually have three properties: strength, valence and direction. 
Depending on context, associations might be activated or non-activated (possible 
mental connections between concepts). For example, the above figures have many 
associations for bird; however, not all of them will be activated when bird is used to mean 
something specific during our communication. Similarly, some ‘new’ associations will be 
activated when we use bird to mean something specific in a certain communicative context. 
When associations are activated, there are different degrees of the strength of the activation. 
Some associations are strongly activated and others are weakly activated. For example, in 
certain context, fly / wings might be strongly activated while hollow bones / light bone 
structure is activated relatively weaker. Therefore, strength of association is defined as the 
potential for one concept to activate another. For example, in our figures, each association 
of bird is accompanied with an indicator of the association strength that was derived 
empirically. 
The valence6 of an association reflects the grouping ability of our mental structure. It 
is assumed that grouping, as a very basic cognitive activity, is one of the fundamental ways 
for us to make sense of the world. We group things together and make judgments of 
whether things go together on a certain basis. Valence of association is defined as the 
positive or negative tendency that a concept is grouped with another concept on a certain 
basis. For example, in our bird figures, the valence of each association is positive since 
they are all associated with the concept bird. Certainly, there are negative associations as 
well. For example, bird is not a mammal; or bat is not a member of bird category. We 
could imagine a limitless set of negative associative concepts that is composed by a pure 
opposite plus anything that is not positively associated with the target concept. It is 
assumed that because there are potentially many negative associations, they are not 
normally salient. However, when we combine two concepts, some negative associations 
                                                     
6  Different from some usage of the term valence, which mainly refers to sentimental relations, this 
research treats valence signifying the unit relationship.  
 53
might become salient when associations of two different concepts must interact with one 
another during the meaning construction.  
The third property of the association is the direction. Although the current framework 
on conceptual interactions will not implement this property, however, it could still be 
postulated that there are two possible senses for the association direction. One is that the 
direction of association refers to the traverse route of the cognition from one associative 
concept to another. For example, when activating associations for bird, we might think 
about fly then think about freedom. The traverse route from bird to fly to freedom indicates 
the direction of these associations. The other sense for direction of association is the 
asymmetrical probability of one concept being associated with another concept. That is to 
say, if concept A is highly probable as an association of the concept B (e.g. p=0.5), but B is 
less probable as an association of A (p=0.2), then, the direction of the association between 
A and B should be treated respectively: the direction from B to A has probability of 0.5 and 
the direction from A to B has probability of 0.2. The direction in this sense indicates the 
specific probability related to which concept activates which.  
The associations of a word / concept are not independent. There are logical relations 
between them. For example, in our pilot study, most of the participants mentioned that 
birds fly because they have wings and feathers. Unfortunately, our current graphic 
representation cannot represent these logical relations. Some kind of representation is yet to 
be developed that could capture both the associations and their logical relations.  
3.1.1.2 Associations are prototypical 
Concepts have prototypical structure (e.g. prototypes) in terms of its members and its 
associations. In this research, the term “prototypical” is used broader than the 
categorization literature in which the prototype often refers to a “best” example or a 
schematic representation of the category. Here, “prototypical” refers to the set of 
associations that are activated with highest degree of strength. For example, the 
prototypical associations of bird include a set of associations that are activated with highest 
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degree of strength: {animal, fly/glide, wing, feather, beak, lay eggs/hatched from egg etc., 
and bluejay, eagle, chicken, duck, robin, seagull, pigeon, hawk, etc}7. Here, the numeric 
threshold of judging highest degree is not pre-determined. Rather, it is a comparative and 
subjective judgment. By this conceptualization, prototypes and typicality are not longer 
singled out as a special entity or phenomena in this framework; on the contrary, they are 
incorporated into the same representational framework undergoing the same cognitive 
processing as ‘non-prototypes’ or ‘non-typicality’, i.e., they are all reflected via strength of 
activation. 
3.1.1.3 Context and knowledge are represented by mental associations 
We assume that meaning is a subset of the individual’s total knowledge activated by 
contextual situations. Two key terms need to be clarified in this definition: knowledge and 
context.  
Knowledge is a set of historically collected associations with some historically 
derived activation8 levels. For example, the meaning of bird, represented by a set of 
activated associations, is a subset of our total knowledge about bird. This knowledge is 
acquired historically through learning and experience. Historically, we learn about bird via 
various sources, and we experience bird directly and indirectly. What we have learned, or 
what we treat as knowledge, are the associations that the concept of bird could potentially 
activate. The strength of these associations is acquired historically as well. For example, for 
different people, light bone structure / hollow bones might have a quite different activation 
level than relatively small; and these different activation levels are derived historically from 
different learning and experience.  
                                                     
7 Due to the design of the pilot experiments, we have two sets of data: one on the properties of the 
thing that a concept denotes, the other on the examples of the things that a concept denotes. 
However, both properties and examples are associations of the concept. Based on our definition, the 
prototypical associations of the concept should include both. 
8  Here, activation means that the strength of the associations is adjusted above zero. 
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Meaning is context specific. Depending on context, associations might be activated or 
non-activated. For example, when I chat with a friend saying “I love birds”, the 
associations activated by the word “bird” is quite different from when I teach my son “this 
is a bird”. A context could be defined as a set of background information selectively 
attended to by the individual that is relevant to the communication. Its function is to add 
constraints on the meaning of the language. The more background information activated, 
the more constraints the context will exert. A context in this sense is not limited to 
information about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding 
utterances. Salient expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, 
anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs and perceptions about the mental 
state or intention of the individuals involved in the communication, may all play a role 
when constructing the meaning in communication. A subset of this background information 
is attended selectively by the individual for the purpose of processing information in  
communication. It is worth noting that the selection of the background information does not 
mean to choose information explicitly; rather, we may pay attention to certain background 
information based on particular goals. The organization of the individual’s knowledge 
structure, and the mental activity in which the individual is engaged, would limit the class 
of potential contexts from which an actual context can be attended to at any given time. 
This subset of background information would be combined with the new information in our 
cognition for the sense-making.  
Based on this analysis, context could be mentally represented as a set of activated 
associations selected by the individual. Clearly, in this framework the representation of 
context is identical to the representation of meaning: both are sets of activated associations 
organized into a cognitive field. This reflects the inseparable relationship between the 
meaning of a language element and the context in which this language element is used and 
understood. This also reflects the cognitive nature of both, in that, context is what we pay 
attention to as part of our cognitive representation of the meaning. When we construct the 
meaning of a language element, we activate a set of associations that could take the form of 
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associative concepts or other mental representations such as images. The context that we 
activate and attend to is just a part of this activated association set. 
3.1.2 Assumptions about meaning construction 
Based on the preceding view of how meaning is represented, we can proceed to 
answer the question of how meaning is constructed. 
3.1.2.1 Meaning is constructed through conceptual interactions 
In this research, the meaning of a certain language element is represented as a set of 
the activated associations. Meaning, therefore, refers to a mental state resulting from the 
interactions of associative concepts (i.e., conceptual interaction) in the communicative 
context. This definition emphasizes that meaning is constructed through conceptual 
interaction, i.e., the influence of associative concepts on each other. For example, for a two-
word combination such as “bird furniture”, the meaning is represented as the set of 
activated associations that come from the interactions between the two sets of associations 
that each word “bird” and “furniture” activates. 
Specifically, in conceptual combination, the assumption that meaning is constructed 
through conceptual interactions has three senses. Firstly, the meaning of the combination is 
a function of its simpler constituent concepts. Using Costello’s example of elephant fish, 
the meaning of this combination is a function of its constituent concepts elephant and fish. 
Each constituent concept provides the combination with the ‘raw materials’, from which 
the meaning of the combination is constructed. Secondly, the meaning of each constituent 
concept is a function of the other constituent. For example, in the combination bird 
furniture, the meaning of furniture depends on the meaning of bird and vice versa. That is, 
the meaning of furniture is not just about furniture in a pure sense; it is somehow 
associated with the other concept bird, so that furniture becomes meaningful in the bird 
context. Thirdly, the meaning of the simpler constituent concepts is a function of the 
compound concept. Using Thagard’s example, the meaning of the constituent concepts 
blind and lawyer is a function of the meaning of the compound concept blind lawyer. Thus, 
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blind would activate some associations that are somehow meaningful in the context of the 
combination blind lawyer. 
3.1.2.2 Meaning construction is goal directed 
It is assumed that meaning construction is a goal-directed cognitive act. For example, 
when we construct the meaning for a conceptual combination, the goal is to make sense of 
this combination. Usually in a meaning-holder’s mind, associations are activated 
selectively to represent and construct meaning for a certain purpose in a certain context. For 
example, when we construct the meaning for the combination zebra bird, not all we know 
about bird will be activated. Only those associations that are relevant to the context, 
contribute to the goal of the communication, and have acquired historically a higher degree 
of strength will be activated. That is, context, goals, and the intrinsic property of the 
concept are the three factors that influence association activation. These activated 
associations will influence each other and will ultimately construct the meaning for the 
combination.  
It should be noted here that the term “activation” has two senses in the framework. 
On the one hand, for a single concept, it refers to the strength of the associations of our 
general knowledge independent of the communicative context. For example, in figure 3-1 
and figure 3-2, associations are activated based on our general knowledge of the concept 
bird independent of immediate communicative context. On the other hand, in conceptual 
combination, it refers to the strength of the associations activated for a specific 
communicative goal – to make sense of the combination in a certain context. In this sense, 
associations activated are a subset of our general knowledge, and the activation of this 
subset guarantees the satisfaction of the goal. For example, to construct the meaning for the 
combination elephant fish as “a big fish”, one association “big” is activated by elephant 
from among many other general knowledge associations.  
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3.1.2.3 The roles of head and modifier are different 
Since the focus of this research is on meaning construction of two-word 
combinations, it is necessary to discuss one unique feature of two word combinations. 
When constructing the meaning of a two-word combination, one word usually serves 
psychologically as the head concept which refers to the central concept that, if standing 
alone, could represent the whole category denoted by the combination. The other is the 
modifier concept which is used to change some aspects of the head concept. For example, 
when denoting a bird with stripes, we could say it is a zebra bird. Bird represents the basic 
category to which the thing we are referring belongs (the psychological head) while zebra 
modifies this central concept along some finer dimensions (the psychological modifier). It 
is worth noting that the grammatical head (Cohen & Murphy 1984; Murphy 1988) and the 
psychological head are not necessarily the same. Grammatically, the head of a two-word 
combination is always the second word while the first word in the sequence is the modifier 
(Murphy 2002 p.444). Using Murphy’s example, the grammatical head of stone squirrel is 
squirrel while stone functions as the grammatical modifier. Psychologically, when people 
construct the meaning of the combination, the more central concept in the construction is 
usually treated as the head concept, and the concept that changes some aspects of the head 
is usually treated as the modifier concept. For example, as noticed by Costello that when 
chair ladder refers to a chair being used as a ladder, chair is the psychological head that is 
central to the meaning of this combination; and ladder used as the modifier, modifies some 
aspects of chair. Clearly, this is different from grammatical division where the word 
“ladder” is always the grammatical head because of its syntactic position. This mismatch 
sometimes confuses people when they construct a meaning for a combination. For example, 
in our pilot study of the phrase “furniture bird”, about half of the participants treated 
furniture as the head (psychologically, but not grammatically) by referring to the object 
denoted as a kind of furniture, and the remaining half treated bird as the head (both 
psychologically and grammatically) by referring to the object denoted as a kind of bird.  
As the central concept in the combination, the psychological head brings in most of 
its associations, while the modifier contributes much fewer associations for the 
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combination. That is, the combination will inherit more of its associations from the head 
concept than from the modifier concept. For example, when chair ladder is understood as 
“a kind of chair that could be used to climb up and down”, chair functions as the head 
concept and brings in most of its associations while ladder only brings in certain 
associations such as “climb up and down” for the combination. Thus, the combination 
denotes something that has more characteristics of chair than ladder. However, it should be 
noted that the number of associations contributing to the combination by head or modifier 
is different from the importance of associations contributing to the combination. Though 
the modifier concept contributes fewer associations to the combination, the ones it 
contributes may be quite important. In the chair ladder case, the gestalt image of the 
combination is much more like a chair than a ladder, but somehow, ladder’s one 
association “climb up and down” has an important effect on this gestalt image relative to 
the associations activated by chair. That is, the psychological head will bring in more 
associations for the combination, but the psychological modifier will bring in one or two 
very important associations for the combination. In this sense, the importance or 
diagnosticity of an association is not pre-determined by component concept alone, as 
assumed by Hampton. On the contrary, the importance of an association is a function of the 
combination. In the chair ladder example, many ‘important’ associations of chair become 
less important because of the combination.   
3.2 The processes of conceptual interaction in meaning construction 
Based on the views and assumptions in the previous section, we now focus on the 
cognitive processes of meaning construction.  
There are two basic elements in our framework: concepts (component concepts and 
associative concepts) and the links between concepts. A geometric representation 
composed of nodes and links could be drawn for these basic elements (Figure 3-3). The 
nodes in this graph represent concepts and the lines represent the linking property, such as 
strength and valence. 
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Figure 3-3:   A geometric representation of concepts and associations 
We propose that meaning is constructed through conceptual interactions, whereby 
each component concept in a conceptual combination influences the other. We further 
propose that the components in the triplet composed of two component concepts and their 
associations interact in organized patterns through which meaning and thoughts are 
structured dynamically9. This theoretical orientation demonstrates the characteristics of a 
Gestalt treatment of configurations and fields in human cognition. A gestalt is "a system 
whose parts are dynamically connected in such a way that a change in one part results in a 
change of all other parts" (Lewin, 1936, p. 218). This dynamic system is tension driven and 
strives toward equilibrium. When the system is perturbed (as in disequilibrium), a tension 
or a force is developed which leads to a psychological tendency towards the reduction of 
tension and the restoration of equilibrium. Based on this view, we assume that when we 
construct meaning in our communication, we experience concepts and associations as a 
cognitive field, within which conceptual interactions take place. In the following sections, I 
will first discuss the characteristics of the cognitive field and then discuss the processes of 
conceptual interactions. 
3.2.1 Cognitive field for conceptual interactions 
There are several important characteristics of the cognitive field: the field is a Gestalt; 
the basic unit of the field is a triangle, and the field should be balanced. 
                                                     
9  Different from schematic structure, here the structure is dynamic in that the meaning and thoughts 
are structured online dynamically, rather than pre-determined or pre-defined. 
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3.2.1.1 Cognitive field is a Gestalt 
The cognitive field is a Gestalt with figure-ground properties. Figure is the 
spontaneous concentration of our cognition in contrast to those that we do not attend (the 
ground) at that moment. In conceptual interaction, component concepts and their activated 
associations form a figure, standing apart from background knowledge comprised of 
potential or latent associative concepts or weaker associations. This basic grouping of 
activated vs. latent concepts and strongly-associated vs. weaker-associated concepts forms 
the figure-ground segregation of the field. For example, when constructing the meaning of 
furniture bird, not all associative concepts of furniture or bird are activated, and not all 
associations are of equal strength. Therefore, during meaning construction, the activated 
associations form a figure against the background of all possible associations that could be 
activated.  
The Gestalt organization of the cognitive field is dynamic. We are capable of 
restructuring the figure / ground relationship based on our focus of attention, which is 
influenced by our intentions, cognitive goals or needs, in a given situation.  Thus, this 
figure-ground segregation is goal-directed. Based on the current goal, concepts and 
associations would change their linkage, change the strength of activation, and even change 
their valence.  Understanding the meaning of a conceptual combination, therefore, 
corresponds with structuring the figure in the cognitive field so as to arrive at the goal state.  
It is proposed that arriving the goal state is a multi-step activity where each step might have 
its own figure/ground segregation. 
3.2.1.2 Basic unit of cognitive field is a triangle 
Graphically, the cognitive field is represented as a network of nodes and links in the 
form of cycles (drawing from Heider’s representation system). The basic elements of the 
field are concepts and links between concepts, graphically represented as nodes and links. 
The smallest constitutive unit of the cognitive field is a pair of 2 concepts and a link 
between them, graphically represented as 2 nodes and a link. However, it is assumed that of 
particular importance in meaning construction is a closed cycle, representing a closed loop 
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from component A to component B via certain associative concepts C, D, E, etc. The 
simplest closed cycle, sharing properties of all closed cycles, is a triangle. As the basic unit 
of the cognitive field, triangle is our focus of attention (3 concepts with 3 links, also called 
triplet). That is, a triangle is assumed to be the unit of analysis in the cognitive field for 
conceptual interactions, because it is the smallest closed cycle. At any given time, our 
cognition will mainly focus on one triangle configuration as the figure while pushing other 
triangles to the background.  
It should be noted that forming a closed cycle indicates that our cognition establishes 
links between two component concepts via some associative concepts. Cycle formation is 
based on the pre-existing knowledge of the component concepts and sometimes, it may 
take a longer path (i.e., require more intermediate associative concepts) in order to establish 
a link between the two component concepts.  
We perceive the cognitive field based on certain organizing bases, which could be 
analytically understood that our cognition partitions concepts and associations into groups 
of triangles using certain organizing bases and valence of these associations are perceived 
based on this grouping. For any particular triangle configuration, the organizing base will 
determine the valences assigned to the links connecting the 3 nodes. For example, if the 
organizing base for grouping the concepts of apple, red and green is “are they colors of 
apple?”, then, the valences are assigned as in the following graph (Figure 3-4), which is 
understood as: red is a color of apple; green is a color of apple; in terms of both being 





Figure 3-4: Grouping red, green, & apple based on the organizing base “are they colors of apple” 
If the organizing base is “are they the same color for apple”, the valence is assigned 
to the following graph (Figure 3-5) which is understood as: red is a color for apple; green is 
a color for apple; red is not the same color as green. 
 
 
Figure 3-5:  Grouping red, green, & apple based on the organizing base “are they the same color for 
apple” 
 
When assigning valence to links in a conceptual combination, it is assumed that there 
is always a positive link between the two component concepts in the two-word 
combination, because these two words are now forced to combine as a new phrase. For 
example, when we graph the combination elephant fish, a positive valence exists for the 




Figure 3-6: Positive valence between two component concepts: elephant & fish 
The bases for organizing different triangles in a cognitive field could be different. 
However, it is assumed that our cognition uses as few organizing bases as possible for the 
cognitive field. For example, a certain cognitive field could be constructed for the 
combination elephant fish (Figure 3-7). 
 
 
Figure 3-7: A certain cognitive field for elephant fish. Dotted lines represent the implicit knowledge 
we have that is not directly salient10 
How should valence be assigned to the links in this graph? First of all, a positive 
valence is assigned to the link between fish and elephant because these two component 
concepts are now combined (Figure 3-7). There are a few triangles in the graph and based 
                                                     
10 Salient association is somewhat different from prototypical association. Prototypical association 
is a description of the conceptual structure drawn from the background knowledge, while salience is 
a degree of activation of associations in communication as an immediate experience. They are 
equivalent given a unit of a concept or a combination of a concept. For example, the prototypical 
associations of a given concept would be salient associations; and the prototypical associations of a 
given conceptual combination would be salient associations as well. However, the salient 
associations of a conceptual combination do not necessarily correspond to the prototypical 
associations of component concepts. For example, when tasty computer is understood as “chocolate 
shaped like a computer”, shape is a very salient association of this combination. However, shape is 
 
 65
on our assumptions, we only attend to one at a time. For triangle Δsize-small-big, if the 
organizing base is the fact that both small and big are “sizes”, then the valence should be 
assigned as follows: (Figure 3-8) 
 
Figure 3-8: Valence assignment alternative 1 for triangle size-small-big 
However, in this field, the triangle Δsize-small-big is embedded in a context of fish 
and elephant, thus, the organizing bases should be “are they same size for elephant and 
fish?” Then, the valence should be assigned as follows: (Figure 3-9. Dotted lines denote 
that they are not in current figure). 
 
Figure 3-9: Valence assignment alternative 2 for triangle size-small-big 
 
Of the remaining triangles, the simplest assignment is based on the “is” relationship: 
fish is small; fish is big; elephant is small; elephant is big (Figure 3-10).  
                                                                                                                                                                 
not a prototypical association of either component concept.  
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Figure 3-10: Valence assignment for the cognitive field of elephant fish (I) 
However, the meaning of small in “fish is small” is different from in “elephant is 
small” since small is a relative concept. That is to say, small fish is quite different from 
small elephant in terms of sizes. Independent of elephant, fish could be small as well as 
big; and independent of fish, elephant could be small as well as big. However, in the 
context of the combination elephant fish, big / small acquires a very specific meaning, i.e., 
now big / small is meaningful in relation to the context of elephant fish. That is, in isolated 
cases, big / small is only relative to elephant or only relative to fish. But in combination, 
big / small is relative to a context of two concepts. In this context, fish is comparatively 
smaller than elephant; and elephant is comparatively bigger than fish. Thus, to be 
consistent with the meaning of small or big in this context, the link between fish and big 
should be negative, i.e., fish is big not in the same sense that elephant is big. Similarly, the 
link between elephant and small should be negative, i.e., elephant is small not in the same 







Figure 3-11: Valence assignment for the cognitive field of elephant fish (II) 
 
3.2.1.3 Cognitive field should be balanced 
Generally speaking, the cognitive field should be balanced. If not, forces or tension 
will be generated to change the field into a balanced state. As defined by Heider, “by a 
balanced state (or situation) is meant a harmonious state, one in which the entities 
comprising the situation and the feelings about them fit together without stress” (Heider 
1958 p. 180). Mathematically, when there are three entities linked together in a triangle, a 
balanced state exists if the product of signs is positive, i.e., when all three links are positive 
or when two are negative and one positive (Heider, 1958).  However, Heider treated 
balance as an absolute concept and restricted his analysis to binary cases in which a triangle 
was either balanced or imbalanced. In this research, balance will be defined as a variable 
with a scale of degree from less balanced to more balanced. Thus, if Vi represents the 
valence of the ith association and Si represents the strength of the ith association, then, 
balance is defined as the product of Vi and Si (where Vi ∈ [+1, -1] and 0 ≤ Si ≤ +1). For 
example, in a triangle Δa-b-c, balance is defined as the product of every valence and 
strength of the three associations (Figure 3-12), i.e.,  





Figure 3-12: Balance Operationalization 
Here, balance indicates how strongly an association could link the two component 
concepts in a closed cycle11. In the above equation, we assume point C is the association of 
the component concept B that could form a closed loop with the other component concept 
A in the combination AB. Thus, it is clear that balance indicates the degree of the strength 
that an association (in this example, C) activated by one component concept (in this 
example, B) could be linked to the other component concept (in this example, A).  
We assume that the network reflecting links among all the associations (activated & 
potential) of a single concept is always in a balanced state. That is, the knowledge about a 
single concept is in a balanced state. For example, the cognitive field of bird and its 
associations (Figure 3-1) are assumed to be in a balanced state.  
For a cognitive field larger than single concept, the basic hypothesis is that there is a 
tendency for the network of the cognitive units to achieve a balanced state. “If a balanced 
state does not exist, then forces toward this state will arise… If a change is not possible, the 
state of imbalance will produce tension” (Heider, 1958, p. 201). When tension caused by 
imbalance arises in the mind of the individual, the individual is likely to exercise some 
mental effort to reduce the tension as much as possible. 
                                                     
11  In Cartwright & Harary (1956) p.288, the degree of balance of an s-graph is defined as the 
amount of balance possessed by an unbalanced s-graph, i.e., degree of balance = the ratio of the 
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The cognitive field is balanced in a cognitively efficient manner. In theory, it is 
possible to form a balanced cycle between two component concepts through many different 
associative concepts; some are simple while others are quite complicated. Out of these 
possible cycles, we would always tend to choose the ones that are most convenient (easiest 
or quickest to form a closed cycle). It should be noted that we do not necessarily take the 
one that is maximally balanced; instead, it is more likely that we take the first one that is 
above a certain threshold, although we do not know empirically what that threshold is.  
3.2.2 Cognitive steps in conceptual interactions 
Having characterized the properties of the cognitive field, it is proposed that the 
following cognitive steps are involved in conceptual interactions to construct the meaning 
of a combination. Analytically, the conceptual interaction is achieved through four steps: 1. 
perceiving head and modifier; 2. activating associations to form a closed cycle; 3. balancing 
the cycle; 4. strengthening balance. However, it is important to note that these four steps 
are divided analytically for convenience of presentation only and should not be taken to 
imply a sharp and clear segregation between steps or that they happen in a linear sequential 
way. On the contrary, it is assumed that these four steps are always interwoven with one 
another and might happen concurrently.  
3.2.2.1 Perceiving head and modifier 
Perceiving head and modifier refers to the mental processing that each component 
concept in a conceptual combination is perceived as playing the role of (psychological) 
head or modifier. This perception is firstly based on the grammatical constraints of the 
language. In the English language, the first word in the sequence is normally the modifier 
and the second word is normally the head. If this interpretation is not working (judged by 
                                                                                                                                                                 
number of positive cycles to the total number of cycles. Clearly, what I defined as the degree of 
balance is different from what Cartwright & Harary defined “degree of balance”. 
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the following steps), a reverse interpretation is given, i.e., the first word in the sequence is 
treated as head and the second word as the modifier.  
As we explained, psychologically, the distinction between the head and modifier is 
that the head concept normally keeps most of its associations as default (activated or not), 
which are assumed to be in a balanced state. In contrast, the modifier may only contribute 
one or two of its associations to the meaning of the combination. The associations 
contributed by modifier is used and processed by later steps. As the example chair ladder 
shows, when ladder is interpreted to be the head and chair to be the modifier, most of the 
ladder’s associations are kept while only one or two associations of chair are used to 
construct the meaning, i.e., we are exploring the meaning of “a ladder (with some 
properties of a chair)”. On the other hand, when chair is interpreted to be the head and 
ladder to be the modifier, most of the chair’s associations are kept while only one or two 
associations of ladder are used to construct the meaning, i.e., we are exploring the meaning 
of “a chair (with some properties of a ladder)”.  
3.2.2.2 Activating associations to form a closed cycle 
Activating associations to form a closed cycle refers to the mental processing that 
each component concept activates its own set of associations selectively in order to form a 
cognitive field (graphically represented as a cycle). There are four general properties for 
association activation. 
First, the activation is goal-directed. As we assumed, meaning construction is a goal-
directed action. Here, the goal of association activation is to make sense of the 
combination, i.e., to understand how the meaning of the two component concepts can fit 
together harmoniously. Analytically, it equates to forming a balanced cycle from one 
component concept to the other. That is to say, only those associations that are necessary 
for constructing a (possibly) balanced cycle are activated consciously. If from the 
perspective of the individual, a highly prototypical association cannot satisfy the goal, it 
will be either not activated or dropped from the set of activated associations. For example, 
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when the meaning of the combination elephant fish is understood as “a big fish”, some 
highly prototypical associations of elephant (e.g. trunk) are either not activated or dropped 
from the set of activated associations for the reason that for some people it is impossible to 
construct a potentially balanced cycle from elephant to trunk, and then from trunk to fish 
(the triangle elephant-trunk-fish does not fit together harmoniously). For these people, it is 
highly improbable for a fish to have a trunk even though trunk is very typical of elephant. 
The associations they attend to and activate are those that are already balanced for them, or 
can be balanced for them.   
Second, the activation is contingent. There are two senses of contingency when 
activating associations to form a closed cycle: one, the meaning of each constituent concept 
is a function of the other constituent; and two, the meanings of the simpler constituent 
concepts are a function of the compound concept. For the first sense of contingency, the 
probability of one concept’s association being activated depends on the other concept’s 
activated associations. For example, when constructing the meaning of the combination 
elephant fish, elephant will activate a subset of its associations in relation to the other 
concept fish. A different subset of associations will be activated if, say, elephant is paired 
with the concept cage in the combination elephant cage. Similarly, because of the presence 
of the concept elephant, fish will activate certain associations that are different from, say, 
those that will be activated when fish is paired with ocean in the combination ocean fish. 
Empirically, we hope to demonstrate that the set of associations activated for the concept of 
fish or elephant is different in the context of different combinations such as elephant fish, 
ocean fish and elephant cage. For the second sense of contingency, the associations 
activated by each component concept are contingent upon the existence of the combination. 
That is, as a Gestalt, the combination influences how we understand the meaning of its 
components. As an example, the meaning of polysemous or homonymous words such as 
“bank” is influenced by the sentence in which the word is used: “I went to the bank of 
Yangtze River which was just merged with TD Canada” vs. “I went to the bank of Yangtze 
River over which a bridge was just constructed” . Here, the meaning of the constituent 
concept bank is clearly a function of the total meaning of each sentence. 
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Third, the activation is prototypical. The activation of an association is a function of 
the prototypicality of the associations. That is to say, the intrinsic property of the 
component concept itself influences association activation. The activation of associations is 
always from high-strength (more prototypical) associations to lower strength (less 
prototypical) associations. For example, when elephant is used in combinations such as 
elephant fish, high-strength associations of elephant such as “trunk, big, grey etc” will 
likely be activated before lower strength associations (such as sex, ears to cool itself, etc) 
are activated. It could be postulated that, other things being equal, an association activated 
with higher strength by at least one of the component concepts will be more likely to be 
activated high when constructing the meaning of combination. For example, the meaning of 
the combination triangular computer could be constructed as “a triangular-shaped 
computer”. Because shape is a prototypical association of triangular, its relative strength is 
carried over to the combination too. Even though shape may be a very weak association of 
computer, it will still become a relatively high strength association for the combination 
triangular computer. However, if this highly prototypical association cannot form a 
balanced cycle, it will be dropped from the set of activated associations and a less 
prototypical association will be activated. As the example of elephant fish showed, if it can 
not be understood as a fish with trunk, then even though trunk is a highly prototypical 
association for elephant, it will be dropped from the set of activated associations. 
Fourth, the activation is cognitively efficient. For example, many associations of 
elephant could be activated for further processing, and it is easy to list such associations: 
trunk, large, grey, be eaten etc. Then why should not the meaning of elephant fish be 
constructed as “a large grey fish with a trunk that eats elephants”?  That is, this particular 
understanding of the combination elephant fish has many elephant associations while still 
being a fish.  In theory, it is possible to use multiple associations of the modifier that could 
form balanced contingent cycles with fish to construct the meaning of elephant fish. 
However, it is assumed that the amount of cognitive effort required to balance a cognitive 
field increases with the complexity of the field. That is to say, the more elephant 
associations are brought into the cognitive field, the more cognitive work is required to 
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make everything consistent. Thus, a simpler constructed meaning that requires less 
cognitive effort is likely to be perceived as a good enough meaning in most cases. 
However, in cases where multiple associations of the modifier are used, it could be 
postulated that they should make for a better example of the combination than when a 
single association of the modifier is used.  For example, “a large grey fish with a trunk” 
should be judged as a better example of an elephant fish than just “a grey fish”.  
After associations are activated to form closed cycles, these cycles need to be 
balanced. 
3.2.2.3 Balancing closed cycle 
Balancing closed cycle refers to the mental processing that activated associations are 
formed into closed cycle and checked for its balance state; and if not balanced, some 
cognitive mechanisms (reverse valence, change strength, and / or activate nth-order 
associations) are implemented to balance the cycle.  
To check the balance state is to feel whether or not “the entities comprising the 
situation and the feelings about them fit together without stress” (Heider 1958 p. 180). 
Mathematically, it equates to deciding whether or not the product of signs of cycle links is 
positive. As we assumed, our focus of attention is always on the smallest closed cycle: a 
triangle. Thus, a balanced state for a triangle exists if all three links are positive or if two 
are negative and one positive. For example, when constructing the meanings of the 
combination elephant fish, the concept elephant will activate certain associations that are 
cognitively efficient, prototypical and possible to form a closed cycle. There might be 
numerous associations that might satisfy these conditions. I will use a couple of them as the 
examples to demonstrate the process of balancing.  
Possibly, one of such associations is big. Contingently, fish will activate small 





Figure 3-13: Balancing the cognitive field for elephant fish: via big (I) 
In this graph, there are four nodes and six links (L). As we analyzed previously,  
• Lelephant-fish has positive valence and strong strength due to the fact that these two 
concepts are now combined.  
• Lfish-small has positive valence because generally fish is small. 
• Lelephant-big has positive valence because generally elephant is big.  
• Lsmall-big has negative valence and strong strength because small is definitely different 
from big in the context of comparing size of elephant and fish. 
• L fish-big has negative valence because fish is not big in the same sense that elephant is 
big in the triangle Δelephant-fish-big. 
• L elephant-small has negative valence because elephant is not small in the same sense that 
fish is small in the triangle Δelephant-fish-small. 
Apparently, this is not a balanced cycle overall because it has 2 imbalanced triangles: 
Δelephant-fish-big and Δelephant-fish-small and 2 balanced triangles: Δfish-small-big 
(meaning “fish is small, not big) and Δelephant-big-small (meaning “elephant is big, not 
small). Based on our postulation, there should be a tendency to change the field into a 
balanced state by changing the valence of one or more associations. 
We further postulate that change will first happen in the weaker link (lower strength), 
and the change should reduce the number of the unbalanced triangles rather than create 
more unbalanced triangles. Thus, one of such feasible changes in the two imbalanced 
triangles is to change the valence of the link L fish-big (dotted line) and the link L fish-small 
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(dotted line) so that all 4 triangles are balanced and the whole structure is in balance as well 
(Figure 3-14). This kind of change is through reversing valence of certain associations so 
that the cycle becomes balanced. When a cycle is balanced, we will say the system reaches 
a stable state and the conceptual interaction is finished with a resultant meaning 
constructed. In this case, the resultant meaning is “elephant fish is a big fish”. 
 
Figure 3-14: Balancing the cognitive field for elephant fish via big (II) 
 
This graph could be understood as follows (based on the four triangles):  
• Elephant fish is big (triangle Δelephant-fish-big) 
• Elephant fish is not small (triangle Δelephant-fish-small) 
• Fish is big, not small because small is not big (triangle Δfish-big-small) 
• Elephant is big, not small because small is not big (triangle Δelephant-big-small) 
Another possible association activated might be trunk when elephant fish is 
understood as “a fish with trunk” (Figure 3-15). Here, elephant and fish have a strong 
positive link L elephant-fish because these two words are now combined. Trunk as a 
prototypical association of elephant has a very strong positive link Lelephant-trunk with 
elephant. The only (comparatively) weaker link is the negative link Lfish-trunk between fish 





Figure 3-15: Balancing the cognitive field for elephant fish via trunk 
Apparently, this is not a balanced structure, so the structure will generate a cognitive 
force driving changes from the imbalanced state to a balanced one. The most feasible 
change here is to change / reverse the valence of the weaker link Lfish-trunk (Figure 3-15) so 
that fish could now be positively linked to trunk (hence the meaning “elephant fish is a fish 
with trunk” is constructed).  
The third possible association activated to construct the meaning of elephant fish 
might be when it was understood as “a fish that eats elephant” (Figure 3-16). In this graph, 
elephant and fish has a strong positive link L elephant-fish. Eat as the association of both fish 
and elephant (positive links: L fish-eat and L elephant-eat) has the potential to form a closed 
cycle, thus might be activated saliently. Since the product of the links is positive, it is a 
balanced triangle and a meaning is constructed. Because the head of the combination 
elephant fish is fish, the meaning constructed is “elephant fish is a fish that eats elephant”. 
Interestingly, this graphical representation also suggests another meaning. If for some 
reason, elephant were regarded as the head (e.g. the combination is fish elephant), then the 







Figure 3-16: Balancing the cognitive field for elephant fish via eat 
The above three examples demonstrate that balance could be achieve by valence 
reversal and how various meanings could be potentially constructed for the combination 
elephant fish. However, these meaning constructions are not equally probable in our mind. 
When we activate associations to form a cognitive field, the activation should be goal-
directed, contingent, prototypical, and cognitively efficient. Clearly, all the associations 
activated in the above three examples are goal-directed contingent activations (i.e., to form 
a closed cycle with the other pairing concept). They can all form some closed cycle by 
activating corresponding associations. However, these associations are not all equally 
prototypical or equally cognitively efficient. For example, eat is probably less prototypical 
than big or trunk for the concept elephant. Thus, it could be predicted that the meaning 
“elephant fish is a fish that eats elephants” is less likely to be constructed than the meanings 
“elephant fish is a big fish” or “elephant fish is a fish with trunk”. This phenomenon could 
be explained using our definition of balance. 
As we defined, in a triangle Δa-b-c, Balance (B) = (Vab*Sab)*(Vac*Sac)*(Vbc*Sbc). 
Thus, the balance value of the above examples12 before the valence change (before the 
cycles are balanced) could be calculated as (Figure 3-17):  
Btrunk = (Vfish-elephant*Sfish-elephant)*(Velephant-trunk*Selephant-trunk)*(Vfish-trunk*Sfish-trunk), 
                                                     
12 When the meaning of “elephant fish” is constructed as “a fish that eats elephant”, the direction of 
the link actually functions. However, the current framework did not incorporate direction when 
defining balance, thus this meaning is not including in the following discussion. 
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Bbig = (Vfish-elephant*Sfish-elephant)*(Velephant-big*Selephant-big)*(Vfish-big*Sfish-big), 
where13, Vfish-elephant=+1, Sfish-elephant=+1, Velephant-trunk=+1, Vfish-trunk=-1, Velephant-big=+1, Vfish-big=-1. 
Thus, the above formulas could be shortened as: 
Btrunk = Selephant-trunk *(-1)*Sfish-trunk = - Selephant-trunk *Sfish-trunk 
Bbig = Selephant-big*(-1)*Sfish-big = - Selephant-big*Sfish-big 
 
 
Figure 3-17: Elephant fish – meaning selection based on balance value 
This formulation permits a few predictions on the process of conceptual interaction. 
For example, if trunk and big are equally prototypical associations of elephant (Selephant-
trunk= Selephant-big), then, it could be postulated that the probability of using either association 
(big or trunk) as the final meaning of the combination is in direct relation to the degree of 
balance of this association, i.e., other things being equal, the more balanced an association 
is, the more probable this association will be selected as the meaning of the combination. 
Based on this prediction, under the above conditions, if Sfish-big is higher than Sfish-trunk, big 
will be more likely to be selected as the meaning of the combination than trunk. Certainly, 
                                                     
13 The details of getting the strength of an association will be discussed in the method section. Here, 
we will assume a weight of 1 and positive valence for the association between two component 
concepts. 
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there might be other predictions that are of interest to the research. It will be worthwhile to 
further explore the potential predictions using this way of theorizing. 
Our next example demonstrates that balance could be achieved by changing strength 
of activated associations and by activating nth-order associations.  Based on our 
postulations, concepts will activate their associations contingently in order to form a 
balanced cycle. When constructing the meaning of tasty computer, let us assume that none 
of the prototypical associations of either concept easily form a closed cycle for balancing.  
That is, the first order activations (the associative concepts activated directly by the 
component concepts) can not form a path linking the two concepts. Then a second order 
activation (the associative concepts activated by the activated first order associations) will 
be activated in order to form a possible path from head to modifier. We postulate that when 
the first order activation cannot form a closed cycle, our cognition will activate second 
order (or third order, etc.) associations in order to form a closed cycle for balancing. In this 
example (among many other possible understandings), let us assume that chocolate, as a 
first order association of tasty, is activated with strong strength. Further, moldable or shape 
as associations of chocolate (i.e., second order associations of tasty) are activated in order 
to form a closed cycle with computer. Shape in this example represents a feasible, though 
very weak, first order association of computer that enables a closed cycle to be formed. 
Because of this potential for shape to satisfy the goal of this cognitive activity, the strength 
of shape increases significantly for computer and becomes very salient association for tasty 
computer. Thus, a closed cycle is constructed logically and feasibly from tasty to computer: 
tasty-chocolate-(moldable)-shape-computer, and the meaning “tasty computer is a 
chocolate shaped like a computer or a chocolate in the shape of a computer” is constructed 




Figure 3-18: Balancing the cognitive field for tasty computer via second order associations 
It is proposed that balancing includes two processes: checking the balance state of the 
cognitive field, and (if not balanced,) certain cognitive mechanisms such as valence 
reversal, strength change, and nth-order association activation are implemented to balance 
the field. However, it should be noted that balancing, especially valence reversal, requires a 
lot of cognitive efforts afterwards as explained in the next section.  
3.2.2.4 Strengthening balance 
It is worth noting that, with the specific proposals on how to change the field from an 
imbalanced state to a balanced one, Heider concluded that “the situation can be made 
harmonious” by a change in valence (valence reversal). This is a correct observation based 
on his operationalization of balance. In Heider’s examples, systems are balanced because 
balance was operationalized mathematically as the positive product of valence. However, at 
the same time, as a psychological concept, balance is defined by Heider as “a harmonious 
state, one in which the entities comprising the situation and the feelings about them fit 
together without stress” (Heider 1958 p. 180). It is easy to see the discrepancies in this 
definition of balance and the Heider’s operationalization of the concept mathematically. 
Does the mathematical balance equate to psychological balance? Using Heider’s example, 
“Let us suppose p likes o, and p perceives or hears that o has done something, which we 
call x… x may be something which is negative for p…..imbalance results: the triad 
contains two positive relations (o U x), (p L o) and one negative relation (p DL x). This is 
an unpleasant situation for p. Tension will arise and forces will appear to annul the tension. 
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The situation can be made harmonious either by a change in the sentiment relations or in 
the unit relations. (For example, to) change in sentiment relations, p can begin to feel that x 
is really not so bad, thereby producing a triad of three positive relations” (1958 pp.207 – 
209). However, after p begins to feel that x is really not so bad, thereby producing a triad of 
three positive relations as suggested by Heider that is mathematically balanced, does p 
really feel harmonious psychologically?  Psychologically, the shift from a feeling of 
disliking x to a feeling of liking x (a valence reversal) seems too easy and too quick. Using 
another Heider’s example, if “p worships o; o told a lie; p disapproves of lying” (Heider 
1958 p. 203), by feeling that lying “is really not so bad”, can p feel harmonious now? 
Mathematically, a change from negative sign to a positive sign is quick and easy; however, 
psychologically, a change from “dislike lying” to “like lying” is not as easy and quick as 
flipping a sign (Figure 3-19). 
 
Figure 3-19: Valence reversal for balancing network of p-o-lying 
 
It is quite clear that even after a cognitive field is balanced mathematically by valence 
reversal, there is still some psychological discomfort or imbalance remaining in the field. In 
the above example, after feeling that lying “is really not so bad”, it might take p a while and 
require some additional cognitive effort to really feel that “the entities comprising the 
situation and the feelings about them fit together without stress” (Heider 1958 p. 180).  
Based on this analysis, even if elephant fish could be mathematically balanced as “a fish 
with trunk”, there may still be some psychological imbalance left in the field and felt by 
people. That is to say, psychologically, we do not feel balanced or harmonious toward this 
constructed meaning. The remaining feeling of imbalance comes from a larger cognitive 
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field that the specific constructed meaning is part of. That is, although the field of “a fish 
with trunk” could be balanced, a larger cognitive field that involves our knowledge (other 
associations) of fish might be inconsistent with the balanced field; thus, there are still a 
tension between the constructed meaning and a larger field (our knowledge). In this 
circumstance, it is likely that further cognitive effort will be exerted to strengthen the 
degree of balance and thereby reduce the remaining tension. 
Strengthening balance refers to the mental processing that rationalizes, strengthens or 
weakens the associations in the activated cognitive field to increase the degree of balance. 
It is assumed that whenever a change happens in the cognitive field, there is always some 
remaining tension associated with this change, and there is always a need to provide further 
information to reduce the tension. The need to provide further information is to increase 
additional loops / cycles by activating additional associations. These newly activated 
additional associations will form new links between the activated associations of the two 
concepts. These additional loops will change the strength of the association that are still felt 
somewhat discomfort. Though I do not have a specific theory on the cognitive mechanism 
on strengthening, various methods such as PDP or weight propagation may explain this 
process.  
Two kinds of strengthening could be postulated: a). strengthening some activated 
associations as more salient and weakening other non-reconcilable associations, b). 
providing additional associations that reconcile the possible tension that the newly modified 
associations might bring in. Essentially, these two kinds of strengthening imply one 
mechanism – to change the strength of the associations in the cognitive field.  
For example, if the meaning of the combination elephant fish is somehow constructed 
as “a fish with trunk”, it may be in conflict with our general knowledge of what a fish is. 
This tension could be resolved by strengthening the modified associations in the cycle. 
More specifically, tension could be reduced by providing situational contexts (as additional 
associations) to add further details. For example, we could reduce the tension by 
constructing a context (providing additional associations) such as “in the deep and 
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unknown sea” where any kind of strange animal might exist or “in a fairy land” where a 
fish might have a big long nose just like an elephant etc. As we assumed, context is another 
set of associations contributing to the meaning construction. If the additional association 
“strange fish” is activated, the process of this strengthening could be graphed as follows 
(Figure 3-20): 
 
Figure 3-20: Strengthening elephant fish network after balancing 
In this graph, “strange fish” as a newly activated association for the combination 
elephant fish, further strengthens the link between Fish and Trunk, i.e., the newly activated 
association seems to increase the number of positive associations that reinforce or add 
strength to the modified association Lfish-trunk . It is worth noting that at this stage, our focus 
of attention is on the combined concepts elephant fish as a whole rather than on the 
component concepts fish or elephant respectively. Thus, it is more accurate to graph this 
process as follows (Figure 3-21): 
 
Figure 3-21: Strengthening elephant fish network after balancing – a more accurate graph 
Strengthening balance not only refers to increasing the number of positive 
associations that reinforce or add strength to the constructed meaning, but also refers to 
rejecting or ignoring other non-reconcilable associations, i.e., negating imbalanced 
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associations of the component concepts that are no longer valid for the combination.  For 
example, when the meaning of tasty computer is constructed as “a chocolate shaped like a 
computer”, people might still feel some tension that needs to be reconciled. This tension 
comes from the fact that computer normally has an implicit association of being “real” 
together with all other associations (CPU, keyboard, calculation, internet etc) that computer 
has in a balanced state.  The newly constructed meaning brings the incompatible concept 
chocolate into the field of computer associations, creating tension that now needs to be 
adjusted. To do this, a new association “real computer” could be activated to help adjust the 
relation between tasty computer and real computer (Figure 3-22).  This newly activated 
association negates the link between tasty computer and real computer and thereby 
eliminates imbalance elsewhere in the network.  
 
                
Figure 3-22: Strengthening tasty computer network after balancing 
Both negative and positive strengthening seem mainly to add additional information 
to reduce residual tension associated with the balanced meaning. In this sense, negative 
strengthening and positive strengthening function in a similar way and lead to similar 
effects. For example, elephant fish could be strengthened by activating a new association 
“strange fish” to positively strengthen the constructed meaning as described above, or by 





Figure 3-23: Strengthening elephant fish by both positive and negative strengthening 
Strengthening the degree of balance is not absolutely necessary but is assumed as an 
extra optional step in the meaning construction process. It is postulated that strengthening is 
necessary when there is some remaining tension felt in the cognitive field, such as when 
constructing the meaning of novel combinations like tasty computer. It is noted that 
constructing the meaning of a novel combination involves combining two sets of originally 
balanced associations of the two component concepts, some of which might now be in 
conflict with one another. To construct a balanced and harmonious meaning in such cases, 
major cognitive work such as valence reversal might be involved, leaving residual tension 
to be reduced. 
3.3 Mundane and novel combinations  
It is worth noting that when constructing the meaning of everyday / mundane 
conceptual combinations, we do not experience the same degree of cognitive complexity as 
such novel combinations. Here, it is necessary to define what I mean by mundane or novel 
combinations. Based on my framework, a novel combination is defined as one in which the 
probability of one component concept being present in the cognitive field of the other 
component concept is very low, i.e., the two component concepts are not part of the 
prototypical knowledge for each other. For example, tall stapler is considered as the novel 
combination because the probability of tall being present in the cognitive field of stapler is 
quite low. Correspondingly, an everyday / mundane combination is defined as one in which 
the probability of one component concept being present in the cognitive field of the other 
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component concept is quite high, i.e., either one or both component concepts are part of the 
prototypical knowledge for the other. For example, red apple is understood as “apple that 
are red (colored)”, in which red-colored itself is a prototypical knowledge of apple. Since 
they are part of the prototypical knowledge of each other, we are so accustomed to co-
activate these two set of associations for the meaning of such mundane combinations in our 
everyday life that they do not seem to require any complex cognitive processes to balance 
the cognitive field. They are used so frequently that the cognitive field already seems to be 
balanced for most of us. In a way, we seem to use some sort of ‘short-cut’ to construct the 
meaning of these mundane combinations. However, we would argue that this ‘short-cut’ 
comes originally from the complex cognitive processing that require the activation of 
contingent associations and balancing the activated cycles. It is just because these 
combinations are so frequently used that the two component concepts become part of the 
prototypical knowledge for each other, thus requires no need for further balancing.   
Compound words such as daybreak, blackboard, playboy, haircut, windmill, 
brainwash, lipread, babysit, dutyfree etc., represent extreme cases of the everyday / 
mundane combinations Taking “blackboard” as an example, it is a single word with its own 
distinct meaning that is separated from its original conceptual components “black” or 
“board”. Although it is still possible to trace the meaning of this word back to its 
conceptual components, the process of the original conceptual combination is so “short-
cut” that the original combination now is reduced to a single word of its own. There is 
almost no cognitive effort involved to combine “black” with “board” any more. However, 
this seeming lack of cognitive processing is due to the cognitive efficiency from the 
repeated use, and due to the fact that later generation learned the compound words as one 
word rather than a conceptual combination. That is, this type of everyday / mundane 
combination should originally have the same cognitive processes as more novel ones, 
though now they are processed quicker due to cognitive efficiency that we gained through 
learning or experience.  
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3.4 A brief summary 
The framework proposed here tries to address one of the fundamental questions in 
human communication: how is complex meaning constructed from smaller linguistic units 
such as words? By conceptualizing meaning as a mental state resulting from the 
interactions of associative concepts in the communicative context, we studied the process 
of meaning construction through a detailed discussion on the conceptual interactions of the 
associations activated by these units. More specifically, these linguistic units are first 
perceived playing the role of either head or modifier, and then associative concepts are 
activated contingently and prototypically to form a cognitive field exhibiting Gestalt figure-
ground characteristics. If the field is not balanced, certain cognitive mechanisms are 
implemented to balance it. After balancing, a rationalization or strengthening of the 
modified associations could be conducted to increase the salience of the activated 
associations and decrease the salience of other non-reconcilable associations.  
Essentially, meaning construction could be theorized as a process of cycle formation 
and cognitive balancing. Constructing complex meaning from simpler concepts equates to 
two processes: one is to form a feasible and logical cycle between these concepts with least 
cognitive effort; the other is to change from an imbalanced state of the field to a balanced 
one. These two cognitive activities are the driving forces for conceptual interaction in 
meaning construction. The concepts interact in the field by changing the properties of the 
linkages between them, that is, by changing the valence and / or the strength of links.  
3.5 Hypotheses  
Meaning construction through conceptual interactions is a complex phenomenon. The 
tentative framework proposed suggests many possibilities for theoretical predictions that 
are worth exploring.  However, in this section, I will not present a full list of all possible 
predictions that the framework could entertain; instead, I will provide some suggestions on 
the kind of hypotheses that could be formulated based on this framework.  
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For example, the central claim of the framework is conceptual interactions, where 
two component concepts are first interpreted as either head or modifier (H4), and then 
associative concepts are activated contingently (H1) and prototypically (H2) to form a 
cognitive field for balancing (H3). Moreover, novel combinations have their own 
characteristics that are different from everyday / mundane combinations, thus worth some 
further exploration (H5). 
Some of these hypotheses are quite interactive. For example, the theory predicts that 
the process of association activation is a process demonstrating multiple properties such as 
goal-directed, contingent, prototypical and cognitive efficiency that jointly contribute to the 
activation. Based on this observation, even though I treat each of these properties as an 
independent factor when proposing hypotheses, I will examine their interactive effects at 
the end of hypotheses testing. 
It is proposed in the framework that conceptual interaction starts from association 
activation of the two component concepts. Association activation refers to the mental 
processing that each component concept brings in its own set of associations selectively in 
order to form a closed cycle between the head and modifier. In this process, we assumed 
that “slots” of a concept (associations) are not necessarily inherent with the concept but are 
mutually selected by the two component concepts. As I explained in the contingent 
property of association activation, the probability of one concept’s association being 
activated depends on the other concept’s activated associations. For example, when 
constructing the meaning of the combination chocolate church, chocolate and church each 
brings in its own set of associations in relation to the other concept present. The concept 
chocolate will activate only a small subset of all possible associations that it might entertain 
because of the existence of the pairing concept church. A different subset of associations 
would be activated if chocolate were paired with the concept cake in the combination 
chocolate cake. Similarly, because of the presence of the concept chocolate, church will 
activate certain associations that are different from, say, those that would be activated when 
church is paired with Baptist in the combination Baptist church. Based on this theorizing, it 
could be hypothesized: 
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• H1: Other things being equal, associations of one component concept are 
activated contingently upon the existence of the other component concept. 
o Corollary 1-1: Other things being equal, a concept will activate different 
associations when paired with different concepts.  
The theory proposed that the potential associations of a concept are not activated with 
equal probability, and it predicts that the prototypical associations – associations with 
stronger strength generally - are more easily to be activated than less prototypical 
associations, i.e., the activation of associations is usually from high-strength associations to 
lower strength associations. This certainly does not mean that the one with stronger 
strength will be the one that could be used to construct the meaning, however, our sense 
making process for a feasible association that might connect the two component concepts 
will begin with the strongest associations. Thus, it is predicted that the stronger an 
association is for each component concept, the more likely it would be activated and used 
to construct the meaning of the combination (assuming equal degree of balance). Based on 
this observation, it could be hypothesized: 
• H2: Other things being equal, the relative probability of an association activated 
in combination increases with the relative probability of the association 
activated in component concepts. 
As discussed in the framework, balance indicates how strongly an association could 
link the two component concepts in a closed cycle. Mathematically, in a triangle Δa-b-c, 
Balance (B) = (Vab*Sab)*(Vac*Sac)*(Vbc*Sbc) where we assume point B is the association of 
one component of the combination AC. Thus, it is clear that balance indicates the degree of 
the strength that an association (in this example, B) activated by one component concept (in 
this example, C) could be linked to the other component concept (in this example, A). If an 
association is comparatively easier to form a linkage between the two component concepts 
(i.e., Sab and Sbc are comparatively larger), the balance score calculated by the above 
equation will be larger. Based on this analysis, it is hypothesized:  
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• H3: Other things being equal, the likelihood of an association of one of the 
component concepts being activated in the combination increases with the 
degree of balance of the triplet consisting of the 2 component concepts and the 
association. 
In a two-word combination, the role each word plays is different. Murphy defines: “a 
final bit of terminology is that the first word (in a two-word combination) is called the 
modifier, and the final word, the head noun (because it is the head of the noun phrase in 
syntactic terms)” (Murphy, 2002 p.444). This syntactic distinction leads to what I called 
grammatical head and grammatical modifier. As assumed in the framework, there is a 
difference between grammatical head / modifier and psychological head / modifier. 
Psychologically, when people construct the meaning of the phrase, the more central 
concept in the construction is usually treated as the head concept, and the concept that 
changes some aspects of the head is usually treated as the modifier concept. Here “more 
central concept” is not defined in terms of syntactic relations, but refers to the fact that 
more of psychological head’s associations will contribute to the meaning of the 
combination, while one or two of psychological modifiers’ associations will be 
incorporated in the combination. Based on this distinction on the syntactic or psychological 
role, it is interesting to explore how closely grammatical head and modifier correspond to 
psychological head and modifier.  
• H4: Other things being equal, more associations originated from the second 
concept (grammatical head) will contribute to the meaning of the combination 
than associations originated from the first concept (grammatical modifier) in the 
combination.  
It could be expected, that in cases where H4 holds true, it will provide a useful link 
between psychological head / modifier and grammatical head / modifier and may provide a 
useful operational definition for head and modifier in conceptual combination literature. 
Further, it could be predicted that if a concept is put into different syntactic positions in 
different combinations, this concept will contribute more when it functions as head than 
when it is functions as a modifier, as hypothesized: 
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o Corollary 4-1: Other things being equal, a concept will contribute more 
to the meaning of a combination when it functions as a grammatical 
head than when it functions as a grammatical modifier. 
It is observed that everyday / mundane conceptual combinations are quite different 
from the novel combinations in terms of the probability of one component concept being 
present in the cognitive field of the other component concept (i.e., whether or not the two 
component concepts are part of the prototypical knowledge for each other). If novel 
combination implies that the prototypical associations of the component concepts are not in 
the cognitive field for each other and thus could not be easily used to construct the closed 
cycle for meaning construction, then, to construct the meaning for novel combinations will 
require the activation of less prototypical associations. It will require more effort to search 
for potentially useful associations to construct the meaning for novel combinations. 
• H5: The meaning of a novel combination is more likely to incorporate low 
strength associations from its components than everyday / mundane 
combinations.  
The current hypotheses focus on the major factors that will influence the conceptual 
interactions in meaning construction, such as contingency property, prototypicality 
property, balance property, head/modifier effects, and novelty effects. Clearly, this is only a 
small subset of the possible hypotheses that this framework could entertain. Because of the 
scope of this research, I will only focus on testing of these proposed hypotheses in the next 
chapter, although there are lots of other factors whose effects could be predicted and tested. 
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Chapter 4  Method 
When designing experiments to test hypotheses, it is important to note that an 
individual’s mental representation of meaning is only accessible to others via some kind of 
symbolic system, such as verbal descriptions using language; and what is expressed 
verbally is an idiosyncratic version of the meaning particular to that individual at that time 
in that location. Two issues arise when we verbally express what we mean: one is that not 
all aspects of the mental representation of meaning are expressible verbally, and what is 
expressed may not necessarily correspond to the form of the mental representation; the 
other is how to represent the consensus meaning across population through an aggregation 
of the individual’s verbal descriptions. 
I do not have any method to address the first issue except for a tentative trial in which 
participants were asked to draw a picture of what a concept means to them while verbally 
describing these things. This tentative trial was based on the assumption that some mental 
representations take the form of mental image on top of verbal descriptions. However, this 
trial was not successful because different people have different abilities to draw mental 
images and the analysis of drawing is too subjective. As for the second issue, I propose to 
use an aggregated verbal description across a population of participants to identify the 
relatively stable consensus meaning of concepts. This proposal is based on the observation 
that although in communications, idiosyncratic characteristics of the individual and 
contextual information influence the specific understanding of the meaning of concepts, the 
meaning of concepts largely depends on the consensus of a social group. The dictionary 
definitions of concepts are examples of such a consensus meaning. Thus, it is possible for 
me to empirically abstract the consensus meaning of a language element or a concept from 
a population.  
 93
4.1 Pilot experiment 
A pilot experiment was conducted in the course of developing the experimental 
methods. The participants were 125 undergraduate students at University of Waterloo, who 
received a bonus mark added to their final exam mark for participating. 
The pilot experiments were designed to examine the following issues: 1. could we 
induce associations from individuals’ verbalizations of their understanding of concepts and 
combinations? 2. Could we induce an aggregated verbal description across participants to 
identify the relatively stable consensus meaning of concepts? 3. Could we find a way of 
measuring the strength of associations? 4. Is it feasible to analyze this type of data 
objectively?  
The choice of stimulus concepts was based on our intuitive feeling of mundane 
conceptual combinations and more novel combinations. We chose 2 very common nouns 
“furniture” and “bird” that have been used extensively in the concepts and categorization 
literature. We then chose 4 adjectives to modify these two concepts. Two of these 
adjectives were common modifiers for one of the nouns: “fast” for “bird” and 
“comfortable” for “furniture”. The third adjective was a common modifier for both nouns: 
“small” for “small bird” or “small furniture”. The last adjective was more novel modifier 
for both nouns: “difficult” for “difficult bird” or “difficult furniture”. In experimental 
conditions, these 2 nouns and 4 adjectives were mix-matched to generate 10 conceptual 
combinations: fast bird, fast furniture, comfortable bird, comfortable furniture, small bird, 
small furniture, difficult bird, difficult furniture, furniture bird, and bird furniture. Thus, in 
total, there were 6 concepts and 10 conceptual combinations. In the pilot experiment, 125 
participants were randomly assigned to 5 groups. Group #1 – #4 each was assigned the 2 
noun concepts (furniture, bird), 1 adjective concept, and 2 of the 10 combinations. Group 
#5 was assigned the 2 noun concepts and 2 of the 10 combinations. 
Each group of students was asked to do two kinds of tasks: 1. to give as many 
examples of the listed concepts as they can think of (up to 15 examples) and to write these 
examples in the order that they think of them; 2. to define / explain / describe the meaning 
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of the concept or combination in their own words. For example, one of the groups was 
given the following tasks (Table 4-1): 
Table 4-1: Tasks in the pilot experiments 
Task 1 
Please give as many examples of the following concept as you can think of. Write these examples in 
the order that you think of them. 
“Furniture” 
Please define / explain / describe what “Furniture” means in your own words:  
Task 2 
Please give as many examples of the following concept as you can think of. Write these examples in 
the order that you think of them. 
“Bird” 
Please define / explain / describe what “Bird” means in your own words:  
Task 3 
Please give as many examples of the following concept as you can think of. Write these examples in 
the order that you think of them. 
“Small Bird” 
Please define / explain / describe what “Small Bird” means in your own words: 
Task 4 
Please give as many examples of the following concept as you can think of. Write these examples in 
the order that you think of them. 
“Fast Furniture” 
Please define / explain / describe what “Fast Furniture” means in your own words: 
 
A tentative analysis was conducted using data collected about bird. Definitions / 
descriptions of bird by 125 participants were analyzed by breaking the verbal descriptions 
into simplest ideas. For example, the description “animal with wings and feathers that nests 
and lay eggs” was broken into animal, wings, feathers, nests, and lay eggs. Each of these 
ideas was treated as one association of the concept bird. By counting how many of these 
ideas were listed by participants, I got a rough description of the general understanding on 
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the meaning of bird. Examples of birds listed by the 125 participants were aggregated as 
well. Partial results were given in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. The strength of these simplest 
ideas (association / example) was calculated as the percentage of the number of a particular 
association / example mentioned over the total number of associations / examples 
mentioned by participants. 
Other data were closely observed, although there was no formal analysis on these 
data. However, by looking through these results, a few conclusions were drawn:  
1. People are able to define, describe or explain their mental representation of 
meaning using language.  
2. Associations that were activated by concepts could be abstracted from participants’ 
verbal descriptions.  
3. By analyzing all of the descriptions for the same concept, it was possible to 
identify associations that were common across participants, reflecting consensus across the 
population.  
4. The relative frequency of associations could be calculated to indicate the strength 
of the association.  
Based on these conclusions, the following experiments were designed to test 
hypotheses derived from the proposed conceptual framework. 
4.2 Experiments 
Two experiments were designed and conducted at University of Waterloo from 
September, 2005 to December, 2006. Experiment One was designed to identify 
associations for conceptual entities (i.e., single word concepts and two-word conceptual 
combinations) and to obtain familiarity / novelty scores for the conceptual combinations. 
Experiment Two was designed to evaluate the associations identified in Experiment One 
under various manipulations and experimental conditions. 
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4.2.1 Experiment One: Identify Associations 
The design of the experiment 1 started from selecting the experiment stimulus set. 
4.2.1.1 Stimulus  
The North American Industry Classification System, NAICS, 2002 US, a newly 
designed industry classification system that replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system, was used to select the stimulus for experiment one. NAICS 
was developed jointly by U.S., Canada, and Mexico to provide new comparability in 
statistics about business activity across North America. The 2002 manual includes 
definitions for each industry, tables showing correspondence between the 2002 NAICS and 
1997 versions of NAICS for codes that changed, and a comprehensive index. We focus on 
the NAICS codes and titles (http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/naicod02.htm) as the raw 
materials from which our experiment stimulus set was drawn.  
The coding system of NAICS is designed as a six-digit categorization system where 
each subsequent digit further specifies a subcategory of a higher level digit. Specifically, 
the first two digits designate the economic sector, the third digit designates the sub sector, 
the fourth digit designates the industry category, the fifth digit designates the NAICS 
industry, and the sixth digit designates the national industry. For example, the following 
hierarchical categorization is used to describe the information industry and one of its sub-
industries.  
51 Information 
512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 
5121 Motion Picture and Video Industries 
51213 Motion Picture and Video Exhibition 
512132 Drive-In Motion Picture Theatres 
NAICS classifies business activities into 20 economic sectors. In order to 
accommodate the scale of my experiments, I focused on the manufacturing sector. The 
manufacturing sector has 765 industrial categories and subcategories, among which there 
are 591 noun concepts. Our selection of the experiment stimulus started from these 591 
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noun concepts. Because of the large number of possible concepts, we used a series of 
criteria to filter through these noun concepts. For example, the criteria included selecting 
concepts that refer to a product (e.g. chocolate) rather than a raw material (e.g. cacao 
beans); selecting concepts that are not polysemous (e.g. dressing could refer to either 
“seasoning” or “clothing”, thus not selected); selecting single concepts that are meaningful 
as the industry category (e.g. cigarette is selected but sugar cane is not) etc. After this round 
of filtering, 280 concepts were selected (Appendix 1) representing specific manufactured 
products.  
A second round of selection was done by ranking these 280 concepts based on 
familiarity. Five graduate students and one faculty member of the department were asked to 
rank the familiarity of these concepts as industry products. The survey was worded as 
follows:  
“We are interested in how familiar you are with the following types of products. For 
example, most of us are very familiar with “books” and “computers”, but very unfamiliar 
with “die-cast” or “forged metal products”. Please rate the following products from 1 to 5 
based on your familiarity with these products. (1 means extremely unfamiliar and 5 means 
extremely familiar)”.  
The survey was conducted to collect both rankings and verbal comments from 
participants on these concepts. The average rankings were calculated. Out of 280 concepts, 
55 concepts were selected (Appendix 2) based on their familiarity ranking (higher than 3.5) 
and participants’ verbal comments such as connotations (underwear was not selected) and 
ambiguous meanings (can, oven, sign, etc were not selected). These 55 concepts were 
mapped back into the NAICS categorization scheme for the final selection. 
The final selection was based on the consideration of the size of the subject pool, the 
experimental task, the workload per participant, and the characteristics of the individual 
concepts and their combinations. Especially, concepts were randomly chosen to be 
organized into different concept sets that were composed of concepts from different 
industry categories (the 4th digit in NAICS) to create within-industry or between-industry 
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combinations. Based on this consideration, 5 sets of the experimental concepts were 
selected. Among these 5 sets, 4 concept sets were composed of 2 concepts from the same 
industry category and 1 concept from a different industry category; and 1 concept set was 
composed of 3 concepts from the same industry category.  
In the process of selection, two groups of concepts in 2 industry categories drew our 
attention. The concepts are Air-Conditioner, Fan, Heater (in 3334 Ventilation, Heating, 
Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment Manufacturing) and 
Refrigerator, Freezer, Furnace (in 3352 Household Appliance Manufacturing). These 
concepts denote conflicting yet strongly correlated characteristics. We chose 4 concepts 
from these two industry categories: {Air-Conditioner, Heater, Refrigerator, Furnace} as 
one group of the experimental stimuli. Thus, the full set of experimental stimuli was 
composed of 6 groups (Table 4-2).  
Table 4-2: The full set of experimental stimuli 
Concept 
sets 
Conceptual Units  (NAICS 
Industry Codes) 
Conceptual Combinations Number of 
conceptual 
entities 




Hat Mitten, Hat Butter, Mitten 








Telephone Television, Telephone 
Soap, Television Soap, Television 








Cereal Chocolate, Cereal Watch, 
Chocolate Watch, Chocolate 







 Bread Cookie, Bread Pasta, 
Cookie Pasta, Cookie Bread, Pasta 







Carpet Box, Carpet Envelope, Box 
Envelope, Box Carpet, Envelope 
Carpet, Envelope Box 
9 







Heater, Furnace Refrigerator, Air-
conditioner Heater, Air-
conditioner Refrigerator, Heater 
Refrigerator, Air-conditioner 
Furnace, Heater Furnace, 
Refrigerator Furnace, Heater Air-
conditioner, Refrigerator Air-
conditioner, Refrigerator Heater 
 
4.2.1.2  Procedure 
Experiment One was designed to identify associations of conceptual entities (single 
concepts and conceptual combinations) and to obtain familiarity / novelty rankings for 
combinations. In this experiment, participants were asked to do two tasks. In the first task, 
participants were presented with one of the conceptual entities from the experiment stimuli 
and asked 3 questions:  
1. What are the first things that come to your mind when you think of this product? 
2. Please define / describe / explain this product in your own words: 
3. What are some of the characteristics or attributes of this product and how might 
this product be used? 
By asking participants to describe their initial impressions about the real or 
hypothetical products denoted by the given conceptual entity, to define this product, and to 
explain its characteristics & functionality, these questions were designed to identify as 
many associations as possible relevant to participants. In the second task, participants were 
asked to rate how familiar the product denoted by the conceptual combination was to them 
or how easy it was to imagine such a product (presumably novel concepts are harder to 
imagine that everyday concepts), using a scale from 1 (least familiar or most difficult to 
imagine) to 5 (most familiar or easiest to imagine).  
140 undergraduate students registered in one Management Sciences course in the Fall 
2005 were recruited to participate in this experiment for a bonus mark. Students who 
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declined to participate in this experiment were given an opportunity to complete an 
alternative assignment with comparable workload to earn the same bonus mark.  
Participants were divided into 7 groups. Each group was assigned a different 
experimental stimulus. The 7 stimuli were designed such that there would be minimum 
repetitions of the same concepts (as a single concept or as a part of a conceptual 
combination) within a given stimulus. The division of the stimuli into student groups (S.G.) 
for the first task is presented in Appendix 3. The division of the stimuli into student groups 
for task 2: familiarity / novelty ranking is presented in Appendix 4.  
Since 140 participants were divided into 7 groups, there were 20 participants per 
student group. To avoid potential bias associated with the sequence effects within a given 
stimulus, 4 versions of the experimental stimulus assigned to each student group were 
created, which varied the order of conceptual entities presented to the participants. Thus, a 
total of 28 different stimuli were used in this experiment. 
The experiment was conducted through UW-ACE, a tailored version of the ANGEL 
web-based course management and collaboration portal used at University of Waterloo. 
ANGEL’s build-in survey function was used to design and conduct the experiment. 
The experiment started from a web page describing the experiment tasks, followed by 
a consent form where students could choose “Continue” or exit for an alternative 
assignment of equal bonus mark. If students chose “Continue”, they were presented a series 
of tasks in 30 to 33 web pages designed to be finished in about 30 to 40 minutes. A sample 
of the experiment webpages for one version is presented in Appendix 5. 
4.2.1.3 Results 
Out of 140 students, 120 chose to participate in the experiment (Table 4-3). The 
quality of responses was quite good and participants provided detailed descriptions for each 
of the three questions related to each conceptual entity.  
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Table 4-3: The distribution of the number of participants participating in each group 










The results acquired from experiment one were analyzed. Two analyses were 
conducted: one identified associations of conceptual entities; the other calculated the 
familiarity / novelty rankings of the conceptual combinations. 
The first analysis started by aggregating all the responses in relation to each 
conceptual entity. For example, 17 participants provided 51 descriptions regarding butter 
(Appendix 6). Each of these 51 verbal descriptions was treated as one unique description of 
a particular understanding of butter. A detailed text (content) analysis was conducted to 
identify the most prominent associations mentioned among these verbal descriptions. 
Prominent associations refer to the associations that were mentioned most commonly by 
participants. In this analysis, each description was broken into simplest ideas which were 
treated as the associations of the conceptual entity. For example, one of the descriptions of 
butter was “its soft and usually yellow. it tastes better with butter. its oily and makes u fat!” 
(given by the participant coded as g1v1-1). This description was broken into the following 
5 simplest ideas: soft, usually yellow, tastes better with butter, oily, and makes u (you) fat. 
After all 51 descriptions were analyzed this way, the 10 most prominent associations for 
butter were identified. The analysis was conducted for all 61 conceptual entities and 10 
most prominent associations for each conceptual entity were identified. These associations 
are stated in predicate forms, using typical wording used by participants, but “cleaned up” 
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to be grammatically correct for use in Experiment Two. A sample of the most prominent 
associations is given in Table 4-4, and a full list is in Appendix 7. 
Table 4-4: The most prominent associations for conceptual entities hat, butter, hat butter, and butter 
hat 
Concept Most Prominent Associations Association # 
It is worn on the head 1
It protects the head 2
It is used in different environmental conditions (sun, rain, cold) 3
It adds fashion or style 4
It is used in baseball  5
It is made from different materials 6
It is an article of clothing 7
It has various shapes 8
It has different types such as toques 9
Hat 
It is mass-manufactured 10
It is used in cooking, baking and frying 21
It is spread on toast 22
It is yellowish beige 23
It adds flavour to food 24
It is extracted from milk 25
It is a type of food 26
It is fattening 27
It is greasy and oily 28
It is soft when warm 29
Butter 
It is solid when cold 30
It is a type of hat 51
It is a type of butter 52
It is a lubricant 53
It is a sculpture 54
It is worn in cold weather  55
It is yellow 56
It is soft 57
It is used to soften hair  58
It is not easy to melt 59
Hat Butter 
It smells pretty bad 60
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It is a type of hat 61
It is a type of butter 62
It cannot be worn 63
It is made of yellow leather 64
It prevents insect damage 65
It is soft 66
It is used for dispensing 67
It is warm 68
It makes dishes more tasty 69
Butter Hat 
It is used for decoration 70
   
The second analysis was to calculate familiarity / novelty rankings of the conceptual 
combinations. Each combination received 13 – 18 rankings and the average rankings were 
calculated (Table 4-5). Higher rankings indicate more familiar / less novel combinations. 
Table 4-5: Familiarity Ranking acquired after step 1 experiment 
Conceptual Combinations Familiarity Ranking n 
Chocolate Cereal 4.78 18 
Telephone Television 4.23 13 
Cereal Chocolate 3.94 18 
Television Telephone 3.78 18 
Air-conditioner Heater 3.78 18 
Furnace Heater 3.56 18 
Bread Cookie 3.54 13 
Heater Furnace 3.50 18 
Envelope Box 3.38 13 
Pasta Bread 3.28 18 
Heater Air-conditioner 3.28 18 
Cookie Bread 3.12 17 
Furnace Air-conditioner 3.00 18 
Bread Pasta 2.83 18 
Box Envelope 2.83 18 
Mitten Hat 2.78 18 
Air-conditioner Furnace 2.67 18 
Air-conditioner Refrigerator 2.54 13 
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Refrigerator Air-conditioner 2.50 18 
Soap Television 2.50 18 
Cookie Pasta 2.50 18 
Carpet Box 2.39 18 
Heater Refrigerator 2.39 18 
Refrigerator Furnace 2.33 18 
Watch Chocolate 2.28 18 
Chocolate Watch 2.24 17 
Hat Mitten 2.23 13 
Box Carpet 2.18 17 
Carpet Envelope 2.17 18 
Television Soap 2.12 17 
Furnace Refrigerator 2.00 18 
Refrigerator Heater 1.88 17 
Pasta Cookie 1.85 13 
Cereal Watch 1.83 18 
Envelope Carpet 1.67 18 
Butter Mitten 1.67 18 
Butter Hat 1.61 18 
Watch Cereal 1.56 18 
Soap Telephone 1.50 18 
Hat Butter 1.28 18 
Telephone Soap 1.24 17 
Mitten Butter 1.22 18 
 
The results of Experiment One were used as input into the design of Experiment 
Two. 
4.2.2 Experiment Two: Evaluate Associations  
In this experiment, associations of conceptual entities identified in Experiment One 
were used to construct a close-ended questionnaire, which was administrated to another 
group of UW student participants. The objective of the experiment was to acquire the 
strength of associations using a standardized quantitative measure. 
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4.2.2.1 Design 
The stimuli used in Experiment Two were developed from the results of Experiment 
One: 10 associations from each of the 61 conceptual entities for a total of 610 associations. 
Table 4-6 provides a generic summary of the data obtained in Experiment One, which was 
used in the design of the questionnaire in Experiment Two. In the table, for a 2-concept pair 
(C1-C2), each concept (C1 or C2) or conceptual combination (C1C2 or C2C1) are 
represented by capitalized letters. Ten associations obtained for each of these conceptual 
entities in Experiment One are represented by capitalized letter A with a subscript of each 
conceptual unit plus a number from 1 to 10. In total, for a pair of concepts C1 and C2, there 
are 40 associations, with 10 originating from each conceptual entity C1, C2, C1C2, and 
C2C1 in Experiment One. 
Table 4-6: The basic format of the raw data for Experiment Two 
C1 C2 C1C2 C2C1 
AC1-1 AC2-1 AC1C2-1 AC2C1-1 
AC1-2 AC2-2 AC1C2-2 AC2C1-2 
AC1-3 AC2-3 AC1C2-3 AC2C1-3 
AC1-4 AC2-4 AC1C2-4 AC2C1-4 
AC1-5 AC2-5 AC1C2-5 AC2C1-5 
AC1-6 AC2-6 AC1C2-6 AC2C1-6 
AC1-7 AC2-7 AC1C2-7 AC2C1-7 
AC1-8 AC2-8 AC1C2-8 AC2C1-8 
AC1-9 AC2-9 AC1C2-9 AC2C1-9 
AC1-10 AC2-10 AC1C2-10 AC2C1-10 
 
Three steps were used to generate the experimental stimuli for Experiment Two. 
Firstly, these 40 associations were randomly regrouped into 4 new groups containing 
different associations from each conceptual entity as Table 4-7 exemplifies.  










group #1 group #2 group #3 group #4 
AC2-10 AC2C1-1 AC2-9 AC1C2-2 
AC1-9 AC2C1-8 AC1C2-5 AC2C1-3 
AC2-8 AC2C1-5 AC1C2-7 AC1C2-1 
AC2-2 AC2C1-10 AC1C2-9 AC2-4 
AC2-5 AC1-8 AC1-2 AC1-4 
AC1C2-4 AC2-6 AC1C2-10 AC2C1-9 
AC1C2-8 AC1-1 AC2C1-4 AC1-3 
AC2C1-2 AC1-7 AC1-5 AC2C1-7 
AC1-10 AC2C1-6 AC2-1 AC1-6 
AC1C2-6 AC2-3 AC1C2-3 AC2-7 
 
Secondly, each of these 4 randomized association groups were to be evaluated against 
the original 4 conceptual entities, generating 16 tasks to be assigned to particular 
experimental participants. (Table 4-8) 
Table 4-8:  Randomized associations to be evaluated against original conceptual entities 
 C1 C2 C1C2 C2C1 
Randomized 
Association group #1  Task 1 Task 2 Task 3  Task 4  
Randomized 
Association group #2  Task 5 Task 6  Task 7  Task 8  
Randomized 
Association group #3  Task 9 Task 10  Task 11  Task 12  
Randomized 
Association group #4  Task 13 Task 14  Task 15  Task 16  
 
Thirdly, these 16 tasks were randomly assigned to one of the 16 participant groups 
(participants in Experiment Two were divided into 16 groups). This is the generic design 
for a 2-concept pair. 
In the full stimuli set there were 5 concept sets composed of 3 concepts (C1, C2, C3) 
and 1 set composed of 4 concepts (C1, C2, C3, C4) (Table 4-2). For each 3-concept set, 
there are 3 two-concept pairs (C1-C2, C1-C3, C2-C3). For the 4 concept set, there are 6 
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two-concept pairs (C1-C2, C1-C3, C1-C4, C2-C3, C2-C4, C3-C4). Thus in total, there were 
5*3+6=21 two-concept pairs in the stimuli. For each two-concept pair, the 3 design steps 
demonstrated above were applied. After this design stage, each of the 16 participant groups 
had 19 tasks. Each of these tasks consisted of 8 – 12 rating decisions (a particular 
association evaluated against a conceptual entity) as discussed below. 
It should be noted that in the process of generating Randomized Association Groups, 
there were quite a few identical associations within each 2-concept pair (Appendix 8). For 
example, in the 2-concept pair Hat-Mitten, associations #12, #34 and #44 all refer to “used 
in cold winter weather” which are regarded as identical. These identical associations were 
used in the experiment only once to avoid repetition. For example, in the experiment, 
participants evaluated “used in cold winter weather” once. Because of these identical 
associations within each 2-concept pair, the total number of Randomized Association 
groups generated for each 2-concept pair varied. For example, the concept pair Hat- Mitten 
generated 3 Randomized Association groups, while the concept pair Hat-Butter generated 4 
Randomized Association groups. For the same reason, the number of associations within 
each Randomized Association group varied from 8 to 12, thus there were 8 – 12 particular 
associations evaluated against a conceptual entity within each task. After processing 
identical associations, there were 2585 unique association-conceptual entity pairs for 
participants to evaluate. 
4.2.2.2 Procedure 
Experiment Two was conducted in 2006. The experiment was designed for 320 
participants, consisting of 16 groups of 20 students each. Therefore, each evaluation of a 
specific association-conceptual entity pair would be judged by 20 participants. 284 
undergraduate students were recruited from Management Sciences courses in the Winter 
2006 term. These students earned one percent bonus grade for participation. From 
September 2006 to December 2006, 35 graduate students registered in a Management 
Sciences graduate course were recruited to participate in this experiment, and also received 
one percent bonus grade in this course. Among these 35 graduate students, 14 indicated that 
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they had language difficulties understanding the content of the questionnaire, so their 
responses were dropped from the results. Finally, 15 additional graduate students who were 
native English speakers were recruited to participate in this experiment as volunteers. Thus, 
by December 2006, the total number of participants reached 320 (284 + 35 – 14 + 15 = 
320). 
320 participants were randomly assigned to 16 student groups of 20 participants each. 
Each student group was randomly divided into 2 subgroups of 10 students each. Each 
subgroup performed a different version of the questionnaire for a given experimental 
condition. The different versions varied the randomized sequence of evaluation tasks 
performed by participants. The questionnaires were printed on paper and distributed to 
participants as 20 stapled pages. The questionnaire began with a description of the task and 
a consent form (Appendix 9). 
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Figure 4-1  A sample questionnaire page from the Experiment Two 
 
Following this page was the 19-page questionnaire with each page dedicated to one 
experimental task. For each page, participants were asked to think about how to define / 
explain / describe a certain product, such as carpet. Then they were asked to indicate on a 
7-point scale from “definitely no” to “definitely yes”, how likely they were to mention the 
following associations as part of their definition / explanation / description. After these 
judgments, they were given an opportunity to provide any comments regarding this task. A 
sample of such a page is provided in Figure 4-1. 
For the 35 Management Sciences graduate students, we were warned by the course 
instructor that some students had language difficulties for various reasons. Thus, for that 
group of participants, an additional page was added to the end of the questionnaire which 
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asked the following question: “If this is your first time living in an English speaking 
country, did you have any difficulties completing this questionnaire?” Students could circle 
“Yes”, “No” or “Not Applicable”. 14 students indicated that they had difficulties 
understanding the contents of the questionnaire, thus their responses were discarded. 
4.2.2.3 Results 
The participants’ evaluations were firstly assigned to numeric ratings from 1 to 7, 
where “definitely no” was assigned as 1, “not sure” was assigned as 4, and “definitely yes” 
was assigned as 7. And then the ratings were inputted to Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and 
later imported to SPSS for hypothesis testing. 
From the Experiment Two, I obtained 58,418 unique ratings from participants. On 
average, each participant made 182.56 ratings14. Each individual rating was coded in terms 
of 9 variables in SPSS as described in Table 4-9.  
Table 4-9: The meaning of the 9 variables in SPSS  
Variable Name Variable Meaning Values 
IndustryType Denotes the 
different types of 
organizing 
principles of the 
concept sets. 
Type 1: A 3-concept set where 2 concepts come 
from the same industry category and the 3rd 
concept comes from a different industry 
category. 
Type 2: A 3-concept set where all 3 concepts 
come from the same industry category.  
Type 3: A 4-concept set where 2 concepts come 
from one industry category, and the other 2 
concepts come from a different industry 
category. 
Set Concept set Set 1: Hat, Mitten, Butter 
Set 2: Telephone, Television, Soap 
Set 3: Cereal, Chocolate, Watch 
Set 4: Bread, Cookie, Pasta 
Set 5: Carpet, Box, Envelope  
Set 6: Air-conditioner, Heater, Refrigerator, 
                                                     
14 Some associations were left unrated by some participants. 
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Furnace 
OriginalSource Denotes the source 
concept from which 
associations were 
originally obtained 
in Experiment One 
For example, association # 1 to #10 were 
originally obtained from hat in Experiment One. 
FamiliarityIndex The familiarity 
score obtained in 
Experiment One 
Examples see Table 4-5. 
Association The verbal 
description of the 
each association 
For example: “It is worn on the head” 
Association# A unique number 
assigned to each 
association 
From #1 to #610 




For example: association #1 “It is worn on the 
head” was evaluated against Hat, Mitten, Butter, 
Hat Mitten, Mitten Hat, Hat Butter, or Butter 
Hat respectively 
StudentID A unique number 
assigned to each 
participant 
A unique identifier was assigned to each 
participant. 
Rating The specific rating 
given by a 





1 – 7 
 
The distribution of the ratings could be summarized in many different ways. For 
example, a new variable was calculated: “value_mean” representing the mean value of the 
participants’ ratings for each association evaluated against a conceptual entity. A histogram 
of the distribution of value_mean is provided in Figure 4-2. Here, n means the number of 
the unique association – conceptual entity pairs that participants evaluated. In order to 
understand the codes that were assigned to the data which will be used in the hypothesis 


















 Std. Dev. =1.49828
N =2,585
Histogram
Figure 4-2: Histogram of the distribution of value_mean 








Table 4-11: The codes assigned to the data for hypothesis testing 
Conceptual Entities (Codes used in thesis) Concept 
sets Component Concept Conceptual Combinations 
Set 1 Hat (C1) 
Mitten (C2) 
Butter (C3) 
Hat Mitten (C1C2) 
Hat Butter (C1C3) 
Mitten Butter (C2C3) 
Mitten Hat (C2C1) 
Butter Hat (C3C1) 
Butter Mitten (C3C2) 
Set 2 Telephone (C1) 
Television (C2) 
Soap (C3) 
Telephone Television (C1C2) 
Telephone Soap (C1C3 
Television Soap (C2C3) 
Television Telephone (C2C1) 
Soap Telephone (C3C1) 
Soap Television (C3C2) 
Set 3 Cereal (C1) 
Chocolate (C2) 
Watch (C3) 
Cereal Chocolate (C1C2) 
Cereal Watch (C1C3) 
Chocolate Watch (C2C3) 
Chocolate Cereal (C2C1) 
Watch Cereal (C3C1) 
Watch Chocolate (C3C2) 
Set 4 Bread (C1) 
Cookie (C2) 
Pasta (C3) 
Bread Cookie (C1C2) 
Bread Pasta (C1C3) 
Cookie Pasta (C2C3) 
Cookie Bread (C2C1) 
Pasta Bread (C3C1) 
Pasta Cookie (C3C2) 




Carpet Box (C1C2) 
Carpet Envelope (C1C3) 
Box Envelope (C2C3) 
Box Carpet (C2C1) 
Envelope Carpet (C3C1) 
Envelope Box (C3C2) 




Air-conditioner Heater (C1C2) 
Air-conditioner Refrigerator (C1C3) 
Air-conditioner Furnace (C1C4) 
Heater Refrigerator (C2C3) 
Heater Furnace (C2C4) 
Refrigerator Furnace (C3C4) 
Heater Air-conditioner (C2C1) 
Refrigerator Air-conditioner (C3C1) 
Refrigerator Heater (C3C2) 
Furnace Air-conditioner (C4C1) 
Furnace Heater (C4C2) 
Furnace Refrigerator (C4C3) 
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Chapter 5 Hypothesis Testing 
This chapter focuses on the hypothesis testing and discussion of test results.  
5.1  Testing Hypothesis 1  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that associations of one component concept are activated 
contingently upon the existence of the other component concept. The corollary derived 
from this hypothesis predicts that a concept will activate different associations when paired 
with different concepts. For example, hypothesis 1 predicts that the concept C1 will 
activate different associations when C1 is used in the following combinations: 
C1C2 vs. C1C3 (C1 functions as a modifier, paired with different head concepts) 
C2C1 vs. C3C1 (C1 functions as a head, paired with different modifier concepts) 
In the study, activating different associations corresponds to the idea that associations 
originating from C1 will have different activation strengths when C1 is paired with 
different concepts. For example, “It is worn on the head” is an association originating from 
Hat in Experiment One. When Hat is paired with Mitten or Butter, hypothesis 1 predicts 
different activation strengths for this association in Hat Mitten vs. Hat Butter (also different 
in Mitten Hat vs. Butter Hat). Here, the null hypothesis is that associations activated by a 
concept are no different in strength when the concept is paired with different concepts.  
5.1.1 Test Statistic 
A series of independent samples T tests were used to test this hypothesis. For 
example, there are 10 associations originated from a given concept C1 identified in 
Experiment One. For each of these 10 associations, the mean rating of the association 
against C1C2 was compared to its mean rating against C1C3. Similarly, its mean rating 
against C2C1 was compared to its mean rating against C3C1. Concept sets #1 - #5 
consisted of 3 individual concepts each, so there were 60 t tests per concept set, and a total 
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of 300 t tests for all 5 concept sets. Concept set #6 consisted of 4 individual concepts, so 
considering all possible combinations, there were 240 t tests for concept set #6. In total, for 
the whole data set, 300+240=540 t tests were performed and the results are provided in 
Appendix 10. Of the 540 t values, there were 262 cases where p ≤ 0.05 which support H1 
(rejecting H0). In a random condition, it is expected there will be 5% of cases that t test will 
be significant (95% confidence level) by chance. The percentage of t value that support H1 
is 262/540=48.5%, which is significantly higher than chance.  
To generalize from the individual t-test results to the full data set, a chi-square test 
was performed to test whether the acquired distribution of t-values was significantly 
different from chance. If we assume conservatively that p<0.05 would result 50% of the 
time, the chi-square test does not provide support for the hypothesis (χ2=0.474; p=0.491; 
df=1; n=540). If we assume 40% as the sufficient support threshold, the chi-square test 
supports the hypothesis (χ2=16.327; p<0.001; df=1; n=540). This analysis suggests that H1 
is accepted based on the judgment on what is the appropriate level of criteria of the support 
by chance.  
5.1.2 Analysis of the test result 
In a sense, the degree of the support of this hypothesis is a matter of judgment. A few 
reasons could be postulated. First, the 7-point scale has a constraint on the variance of the 
ratings the experiment could get. From the summary statistics of the Experiment Two data, 
the mean of all ratings is 4.1774 which implies that participants’ ratings can only vary from 
the mean by about +/- 3. For data that is roughly normally distributed, we expect that about 
68.3% of the data will be within 1 standard deviation of the mean (i.e., in the range Xavg ± 
s.d.) and about 95% of the data will be within 1.96 standard deviation of the mean (95% 
confidence interval for the sample). Thus, there is a limit on how far 95% of the ratings can 
different from each other, which would lead to the fact that a lot of t tests would not be 
significant because of this upper / lower boundary of the scale.  
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Secondly, there might be some interactive effects between hypotheses. For example, 
there are conceptual influences between the contingency property that H1 predicts and the 
prototypicality property that H2 predicts. The contingency property predicts that the 
strengths of associations of C1 will be different when evaluated against C1C2 or C1C3. 
The prototypicality property predicates that the relative probability of an association 
activated in combination increases with the relative probability of the association activated 
in component concepts. Thus, if an association is a strong association for C1, then in any 
combination involving C1 as one component concept, this association will be relatively 
stronger. Thus, on the one hand, H1 predicts that C1 will activate different associations 
when paired with C2 or C3; on the other hand, H2 predicts that C1 will activate similar 
associations in any combination. This potential contradiction reflects the essential property 
of the cognitive system in meaning construction. Meaning construction is to create an 
integrated system that is based on the knowledge of two concepts, thus, stronger 
associations of component concepts will have more impact on the combination relative to 
weaker ones (H2). On the other hand, the pairing concept will have some impact on the 
combination as well, leading to some differences on the association activation of both 
component concepts (H1). Thus, it is understandable that there is an interaction effect 
between H1 and H2, leading to the weak support for both H1and H2. 
Another possible interactive effect is between contingency property (H1) and the 
different types of combinations. When designing the experiment stimulus, concept sets are 
composed of individual concepts from different industry categories (the 4th digit in 
NAICS), thus creating within-industry or between-industry combinations. For example, 
concept set #4 was composed of 3 concepts (Bread, Cookie, Pasta) that were drawn from 
the same industry category, thus generating 6 within-industry combinations; while concept 
set #1 (Hat, Mitten, Butter) was composed of 2 concepts from the same industry category 
and 1 from a different industry category, thus generating 2 within-industry combinations 
and 4 between-industry combinations. When evaluating associations against within-
industry combinations, it might be more difficult to differentiate their relative strength. For 
example, association #294 “It is made from flour and water” is originated from Pasta. 
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When participants evaluated this association against Bread Pasta or Cookie Pasta, they gave 
almost identical ratings. Thus, most of the t-test results for within-industry combinations 
were quite insignificant. 
The preceeding analysis indicates the importance of interaction effects between 
different variables in the conceptual interaction process, which will be tested later. 
5.2  Testing Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the relative probability of an association activated in 
combination increases with the relative probability of the association activated in 
component concepts. This hypothesis is a correlational prediction about the relation 
between the strength of the associations in components and in combination. For example, 
based on the prediction, if “it is worn on the head” is a stronger association than other 
associations originated from Hat, then, it will be a relatively stronger association in Hat 
Mitten, Hat Butter, Mitten Hat, and Butter Hat. The null hypothesis is that the strength of 
the component associations do not covary with the strength of the associations evaluated 
against combination. 
5.2.1 Test Statistic 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (r) was used to test this hypothesis. The generic 
design of this test is structured as follows: for any two-concept pairing such as C1-C2, up to 
40 associations were evaluated. Each association was evaluated by 20 participants against 
C1, C2, C1C2 and C2C1 respectively. A mean rating was calculated across 20 participants 
for every association, based on which Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated 
between the mean ratings of C1 and C1C2, as well as between C1 and C2C1, between C2 
and C1C2, between C2 and C2C1. For concept sets with 3 component concepts (sets #1 to 
#5), 12 Pearson correlation coefficients were required for each set, thus a total of 60 
Pearson’s r were computed. For concept set #6 with 4 component concepts, 24 Pearson 
correlation coefficients were required. Thus in total, 84 correlation were computed. The 
results are given in Appendix 11. 
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Out of 84 Pearson correlation coefficients, there were 48 results with p ≤ 0.05 and 52 
results with p ≤ 0.10.  Using the same thinking as hypothesis One, in a random condition, it 
is expected there will be 5% of cases that Pearson’s coefficient r will be significantly 
supporting H2 by chance based on 95% confidence level. The percentages of Pearson’s 
coefficients (r values) that support H2 in the results are 57% at 95% confidence level and 
62% at 90% confidence level, which are significantly higher than chance. Chi-square tests 
were conducted on these correlation results. Assuming 40% chance of obtaining a 
significant correlation (for correlations significant at the 0.05 level) between the strength of 
an association in the component and the strength of the same association in a combination, 
χ2=10.286 (p=0.001; df=1; n=84). Even assuming 50% chance of obtaining a significant 
correlation, for correlations significant at the 0.10 level, χ2=4.762 (p=0.029; df=1; n=84). 
The chi-square results further confirmed that the distribution of Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients is significantly different from chance at the 0.05 level (assuming 40% chance) 
and at the 0.1 level of significance (assuming 50% of chance). Thus, we are at least 95% 
confident that the strength of the component associations covaries with the strength of the 
associations evaluated against combination for correlations significant at the 90% 
confidence level. 
5.2.2 Analysis of the test result 
Observation of the distribution of Pearson’s correlation coefficients in Appendix 11 
suggests that when a concept functions as the grammatical head (i.e. the second word) in a 
combination, the relation predicted by H2 is more likely to be supported than when a 
concept functions as the grammatical modifier (i.e. the first word) in a combination. That 
is, for the concept pair C1 and C2, it appears that the association strengths of C1 are more 
likely to be significantly correlated with those of C2C1 (when C1 is the head) than with 
those of C1C2 (when C1 is the modifier). 
As a preliminary test of the moderating effect of a concept’s Head / Modifier role in 
combination on the relation between the strength of the component associations and the 
strength of the associations evaluated against combination, 2 chi-square tests were 
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conducted. When the correlation was between Head and combination, 32 out of 42 Pearson 
correlations were significant at the 0.05 level (χ2=11.542; p=0.001; df=1; n=42). When the 
correlation was between Modifier and combination, 16 out of 42 Pearson correlations were 
significant at the 0.05 level (χ2=2.381; p=0.123; df=1; n=42). These results suggest that 
whether a concept functions as the Head or Modifier in a conceptual combination will 
influence the relation between the strength of its associations and the strength of these 
associations evaluated against the combination. Further investigation of the moderating 
effect of Head-Modifier role will be reported in Section 5.7 
5.3  Testing Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis #3 predicts that the likelihood of an association of one of the component 
concepts being activated in the combination increases with the degree of balance of the 
triplet (i.e., the cognitive network consisting of the 2 component concepts and the 
association). Since there is a unique balance value for every association, for the easiness of 
the expression, I will refer to the balance value of the cognitive network as the balance of 
the association. Essentially, this is a correlational hypothesis, comparing two associations 
in terms of their relative balance values and the relative likelihood of their activations in the 
combination. For example, assume that both association #1 and #2 could potentially link 
concept C1 and concept C2 into a closed cycle. If the balance-score of the association #1 is 
larger than the balance-score of the association #2, then the hypothesis predicts that 
association #1 is more likely to be activated by the combination C1C2 (or C2C1) than 
association #2 (i.e., association #1 will obtain higher ratings when evaluated against C1C2 
or C2C1 than association #2). The null hypothesis is that there is no relation between the 
likelihood of an association of one of the components concepts being activated in the 
combination and the degree of balance of this association. 
As explained in Chapter 3, balance is defined as the product of Vi and Si for the three 
link (where Vi ∈ [+1, -1] and 0 ≤ Si ≤ +1) between 2 component concepts (C1, C2) and an 
association A.  
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Balance = (VC1C2*SC1C2)*(VC1A*SC1A)*(VC2A*SC2A) 
In this equation, the product of the valence and the strength of the link between the 
two component concepts in a conceptual combination (VC1C2*SC1C2) is always assumed to 
be 1. The other two factors (V*S) between an association and each component concept 
were obtained from Experiment Two based on participants’ mean ratings of each 
association-conceptual entity pair.  
Thus, balance is operationalized as the product of the mean ratings of an association 
against the 2 component concepts in a conceptual combination. The current ratings of the 
associations against concepts or combinations are of Likert scale type from 1 to 7. In this 
scale, 1 means that participants would definitely not mention the association when asked to 
define / explain / describe the concept; 7 means they would definitely mention the 
association; and 4 means they were not sure whether they would mention the association. 
Since each association would have a mean rating from 1 to 7 against each component 
concept, balance-scores varied from 1 to 49. In essence, this operationalization of balance is 
a kind of joint-prototypicality based on the product of an association’s typicality ratings for 
the 2 component concepts.  
Linear regression models were used to test the effects of an association’s balance 
score on its mean rating against a conceptual combination. In the analysis, the balance 
score for an association of a given concept pair C1-C2 was the independent variable and the 
mean rating of the association against the combination such as C1C2 was the dependent 
variable. 
It should be noted that in a two-concept pair C1 – C2, there are two conceptual 
combinations C1C2 and C2C1. The associations for this two-concept pair (e.g. association 
A) were evaluated against both combinations, corresponding to 2 mean ratings. That is to 
say, as independent variable, each balance-score predicts 2 different dependent variable 
values: the mean rating of an association against C1C2 and the meaning rating of the 
association against C2C1. Therefore, to test this hypothesis, 2 regression models were 
designed: one is the regression of the balance-score on the mean ratings against one 
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combination (such as C1C2); the other is the regression of the balance-score on the mean 
ratings against the reverse combination (such as C2C1). By implementing 2 regression 
models, each balance-score appears only once in a given data set for regression analysis. 
Because it is arbitrary which concept is considered to be C1 and C2 in a given conceptual 
combination, I expected the two models to exhibit very similar properties, as each model 
incorporated half of the data in the data set.  
The result of these two regression models is as follows: 
Table 5-1: Model I Summary and Parameter Estimates 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.320 .319 325.718 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.449 53.388 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.061 .566 18.048 .000 
 
Table 5-2: Model II Summary and Parameter Estimates 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.375 .374 415.030 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.382 54.506 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.066 .613 20.372 .000 
 
The results indicate that both models are significant (F test sig<0.001) and both 
models predict a positive coefficient (Beta = 0.566 and 0.613 respectively), indicating that 
the mean rating of an association for a given combination increases slightly with balance 
score for the association-combination triplet. Moreover, balance-score explains about one 
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third of the variance of the mean ratings of associations against combinations, indicating 
that balance is a strong explanatory variable in the model.  
The preceding analysis used data aggregated across all conceptual combinations in 
the data set. A set of more detailed regression analyses was conducted at the level of 
specific conceptual combinations. For instance, for a concept pair C1 – C2, the specific 
balance scores of the 40 associations were used to predict the mean ratings of those 
associations for combination C1C2 (or C2C1). Thus, for each concept set containing 3 
component concepts (sets #1 - #5), there were 6 regression models, and for concept set #6 
with 4 component concepts, there were 12 regression models, for a total of 42 regression 
models.  
The test design for the linear regression models is given in Appendix 12. The results 
of the linear regression models are summarized in Appendix 13. Among these 42 
regression models, 10 (model #3, #5, #9, #11, #12, #17, #18, #25, #28, #32) did not accept 
H3, either due to insignificant F statistics or negative coefficients, and 32 models supported 
H3 with significant positive coefficients. Chi-square test result (χ2=11.524; p=0.001; df=1; 
n=42) indicated that this distribution of the regression models was significantly different 
from chance (assuming 50% vs. 50%). Chi-square test for the distribution of the regression 
coefficients supports the idea (with 99.9% confidence level) that the likelihood of an 
association being activated in the combination increases with the degree of balance of the 
association. 
5.4 Testing Hypothesis 4  
Hypothesis #4 predicts that more associations originating from the second concept 
(grammatical head) than from the first concept (grammatical modifier) will contribute to 
the meaning of the combination. This hypothesis suggests a useful operational definition 
for psychological head (the one contributing more associations to the meaning of the 
combination) and modifier in the conceptual combination literature. The null hypothesis is 
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that fewer associations originating from second concept in a combination will be used to 
construct the meaning of the combination than the first concept.  
In this hypothesis, the term “contribute to the meaning of the combination” refers to 
the idea that the meaning of the combination would tend to activate these associations. The 
mean ratings of associations by participants give an index to association activation for a 
concept or conceptual combination. If more associations originating from the second 
concept contribute to the meaning of the combination than the associations originating from 
the first concept, then the mean ratings of association of the second concept will be 
relatively higher than those of the first concept. To test this hypothesis, three statistical 
methods were used: chi-square test and paired t test on the relation between Pearson’s 
correlations were used to test the hypothesis at the level of each concept pair, and 
regression was used to test the hypothesis across the whole data set. First, Pearson’s 
correlations between the mean ratings of associations for a single concept and those for 
combinations in which the concept is either grammatical head or modifier were used to 
measure the difference between the relative contributions of the mean ratings evaluated 
against first or second concept to the combination. Based on this logic, two statistical 
techniques were used to test this hypothesis:  chi-square test on the distribution of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients and a paired sample t test comparing Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients where components function as either grammatical head or modifier. 
Second, linear regression models were used to examine the relative contributions of the 
first or second concept to the meaning of the combination. 
5.4.1 Chi-square test on the distribution patterns of the Pearson’s r 
Based on the above analysis, we expect that in a combination, the associations of a 
concept will be more highly correlated with those of the combination when the concept 
functions as the grammatical head than when it functions as the modifier. For example, in a 
2-concept pair (C1 – C2), the meaning of the combination C1C2 will be more correlated 
with the meaning of the C2 (as the grammatical head) than with the meaning of C1 (as the 
grammatical modifier) as exemplified in Table 5-3: 
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Table 5-3: Expectations based on hypothesis 4 on the 2-concept pair Hat – Mitten (C1 – C2) 
Concept Pair Association number Evaluated Against Pearson’s r 
C1 (Modifier) C1C2 r 1 
C2 (Head) C1C2 r 2 
expectation: r2 > r1 
C2 (Modifier) C2C1 r 3 
C1 (Head) C2C1 r 4 
C1 – C2    #1 … #10 
#11 … #20 
#31 …  #40 
#41 …  #50 
expectation: r4 > r3 
 
The distribution of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients is summarized in Appendix 
14. Considering all combinations of single concepts and conceptual combinations in the 
data set, 84 Pearson’s correlation coefficients were computed, resulting in 42 comparisons 
between a given concept functioning as either grammatical head or modifier in a 
combination. Of these 42 comparisons, there were 31 cases in which the correlation was 
higher when the single concept functioned as grammatical head in the combination, and 11 
cases in which the correlation was higher when the single concept functioned as modifier in 
the combination. Chi-square test results (χ2=9.524; p=0.002; df=1; n=42) indicate that this 
distribution of correlation results is significantly different from chance.  
5.4.2 Paired t-test on Pearson’s r 
The proceeding chi-square analysis indicated that associations’ strengths are more 
highly correlated between single concept and combinations when the single concept 
functions as the grammatical head than when it functions as modifier. To determine 
whether these differences in degree of correlation were significant, a paired t-test was 
conducted, between the two matched sets of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r). The 
results are presented in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: Paired t test results for hypothesis 4 
 Paired Samples Statistics 
 
Paired Differences 
head_r - modifier_r  
  Mean N Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
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Pair 1 head_r  .49757 42 .267171
  modifier_r .18055 42 .396464
.317024 .565049
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pair 1 head_r  -  modifier_r  3.636 41 .001
 
The correlation coefficient between grammatical head and combination is 0.317 
higher on average than the correlation coefficient between modifier and combination. The t 
test result (t=3.636, p=0.001) indicates this difference is highly significant.  
Collectively, the chi-square and t test results indicate that the grammatical head (i.e. 
the second concept) contributes significantly more to the meaning of a combination than 
modifier (i.e. the first concept). This result suggests that the logic behind these two methods 
gives us a means of assessing how people actually interpret psychological head. By 
comparing the relative contribution of the component concepts to the meaning of the 
combination, we could differentiate psychological head from modifier.  
5.4.3 Linear Regression models 
Regression analysis was conducted to examine the relative contribution of the first or 
second concept to the meaning of the combination. The data set was evenly split into 2 sub-
sets of 1386 data points each, composed of the mean rating of the each association 
evaluated against either head or modifier. The regression models are as follows: 
Model #1: Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta*mean_rating_first_concept 
Model #2: Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta*mean_rating_second_concept 
The results of the two regression analyses are provided in Table 5-5: 
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Table 5-5: The regression models to examine the relative contribution of 1st or 2nd concept  
Model #1 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.875  54.299 .000
Mean_rating_first_concept 0.138 .016 8.680 .000
Model #2 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.161  50.273 .000
Mean_rating_second_concept 0.311 .514 22.280 .000
 
Both mean_rating_first_concept and mean_rating_second_concept have positive 
coefficients (beta = 0.016 and 0.514 respectively), indicating the probability of an 
association activated in combination increases with the probability of the association 
activated in both component concepts (consistent with the prototypicality hypothesis H2). 
However, mean_rating_second_concept explains much more variance of mean_rating 
against combination than mean_rating_first_concept (R2 = 0.264 vs. 0.052 respectively), 
and there is a greater degree of change (beta = 0.514 and 0.016 respectively) in 
Mean_rating_combination for each unit change in Mean_rating_second_concept than for 
each unit change in Mean_rating_ first_concept. Thus the probability of an association 
activated in combination increases much more with the probability of the associations 
activated in the second concept than in the first concept. That is, the second concept 
(grammatical head) contributes more to the meaning of the combination than the first 
concept (grammatical modifier). 
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5.5 Testing Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the meanings of novel combinations are more likely to 
incorporate lower strength associations from their component concepts than the meanings 
of everyday / mundane combinations. If a combination’s novelty implies that its component 
concepts share no prototypical associations, it is difficult to construct a closed loop / cycle 
during the meaning construction process. Thus, constructing the meaning of a novel 
combination should require the activation of less prototypical associations and require more 
search effort to identify potentially useful associations to construct a meaningful connection 
between the two component concepts. That is to say, the more novel a combination is 
regarded, the more low-strength associations from its components are required to construct 
its meaning. 
Essentially this hypothesis is about the moderating effect of Novelty on the relation 
between prototypicality and the meaning of the combination. It predicts that the more novel 
a conceptual combination is, the less prototypical associations from its component concepts 
will be used to construct its meaning. In this section, I will test this effect using a fairly 
strict measure of the novelty effect, and in next section, I will use moderated multiple 
regression to test this effect more explicitly. 
Novelty was operationalized in two ways in this study. First, novelty was directly 
judged by participants in Experiment One, who were asked to judge the familiarity of 
conceptual combinations on a scale of 1 (“least familiar”) to 5 (“most familiar”). 
Familiarity scores were obtained by calculating the average participant ratings for each 
conceptual combination (Table 4-5). 
Novelty was also operationalized through the selection of particular concepts from 
the NAICS industry classification scheme used to design the experiment stimuli. Based on 
my conceptual framework, novelty is inversely related to the probability of one component 
concept and its associations being present in the cognitive field of the other component 
concept. Thus, novel combinations share few if any associations, such that neither 
component concept is part of the prototypical knowledge related to the other concept. 
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Everyday / mundane combinations, by contrast, share overlapping associations, such that 
one component concepts and their associations are likely to be part of the prototypical 
knowledge related to the other.  
In the design of the 6 concept sets for the experimental stimuli, sets 1 - 5 were 
composed of 3 individual concepts and 6 conceptual combinations, and set 6 was composed 
of 4 concepts and 12 combinations. For sets 1, 2, 3, and 5, 2 concepts were selected from 
the same industry category (4 digit code in NAICS) and 1 was selected from a different 
industry category; for set 4, all 3 individual concepts were selected from the same industry 
category; and for set 6, 2 concepts were selected from one industry category and the other 2 
concepts were selected from another industry category. Thus, the combinations generated 
from each concept set included some combinations within the same industry category, and 
some combinations between different industry categories. If we assume that products 
within the same industry category are likely to be more similar to one another than products 
from different industry categories, then combinations of 2 concepts from the same industry 
category should be less novel (more mundane) than combinations of 2 concepts from 
different industry categories. Table 5-6 summarizes the conceptual combinations within 
and between industry categories. 
Table 5-6: The conceptual combinations within and between industry categories 
Conceptual Combination Concept 
Set Within the same industry category Between industry categories 
#1 Hat Mitten, Mitten Hat Hat Butter, Butter Hat, Mitten Butter, 
Butter Mitten 
#2 Telephone Television, Television 
Telephone 
Telephone Soap, Soap Telephone, 
Television Soap, Soap Television 
#3 Cereal Chocolate, Chocolate 
Cereal 
Cereal Watch, Watch Cereal, Chocolate 
Watch, Watch Chocolate 
#4 Bread Cookie, Bread Pasta, 
Cookie Pasta, Cookie Bread, Pasta 
Bread, Pasta Cookie 
 
#5 Envelope Box, Box Envelope Envelope Carpet, Carpet Envelope, Box 
Carpet, Carpet Box 
#6 Air-conditioner Heater, Heater Air-conditioner Refrigerator, 
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Air-conditioner, Refrigerator 
Furnace, Furnace Refrigerator 
Refrigerator Air-conditioner, Air-
conditioner Furnace, Furnace Air-
conditioner, Heater Refrigerator, 
Refrigerator Heater, Heater Furnace, 
Furnace Heater 
Total 18 24 
 
Based on these two ways of judging combination novelty, two methods were used to 
test hypothesis 5: Pearson’s correlation coefficient and independent samples t test. Because 
the previous hypothesis (H4) predicts a difference between head and modifier in 
contributing to the meaning of the combination, 2 separate tests were conducted by only 
examining head or modifier respectively for each method. 
To test the hypothesis, the description “more likely to incorporate lower strength 
associations from its components” was quantified as the percentage of low strength 
associations from either head or modifier which were high strength associations for the 
combination. Specifically, for each 2-concept pair (C1 – C2), participants rated up to 40 
associations against the single concepts and combinations (C1, C2, C1C2, C2C1). The top 
10 associations evaluated against each combination were treated as most representative of 
the meaning of the combination (high strength associations), and the lowest 10 associations 
for each component concept were treated as least representative (lower strength 
associations) for the component concepts. The percentage of lower strength (bottom 10) 
associations for either head or modifier included among the higher strength (top 10) 
associations for the combination provided a quantitative measure used to test H5. 
5.5.1 Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used to examine the relationship between the 
preceding percentage measure for head (or modifier) and familiarity scores. Hypothesis 5 
predicts that lower percentages should correspond with higher familiarity scores, thus a 
negative Pearson’s correlation was expected. Two Pearson’s correlations were obtained: for 
the correlation between the preceding percentage measure for head associations and 
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familiarity score, and for the correlation between the percentage measure for modifier 
associations and familiarity score. For the first correlation, the results (r=0.267, p=0.087, 
n=42) did not indicate support for the predicted relationship between the percentage of head 
associations and familiarity score. On the contrary, this result indicates a weak support for 
the opposite relationship between the percentage of head and familiarity score (i.e., more 
novel combinations activate more prototypical associations of the head concept). For the 
second correlation, the results (r=-0.257, p=0.101, n=42) indicated weak support for the 
predicted relationship between the percentage of modifier associations and familiarity 
score, but below the traditional 95% confidence level. 
5.5.2 Independent sample t test 
Independent samples t test was also used to test hypothesis 5, using the percentage of 
lower strength associations of either the head or modifier that are high strength associations 
of the combination as previously defined. The t tests compared the percentage measure for 
combinations composed of 2 concepts from the same industry category with the percentage 
measure for combinations composed of 2 concepts from different industry categories. The 
hypothesis predicts that percentages should be higher for combinations from different 
industry categories than combinations within the same industry category. Two results of the 
t test were obtained: one used the percentage of head associations and the other used the 
percentage of modifier associations. The results of the t tests are given in Table 5-7 and 5-
8. 
Table 5-7: The result of independent sample t test using percentage of the head 
 Samples Statistics 
  Mean N Std. Deviation 
within_industry 0.1457 18 0.1155
between_industry 0.0954 24 0.1267
 t df sig. (1-tailed) 
Percentage_Head 
 1.338 38.416 .378 
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For the percentage of the head’s low strength associations included in the 
combination’s top associations, the descriptive statistics indicate that the mean percentage 
was lower for combinations from different industries than for combinations from the same 
industry. The t value 1.338 (p=0.378 one tailed, df=38.416) indicates that the hypothesis is 
not supported.  
Table 5-8: The result of independent sample t test using percentage of the modifier 
 Samples Statistics 
  Mean N Std. Deviation 
within_industry 0.2378 18 0.1209
between_industry 0.3121 24 0.1722
 t df sig. (1-tailed) 
Percentage_Modifier 
 -1.641 39.867 .218 
 
For the percentage of the modifier’s low strength associations included in the 
combination’s top associations, the descriptive statistics indicate that the mean percentage 
for combinations from different industries was marginally higher than for combinations 
from the same industry. The t value -1.641(p=0.218 one tailed, df=39.867) indicates that 
the hypothesis is not supported.  
Collectively, the Pearson’s correlation and the independent sample t test did not 
support hypothesis 5. That is, the above statistical methods did not capture the influence of 
novelty on the meaning of combinations. There are a few potential reasons for this result. 
Firstly, the tests are overly strict. The percentage of top 10 vs. bottom 10 associations is 
quite extreme operationalization regarding novelty effects. This operationalization assumes 
that meaning of the novel combinations is more likely to incorporate associations with 
lowest strength (bottom 10) from its components, which might be an overly strict 
assumption. It is quite possible that before reaching to the bottom associations, a meaning 
has already been constructed using associations with medial strength. Moreover, another 
reason could be proposed. Theoretically, to construct the meaning of novel combinations, 
more search effort is required to identify potentially useful associations. Based on 
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hypothesis 2, when we construct the meaning of a novel combination, prototypical 
associations will be activated firstly as the first order activation. And then, it could be 
postulated that for novel combinations, second order associations might be necessary to 
construct a closed loop / cycle between the two components that do not share first order 
associations. However, the current data did not capture second order activations during the 
meaning construction process. To test how second order activation influences the meaning 
construction for novel combinations, it is necessary to collect more data to confirm this 
postulation.  
5.6 Testing Interaction Effects 
In the process of testing various factors influencing the meaning construction of 
conceptual combinations, each hypothesis was basically treated independently without 
considering interaction effects between variables. However, as the framework theorized, 
these factors mutually influence one another and this section will examine some of these 
interaction effects. The 5 factors influencing the meaning of conceptual combinations that 
were tested in this thesis are: contingency effects (H1), prototypicality effects (H2), balance 
effects (H3), head/modifier effects (H4) and novelty effects (H5). These 5 factors are likely 
to influence one another in complicated ways, but all such interactions are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The current thesis will examine the following interaction effects. Test 1 
will examine the moderating effects of head/modifier role on the relationship between 
prototypical associations of component concepts and association strength of combinations. 
Test 2 and 3 will examine the moderating effects of combination novelty on prototypicality 
and balance respectively. 
Moderated multiple regression procedures were used to test for the existence of 
moderator effects using models of the form Yi = β0 + βxXi + βzZi + βxzXi Zi + εi, where the 
Xi Zi moderating term represents the product of the two independent variables (Aiken and 
West 1991). Thus, the null hypothesis is formulated as H0: βxz = 0. 
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It is suggested by Aiken and West (1991) that before conducting moderated 
regression analysis, the covariances C (X, XZ) and C (Z, XZ) between the independent 
variables and their product should be reduced by "centering" the independent variables and 
using the centered variables, together with their product, in the regression model.  
Centering a variable is achieved by subtracting its mean from all observations. In all of the 
following regressions, centering was performed. 
In the following regression analyses, the dependent variable was the meaning of the 
conceptual combination, operationalized as the ratings of associations in a two-concept 
pairing as in the previous chapter. Independent and moderating variables were also 
operationalized as they were in the previous chapter. 
5.6.1 Test 1 – Head / Modifier and Prototypicality 
In testing hypothesis #2, a preliminary analysis indicated that when a component 
concept functioned as a grammatical head, prototypicality effects were much stronger than 
when the concept functioned as a modifier. Test 1 examined the moderating effects of Head 
/ Modifier role on prototypicality more explicitly. In the following regression, Head / 
Modifier were treated as a dummy variable, where 1 represents Head and 0 represents 
Modifier. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables and the results of the 
regression analysis are given in Table 5-9: 
Table 5-9: Regression analysis on the moderating effects of head/modifier 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Mean_rating against component 2772 1.00 7.00 4.1128 1.82048
H_M 2772 0 1 .50 .500
Model Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 





 B Beta 
T Sig. 
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Constant 4.442 230.787 .000
Mean_rating against component 0.225 .371 21.241 .000
H_M 2.43E-006 .000 .000 1.000
Mean_rating_H_M .174 .143 8.214 .000
 
The regression model is significant and the overall R2 is 0.158. From Table 5-9, we 
see variable H_M sig.=1.000 > 0.05, so removing H_M from this model will not 
significantly reduce the model's predictive capability. 
  It can be concluded that the coefficient of the independent variable “mean_rating 
against component” is positive, indicating that the relative probability of an association 
activated in combination increases with the relative probability of the association activated 
in component concepts (supporting H2). However, the coefficient of the other independent 
variable H_M is insignificant (p=1.000), indicating that Head / Modifier by themselves do 
not predict the activation of an association in combination. The coefficient of the product of 
the two independent variables “Mean_rating_H_M” is positive (0.174, t = 8.214 and p < 
0.001), indicating a significant moderating effect between Head/Modifier and 
prototypicality. Consistent with the preliminary results reported earlier, the effect of an 
association’s prototypicality for a component concept on its activation strength for the 
combination is higher when the component concept functions as the head of the 
combination than when it functions as the modifier of the combination. 
Logically, the effects of Head/Modifier role on the relationship between an 
association’s balance score and its strength in combinations should also be examined. 
However, since balance was calculated as the product of the mean_rating of the head and 
the mean_rating of the modifier, and multiplication has the commutative property, it is not 
expected that Head or Modifier will moderate the effect of balance. 
5.6.2 Test 2 – Novelty and Prototypicality 
Test 2 focuses on the moderating effect of Novelty on prototypicality (H5). It was 
postulated that when constructing the meaning for a novel conceptual combination, lower 
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strength (less prototypical) associations from component concepts will be more likely to be 
used. The more novel a conceptual combination is, the less prototypical associations from 
its component concepts will be used to construct its meaning. 
Similar to hypothesis #5 testing, there are two ways to operationalize combination 
novelty: familiarity score, and within/ between industry categories. Thus, 2 multiple 
regression models were examined. Model I used the familiarity score and Model II used the 
categorical variable within / between industry categories. 
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables in Model 1 and regression results 
are given in Table 5-10: 
Table 5-10: Regression Model I for the moderating effects of Novelty on prototypicality 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Mean_rating against component 2772 1.00 7.00 4.1128 1.82048
Familiarity score 2772 1.2222 4.8333 3.42352 1.09102
Model Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.455  223.067 .000
Mean_rating against component .221 .364 20.035 .000
Familiarity score .034 .033 1.803 .071
Mean_rating_Familiarity -0.029 -0.052 -2.902 .004
 
The regression model is significant with R2 = 0.142. The coefficient of the 
independent variable “mean_rating against component” is positive, indicating that the 
probability of an association activated in combination increases with the probability of the 
association activated in component concepts (supporting H2). However, the coefficient of 
Familiarity score is weakly significant (t=1.803, p=0.071), indicating that Novelty by itself 
weakly predicts the activation of an association in combination. The coefficient of the 
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product of the two independent variables “Mean_rating_Familiarity” is negative (B=-0.029, 
t = 8.214 and p < 0.001), indicating that there are moderating effects between these two 
independent variables.  
Two conclusions can be drawn. First, as familiarity score increases (a combination 
becomes less novel), the slope for the independent variable “mean_rating against 
component” decreases, indicating for a unit change in familiarity score, the unit change in 
“mean_rating against combination” decreases. That is, the strength of association against 
component will predict smaller relative changes in the strength of the association against 
combination. The more familiar a combination is, the less important the strength of 
association against component is in terms of predicting the strength of association against 
combination. Second, as familiarity score decreases, the strength of associations evaluated 
against components also decreases. This suggests that when constructing a novel 
conceptual combination, lower strength (less prototypical) associations from component 
concepts are more likely to be used, thus supporting H5. 
In regression model II, Novelty was treated as a dummy variable, where 1 represents 
Between Industry categories (implying more novel combinations) and 0 represents Within 
Industry category (implying less novel combinations). The descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables and the regression results are given in Table 5-11: 
Table 5-11: Regression Model II for the moderating effects of Novelty on prototypicality 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Mean_rating against component 2772 1.00 7.00 4.1128 1.82048
Within_between 2772 0 1 .58 .493
Model Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.437  227.400 .000
Mean_rating against component 0.209 .345 19.339 .000
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Within_between -0.361 -0.162 -9.109 .000
Mean_rating_within_between -0.035 -0.027 -1.540 .124
 
The regression model is significant with overall R2 = 0.164. The coefficient of the 
independent variable “mean_rating against component” is positive, indicating that the 
probability of an association activated in combination increases with the probability of the 
association activated in component concepts (supporting H2). The coefficient of  
“Within_between” is negative (B=-0.361), indicating that other things being equal, Novelty 
negatively predicts the activation of an association in combination (supporting H5). The 
coefficient of the moderating term “Mean_rating_within_between” is insignificant (t=-1.54, 
p = 0.124), indicating a weak moderating effect between the two independent variables. 
Comparing the two regression models, three observations could be made. First, both 
models indicate that probability of an association activated in combination increases with 
the probability of the association activated in component concepts (supporting H2). Second, 
the direct effect of novelty on the dependent variable “mean_rating against combination” is 
strong in Model II and relatively weaker in Model I. The magnitude of the direct effect in 
Model I is much smaller than in Model II. Third, the moderating effects are significant in 
model I but insignificant in model II. However, considering the relative crudeness of 
within/between industry category as an indicator of combination novelty (Model II), 
compared to the more direct participants’ rating of novelty using familiarity scores (Model 
I), it is reasonable to conclude that model I provides a more accurate assessment of the 
moderating effects of combination novelty on prototypicality (supporting H5). In general, 
the results provide relatively weak support for hypothesis 5, suggesting novel combinations 
do not necessarily incorporate more lower-strength associations from their components 
than everyday / mundane combination. 
5.6.3 Test 3 – Novelty and Balance 
Test 3 focused on the moderating effects of Novelty on the effects of balance.  Since 
balance is defined as joint prototypicality and previous tests found some moderating effect 
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of novelty on prototypicality, it is reasonable to examine the moderating effect of novelty 
on balance as well.  
Similar to the hypothesis 3 testing, Balance effects were tested using two identical 
regression models, each considering half of the data set, because a single balance score for 
an association-combination triplet predicts two association ratings against combination in 
reverse sequence (C1C2 and C2C1). Similar to the preceding analysis, novelty is 
operationalized in two ways: familiarity score, and within/ between industry category. 
Thus, a total of four regression models were analyzed (Table 5-12). 
Table 5-12: The four models used to analyze the moderating effect of novelty on balance 
Novelty Balance (C1C2) 
(using one half of the data set) 
Balance (C2C1) 
(using the other half of the data set) 
familiarity score Regression Model #1 Regression Model #2 
within / between 
industry category 
Regression Model #3 Regression Model #4 
 
The descriptive statistics and regression results for Model #1 and #2 are given in 
Table 5-13. 
Table 5-13: Regression Models #1 & #2 for the moderating effect of novelty on balance 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Balance_score 1386 1.49 45.00 16.1459 10.23245
Familiarity_score 1386 1.2222 4.8333 3.42352 1.091217
Model #1 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.436  173.511 .000
Balance_score 0.062 .574 24.749 .000
Familiarity_score -0.030 -0.030 -1.217 .224
Balance_score_familiarity -0.001 -0.006 -0.261 .794
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Model #2 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.453  181.330 .000
Balance_score 0.067 .620 27.895 .000
Familiarity_score -0.029 -0.029 -1.214 .225
Balance_score_familiarity -0.001 -0.009 -0.381 .703
 
Both regression models were significant with R2 > 0.3. The coefficients of the 
independent variable Balance_score were positive (0.574 and 0.620 respectively), 
indicating that the probability of an association activated in combination increased with the 
balance score of the association (supporting H3). However, the coefficients of the other 
independent variable Familiarity_score were insignificant (p=0.224 and 0.225 
respectively), indicating that Novelty by itself does not predict the activation of an 
association in combination. The coefficients of the moderating terms 
Balance_score_familiarity were also insignificant (p=0.794 and 0.703 respectively), 
indicating that there are no moderating effects between these two independent variables.   
In regression models #3 and #4, Novelty was treated as a dummy variable, where 1 
represents Between Industry categories (implying more novel combinations) and 0 
represents Within Industry category (implying less novel combinations). The descriptive 
statistics and regression results for Model #3 and #4 are given in Table 5-14. 
Table 5-14: Regression Models #1 & #2 for the moderating effect of novelty on balance 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Balance_score 1386 1.49 45.00 16.1459 10.23245
Within_between 1386 0 1 .58 .493
 Model #3 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 







 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.460  174.673 .000
Balance_score 0.060 .561 24.049 .000
Within_between -0.110 -0.049 -2.111 .035
Balance_score_within_bw 0.017 0.074 3.329 .001
Model #4 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 4.478  182.832 .000
Balance_score 0.065 .606 27.113 .000
Within_between -0.128 -0.057 -2.573 .010
Balance_score_within_bw 0.017 0.078 3.646 .000
 
Both regression models were significant with R2 > 0.3. The coefficients of the 
independent variable Balance_score were positive (0.561 and 0.606 respectively), 
indicating that the probability of an association activated in combination increased with the 
balance score of the association (supporting H3). The coefficients of the other independent 
variable Within_between were significantly negative (p=0.035 and 0.010 respectively), 
indicating a slight negative effect of Novelty on the activation of an association in 
combination. The coefficients of the moderating term Balance_score_within_bw had a 
small beta (0.074 and 0.078 respectively) but were significant (p=0.001 and p<0.001 
respectively), indicating a moderating effect on the effects of balance on the likelihood of 
an association being activated in a combination. 
Comparing the results of these 4 regression models, it is very difficult to make a 
general conclusion about whether or not there is a moderating effect between novelty and 
balance. However, even if there is a moderating effect as suggested by model #3 and #4, it 
is relatively small.  
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5.7 Testing relative contributions of prototypicality and balance 
One of the interesting issues derived from the framework is how prototypicality and 
balance contribute to the meaning construction of a combination. Prototypicality refers to 
the strength of the activation of an association by a concept. Previous results have shown 
that other things being equal, associations activated with higher strength by at least one of 
the component concepts are more likely to be activated when constructing the meaning of 
combination. However, the balance hypothesis (H3) predicts that if a highly salient 
association cannot form a balanced cycle, it will be dropped from the set of activated 
associations and less salient associations will be activated. In the framework, balance is 
defined as the product of valence and strength of the associations linking two components 
in a conceptual combination and is therefore a kind of joint prototypicality. Previous results 
have also shown that other things being equal, the likelihood of an association of one of the 
component concepts being activated in the combination increases with the degree of 
balance of this association. The results therefore supports both the prototypicality and 
balance hypotheses, but the relative contributions of prototypicality and balance are not yet 
clear. To explore this question, multiple linear regression models were constructed for 
comparison. 
To explore the relative contributions of prototypicality and balance to the meaning of 
the combination, the data set was split into 2 sub-sets, each contains mean ratings of 
associations evaluated against combinations in one sequence (C1C2) or evaluated against 
combinations in reverse sequence (C2C1) based on the same logic as the hypothesis #3 
testing (i.e., each balance score predicts 2 ratings for a given associations against 
combination C1C2 or C2C1, so these predictions are analyzed separately). Within each 
subset, data were further divided into 2 more subsets composed of the mean rating of the 
each association evaluated against either head or modifier. This leads to 4 subsets of the 
data; each containing 693 data points as demonstrated in Table 5-15. 3 regression analyses 
were conducted in each data sestet. These 3 regression models examined incremental 
effects of meaning ratings evaluated against components (either as head or modifier), 
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balance score and both of mean ratings against components and balance as exemplified in 
the Table 5-16. 
Table 5-15: The division of the data set to test the relative contribution of prototypicality and 
balance. 
 Balance (C1C2) Balance (C2C1) 
Mean_rating_head Regression Model #1, #2, #3 Regression Model #7, #8, #9 
Mean_rating_modifier Regression Model #4, #5, #6 Regression Model #10, #11, #12 
 
The results of 6 regression analyses, corresponding to the first column (C1C2) of 
Table 5-15 are reported here. The corresponding results for the 6 regressions in the second 
(C2C1) column in Table 5-15 are highly consistent with those presented below and are 
reported in Appendix 15.  
Table 5-16: Regression analyses conducted for each data subset 
RM #1. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*mean_rating_head 
RM #2. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*balance_score 
RM #3. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1* mean_rating_head + 
Beta2*balance_score 
RM #4. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*mean_rating_modifier 
RM #5. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*balance_score 
RM #6. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1* mean_rating_modifier + 
Beta2*balance_score 
 
The regression results for Models #1 to #3 are reported in Table 5-17: 
Table 5-17: The regression results for Models #1 to #3 to examine relative contributions of 
prototypicality and balance 
Model #1 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 








 B Beta 
Constant 3.029  35.223 .000
Mean_rating_head 0.345 .566 18.049 .000
Model #2 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.382  54.506 .000
Balance_score 0.066 .613 20.372 .000
Model #3 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 2.905  36.954 .000
Mean_rating_head 0.194 .318 27.113 .000
Balance_score 0.046 0.429 12.294 .000
 
Comparing the results of these regression models, 2 basic observations could be 
made: the adjusted R square increases from Model #1 to #3; and for Model #3, the relative 
effect of balance on the dependent variable is more than that of the prototypicality of head 
(mean_rating_head). The results indicate that the effects of balance generally explain more 
of the variance in the dependent variable (mean_rating against combination) than 
prototypicality of the head concept (mean_rating_head). When the effects of both balance 
and prototypicality are considered (Model #3), the explained variance of the dependent 
variable is the greatest. The larger beta value for Balance compared to the beta value for 
mean_rating_head indicates that the strength of the association against combination 
increases more sharply for a unit of change in Balance than for a unit of change in 
mean_rating_head. That is, generally balance is a better indicator of the strength of the 
association against combination than prototypicality.    
The regression results for Model #4 to #6 are presented in Table 5-18. 
 144
Table 5-18: The regression results for Models #4 to #6 to examine relative contributions of 
prototypicality and balance 
Model #4 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.942  38.978 .000
Mean_rating_modifier 0.124 .205 5.506 .000
Model #5 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.382  54.506 .000
Balance_score 0.066 .613 20.372 .000
Model #6 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.733  46.759 .000
Mean_rating_modifier -0.146 -0.242 -6.682 .000
Balance_score 0.082 0.755 20.892 .000
 
Comparing the results of these regression models, the same 2 basic observations 
could be made: the adjusted R square increases from Model #4 to #6; and for Model #6, the 
relative effect of balance on the dependent variable is more than that of the prototypicality 
of modifier (mean_rating_modifier). The results indicate that the effects of balance 
generally explain more of the variance in the dependent variable (mean_rating against 
combination) than prototypicality of the modifier concept (mean_rating_modifier). When 
the effects of both balance and prototypicality are considered in Model #6, the explained 
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variance of the dependent variable is the greatest. The larger beta value for Balance 
compared to the negative beta value for mean_rating_modifier indicates that the strength of 
the association against combination increases for a unit of change in Balance, but decreases 
for a unit of change in mean_rating_modifier. That is, generally balance is a better indicator 
of the strength of the association against combination than prototypicality, and the 
prototypicality of the associations of the modifier concepts is negatively related to the 
strength of these associations evaluated against combination. 
In summary, the relative contribution of the balance variable is larger than that of the 
prototypicality variable in constructing the meaning of the combination. Moreover, the 
relative contribution of the head concept is much larger than that of the modifier concept to 
the meaning of the combination. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
This thesis has proposed a framework explaining the cognitive processes of meaning 
construction through conceptual interactions. It is proposed that when we construct 
complex meanings from smaller conceptual units, the associations of these units combine to 
form a cognitive field exhibiting Gestalt figure-ground characteristics. Meaning 
construction, therefore, is theorized as a goal-directed cognitive process. The goal is to 
make sense of the combination of concepts, which analytically equates to a search for a 
system of associative concepts that connect two (or more) conceptual units in a balanced 
way.  Experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses derived from the framework. In 
this chapter, I will summarize the major findings from the experiments, identify some of 
the limitations as well as future work, and propose some potential contributions of this 
research. 
6.1 Summary of findings, limitations and future work 
Four general findings could be summarized regarding the processes of conceptual 
interactions in meaning construction: contingency, prototypicality, balance, and the effects 
of head/modifier and novelty. In this section, I will discuss these findings, and then present 
a general discussion on the limitations of the research.  
The first property of conceptual interactions examined in the experiments is related to 
the assumption of the mutual influence of component concepts in meaning construction. 
Meaning, in this thesis, is defined as a mental state resulting from the interactions of 
associative concepts (i.e., conceptual interaction) in the communicative context. This 
definition emphasizes that meaning is constructed through the influence of associative 
concepts on each other. The results of the Hypothesis 1 and 2 testing provided two kinds of 
evidence for this assumption. The first evidence is that the meaning of the combination is a 
function of its simpler component concepts. The chi-square results for Hypothesis 2 
indicated that for correlations significant at 0.1 level, χ2=4.762 (p=0.029; df=1; n=540), 
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which means that we are at least 95% confident that strength of the associations of the 
component concepts covaries with the strength of the associations evaluated against 
combination for correlations significant at 90% confidence level. That is, each component 
concept provides the combination with the ‘raw materials’, from which the meaning of the 
combination is constructed. The second evidence is that the meaning of each component 
concept is a function of the other concept.  The chi-square results for Hypothesis 1 
indicated that if we consider 40% as the sufficient support threshold, (χ2=16.327; p<0.001; 
df=1; n=540), associations of a component concept will be activated contingently in 
combination, depending on the other component concept.  
The second property of conceptual interactions examined in the experiments is 
regarding to the relationship between the strength of associations in component concepts 
and the strength of associations in combinations. Experimental results indicated that the 
prototypicality of associations of the component concepts significantly affects the meaning 
of the combination (H2); and among the 2 component concepts, the head concept has 
significantly more explanatory power than the modifier (H4). Regression analyses indicated 
that prototypicality on average explains about 15% of the variance in mean rating against 
combination and this explanatory power is moderated by the role of head/modifier. This 
finding is consistent with Hampton’s findings (Hampton, 1987, 1999). Hampton found that 
the average prototypicality of 2 component concepts accounted for a very large part of the 
variance in conjunctive prototypicality (about 80 – 90% of variance in the meaning of the 
combination). In my experiment, I found a much lower predicative power for 
prototypicality of associations of component concepts. My data indicated that the head 
concept explains about 25% of variance and the modifier explains about 5% of variance in 
the meaning of the combination.  
There are also some important differences between Hampton’s findings and mine. 
For example, in Hampton’s model, the joint effect of the two component concepts was 
measured as the average of the two typicalities of the attributes of the components. In my 
model, the joint effect of the two was measured as a product of the prototypicalities of the 
associations of the head and the modifier, which has a very good predicative power (though 
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lower than Hampton’s findings), explaining about 37% of variance. In Hampton’s 
experiments, he did not differentiate the head concept from the modifier concepts and only 
dealt with so called true conjunctives of the form “X that is also Y” (such as “pets that are 
also birds”), whereas I did not use combinations phrased as relative clauses in my 
experiment. Instead, I used the direct combinations such as C1C2 or C2C1 (hat butter or 
butter hat). Thus, Hampton’s experiment results did not differentiate the relative 
contributions of the two component concepts; instead, he gave equivalent weight to the 2 
components by taking the average of the typicalities of attributes from the components. In 
my experiment, I differentiated the different roles that each component concept plays in the 
combination and found that the head concept has a much larger effect than the modifier on 
the meaning of the combinations. This finding is also inconsistent with Gagne’s finding 
(1997) that modifiers exerted a greater influence than head on determining the relation 
between 2 components in meaning construction. However, this difference is not difficult to 
explain. Gagne studied thematic relations between two components when constructing the 
meaning of the combination while I focus on the semantic meaning of the combination. 
Because conceptual combination is a relational phenomenon, the way we make sense of a 
combination is by making sense of some kind of relation between the two components. In 
this process, modifiers may have a major effect on how concepts relate to one another, but 
that does not imply that a combination’s overall meaning is dominated by the meaning of 
the modifier. I found that the resultant meaning of the combination is largely dependent on 
the head concept, suggesting that the grammatical head is usually the more central concept 
in combination.  
The third property of conceptual interactions examined in the experiments regards the 
relationship between balance and the strength of association in combination. In the thesis, 
balance was operationalized as a joint prototypicality of head and modifier, reflecting the 
systemic characteristics of triplets composed of two component concepts and an 
association. Through the study on the relative contributions of prototypicality and balance, 
it was found that balance has more explanatory power than prototypicality to the meaning 
of a combination. However, it should be noted that the current operationalization of balance 
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is somewhat different from Heider’s conceptualization. In Heider’s theory, balance 
indicates the total system of the entities (i.e. all three entities in a triplet), while in my 
current method, balance mainly reflects the two links between an association and the two 
component concepts. The strength of the link between the two component concepts is 
conveniently assumed as 1. As a result, I have really tested the joint prototypicality of an 
association in relation to the head and the modifier (3 entities with 2 links), rather than the 
triplet composed of 3 entities and 3 links. This assumption is based on the fact that 
participants were forced to make sense of a combination that was presented to them in the 
experiment. Thus, combinations were treated as perfectly linked concept pairs without any 
uncertainty about the link, although, it is clear that participants should still experience a 
degree of uncertainty about the link between 2 components. In future research, I will 
explore ways of operationalizing balance more consistent with Heider’s conceptualization 
by considering perceived uncertainty in the link between the two components of a 
combination. For example, instead of assuming the strength of the link between head and 
modifier as 1, I could potentially use the familiarity score as an indicator of the degree of 
the uncertainty between the 2 components. Moreover, this operationalization might resolve 
another difficulty in the current methods, the fact that one balance score was used to predict 
the mean ratings of an association against two different combinations (C1C2 and C2C1). If 
C1C2 has a different familiarity score from C2C1, an association’s balance score for C1C2 
should be different from its score for C2C1, thus, leading to 2 different predictions of its 
mean rating against the two combinations.  
In coding participants’ association ratings, I used a numeric scale from 1 to 7, where 
a rating of “definitely no” was coded as 1, “not sure” as 4, and “definitely yes” as 7. All of 
the subsequent data analyses were based on this transformation. However, the 
appropriateness of this transformation is worth considering. Specifically, this 
transformation has difficulty dealing with negative associations. In a preliminary analysis, I 
tried coding participants’ ratings from -3 to +3, where “definitely no” was coded as -3, “not 
sure” as 0, and “definitely yes” as +3, a scheme that resulted in numerous associations with 
negative activation strength. However, there were several problems with this coding 
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scheme. For example, the mapping between the wording of the questionnaire and a -3 to +3 
scale is not clear in this transformation. Based on the wording of the question (“on the scale 
from ‘definitely no’ to ‘definitely yes’, please indicate how likely is it that you would 
mention the following ideas”), responses reflect an estimate of the probability of 
mentioning a certain idea, thus “definitely no” should correspond to a probability of 0 
rather than -3; ‘not sure’ should correspond to a probability of 0.5 rather than 0; and 
‘definitely yes’ should correspond to a probability of 1 rather than +3. Thus, coding 
participant ratings from -3 to +3 did not seem to capture the intended meaning of the 
questions. A coding scheme from 0 to 1 may be used; however, such a coding scheme 
would not capture negative associations as well. 
Another problem with using a -3 to +3 scale or a 0 to 1 scale was related to apparent 
inconsistencies in the computation of balance scores, especially when calculating balance 
between a weak negative link and a strong positive link. For example, in a system 
composed of my wife, me and a movie, if I like the movie very much (a strong positive, say 
+3), but my wife slightly dislikes the movie (a weak negative, say -1), then the balance 
score for the system (calculated as the product of the three links between me, my wife, and 
the movie) would be a strong negative (+3*-1=-3,assuming the link between my wife and 
me is 1). That is, there is a strong negativity in the system of my wife, me and the movie, 
which is in conflict with our intuitive understanding on this situation. If we use a 0 to 1 
scale, the balance score for the system would be smaller than either link between the movie 
and my wife or me (i.e., the degree of the liking relation between the movie and us as a 
couple is even lower), which is in conflict with our intuitive understanding on the situation 
as well. Using data from my experiment, the mean rating of association #21 “used in 
baking, cooking & frying” was 3.05 against hat, 6.58 against butter, 3.83 against hat butter, 
and 3.2 against butter hat on the current scale from 1 to 7. If the scale was transformed into 
a new scale from -3 to +3, the mean ratings would become -0.95, 2.58, -0.17 and -0.8 
respectively. Then the balance score calculated in the system of hat, butter, and “used for 
cooking etc.” becomes a quite strong negative value (-0.95X2.58=-2.451), indicating that 
the association is strongly negatively linked to the combination hat butter or butter hat, 
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which is in conflict with the observed slightly negative values (-0.17 and -0.8 respectively). 
It is clear that in the attempt to code participants’ judgments in a way that captures negative 
associations (e.g. using a scale from -3 to +3), there are some difficulties yet to be solved. 
The last property of conceptual interactions examined in the experiments regards the 
moderating effect of novelty on the relationship between prototypicality / balance and the 
combinations’ association activation. The experimental results indicated that any direct 
effects of combination novelty on the first order association activation are marginal at best. 
Moreover, it seems that novelty does not have obvious interaction effects on either 
prototypicality or balance. As previously noted, there may be several reasons for these 
results. Methodologically, the current experiment captured only first order association 
activations by asking participants to evaluate associations directly against a conceptual 
entity. It did not capture potential second order association activations by, for example, 
asking participants first to generate second order associations related to the first order 
associations and then later to evaluate these against the first order associations. However, as 
I conceptualized in the framework, constructing the meaning of novel combinations should 
require more search effort to identify potentially useful associations to construct a closed 
loop / cycle between two component concepts that do not share first order associations. 
Thus, novelty should have an effect on meaning construction, but the current statistical 
techniques were not able to capture such effects. To test how second order activations may 
influence the meaning construction of novel combinations, further data collection would be 
required.  
A related issue is that novelty was operationalized using NAICS categories (within-
between) and participants’ familiarity scores, and the results suggest these two 
measurements were measuring different things. The familiarity score was the most direct 
measure of novelty but the data indicate a very small moderating effect on prototypicality 
and balance. The within/between category measure presumes that the structure of NAICS 
reflects the overlapping nature of the cognitive fields associated with concepts drawn from 
these categories. As an indirect measure, it exhibited a relatively larger moderating effect 
on balance, but a relatively smaller moderating effect on prototypicality. However, it 
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should be noted that the products in the same NAICS industry category may be quite 
heterogeneous, while products from different categories might share several similarities, 
suggesting that NAICS classification does not necessarily correspond with human 
similarity perceptions.  
The third reason for the weak effects of novelty might be due to the fine grained 
effect was not captured by the current test logic. Maybe when we understand the novel 
combinations and search for the possible associations that could link the two components, 
we do not need to go to the bottom 10 associations of either head or modifier. Thus the 
current percentage measure of top 10 vs. bottom 10 is too strict to capture the movement of 
associations’ weights in the middle, thus leading to the incapability of finding effects of 
novelty. 
Besides issues related to the findings regarding these properties of conceptual 
interactions, certain conceptual difficulties have been encountered that requires further 
research. I will not list all of the difficulties, but will focus on a few issues that are 
interesting to discuss.  
The current framework focuses attention on the triplet involving 2 concepts and a 
single association. The role of the larger cognitive network reflecting other associative 
concepts in the meaning construction processes are not clearly understood. For example, in 
my current framework, the meaning of elephant fish is represented as a triangle Δ fish-
trunk-elephant when it is interpreted as “a fish with a trunk”. However, there is no 
empirical evidence at this stage that the cognitive field of elephant fish for this 
interpretation is composed only of these 3 nodes. Experimentally, it is possible to obtain 
information on the resultant meaning of the combination; however, it is not clear whether 
this meaning comes from the interaction of just these 3 nodes or from interactions 
involving multiple associated concepts. It has also been proposed that the larger network of 
concepts may play a role in reducing the remaining tensions in the cognitive network after 
it is balanced (strengthening balance), however, the precise mechanisms by which this is 
happening remain a subject of future research.  
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Following the previous point, in the framework I proposed that the activation of 
associations is goal-directed, where the goal is to understand how the meaning of the two 
component concepts can fit together harmoniously. Graphically, this equates to 
constructing a linking path between nodes representing the two component concepts via 
other nodes representing associated concepts to form a balanced cycle. Based on this 
conceptualization, it is proposed that only those associations that are necessary for 
constructing a (potentially) balanced cycle are activated. As people encounter difficulties 
forming a closed cycle using first order associations, they are increasingly likely to use 
second order associations, as the tasty computer example used previously (section 3.2.2.3 
Balancing closed cycle) demonstrated. However, the specific mechanisms have not been 
specified. Further work is required to specify the processes involved in constructing a 
cognitive field including such higher order associations. 
The direction of an association is another important variable in the cognitive network, 
which has not yet been incorporated in the current framework. Directionality can be 
understood in two ways. First, direction could be defined as the asymmetric probability of 
one concept being associated with another concept; that is two concepts may have different 
probabilities of being associated with one another depending on which concept is the focus 
of attention. Second, direction can be understood in terms of the path through the network 
of associated concepts reflecting our knowledge of some domain, which our cognition 
follows to link one concept to another concept, as we construct the meaning of a conceptual 
combination. The importance of the second type of direction can be demonstrated by the 
following example. When elephant fish is understood as “a fish that eats elephant”, eat as 
the association of both fish and elephant has the potential to form a contingent cycle with 
two directions (second type direction). Our cognition could traverse from fish through eat 
to elephant to construct a meaning “fish that eats elephant”; or it could traverse from 
elephant through eat to fish to construct a meaning “elephant that eats fish”. It is not clear 
why cognition prefers the direction from fish through eat to elephant, though it could be 
postulated that in this situation, the head of the combination (fish) has the priority. Future 
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work is needed to examine how direction functions in constructing a balanced cycle and 
why certain directionality takes preference over others.  
Lastly, there are some methodological issues in the current data analysis. The current 
analysis used the mean rating across population as the indication of the prototypicality of 
the association relative to other associations when evaluated against a conceptual entity, 
which is consistent with the view that meaning is based on social consensus. However, this 
operationalization results in a loss of information about the variance in individual 
participant rankings. If two associations have different mean ratings but nonetheless 
significantly overlap in their general distributions, the regression results obtained in data 
analyses might be over-estimated due to ignoring the variances between participants’ 
individual ratings. However, the alternative is to obtain information on prototypicality via a 
within-subject experimental design, which has its own problems, such as possible memory 
effects between different rounds of data collection, or difficulties associated with asking 
participants to make comparisons on which association is most salient for them. Another 
way that might improve the current data collection is to design the question to be more 
generic in point of view. For example, instead of asking “how likely you would mention the 
following associations”, participants could be asked “how likely most people would 
mention the following associations” to obtain participants’ understanding of consensus 
meaning directly. 
6.2 Conclusion 
This research proposed a theoretical framework describing cognitive processes 
involved in constructing the meaning of conceptual combinations through conceptual 
interactions. My exploration of the phenomenon started from first principles by thinking 
about the question: what minimal assumptions are needed to understand the meaning of a 
conceptual combination? It seems that the minimum assumption is to have an association 
between 2 concepts, i.e., two concepts are associated with each other. Based on this 
assumption, meaning, knowledge, and contexts are all represented in the same way as a set 
of associated concepts, and the meaning of a conceptual combination is conceptualized as 
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the result of interactions between these associated concepts. This interaction is a goal-
directed cognitive process. The goal is to make sense of a conceptual combination by 
searching for a system of associated concepts that connects two (or more) conceptual units 
in a balanced way. It is proposed that the cognitive processes involved in meaning 
construction start from a distinction between the different roles each component concept 
plays (head or modifier) and then a system of associations are activated contingently, 
prototypically, and efficiently with the goal of forming a cognitive field (analytically 
represented as a closed cycle) to connect head and modifier in a balanced way. The 
balanced system of concepts is strengthened further by changing the strength of the 
activated associations to reconcile the remaining tension in the cognitive field.  
More importantly, this research opens up a question:  what is the relationship between 
schema-based models on conceptual combination and the association framework proposed 
in this thesis? Could we derive the schema based models from the association framework? I 
agree with Gagne that we know that certain words do related to one another in certain 
ways, and I agree with schema theorists that we know apple does have color and color 
could be red. In a sense, we do have various ways to structure our knowledge in certain 
ways. The difference that I am suggesting is that the causal mechanism is not built in that 
structure; rather, the simple associations may be guiding the combination process. For 
example, when we combine red apple, do we treat color as logically prior to red so that 
apple is associated to red via color? Or do we treat red as the direct association of apple, 
and color is just another association of both apple and red?  In a sense, does color enjoy a 
special characteristic of being an organizer, a slot, or a dimension that is different from so-
called value red? Or may be color is not different from red in terms of being associations of 
apple and they are only different when we generate a logical structure (a schema of apple) 
later? That is, what is logically prior in combining concepts?  
Clearly, the syntactic relations and schema structure must play a role in combining 
concepts, such as putting constraints of certain types. How these kinds of knowledge 
structures, which could be grammatical in nature, or more cognitive in nature, related to the 
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association framework that I proposed? For instance, could we derive from the association 
framework a kind of mechanism similar to slot filling? 
In the framework, the meaning of a combination amounts to a coherent Gestalt 
understanding. The parts that make up the meaning are the knowledge of the conceptual 
units. Thus, the meaning construction process is to construct a Gestalt representation that 
draws on, as its inputs, the knowledge we have related to these conceptual units. However, 
not all we know about a conceptual unit will show up in the meaning of a combination. 
Only relevant associations are activated based on contingency, prototypicality, balance and 
cognitive efficiency constraints. Thus, activation is biased in terms of fulfilling the goal: 
only associations that are most probable in terms of linking the component concepts will be 
activated, and activation will stop when a meaning that suits our current goal has been 
constructed. Here, the salience of an association (activated strongly) is based on the 
context, rather than as a property inherent to a concept. Thus, whether or not an association 
is salient depends on the current goal of activation and the context in which activation 
happens. This theorizing explains the emergent nature of association activation during 
meaning construction. 
The framework emphasizes the goal-directed nature of meaning construction and that 
balance is a perspective-based variable, i.e., different people have different perspectives / 
goals when they construct a balanced cycle; and the same individual may take different 
perspectives at different stages of the meaning construction process. Indeed, the 
construction of a balanced cycle involves shifting figure-ground relationship as different 
parts of our knowledge are organized into different Gestalts based on different perspectives 
and goals. 
In conclusion, a framework on meaning construction through conceptual interactions 
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280 concepts selected after the first round of examination of the raw data 
Actuator, Air-Conditioner, Aircraft, Alcohol, Alkalies, Alumina, Aluminum, Apparel, 
Automobile, Bag, Battery, Bearing, Belting, Beverage, Binders, Blade, Blankbook, Block, 
Blouse, Blower, Boiler, Bolt, Books, Bottle, Box, Brake, Bread, Brick, Broom, Brush, 
Bulb, Butter, Button, Cabinet, Cable, Cakes, Camper, Can, Canvas, Cap, Capacitor, 
Carburetor, Carpet, Casket, Cement, Ceramics, Cereal, Cheese, Chemical, Chlorine, 
Chocolate, Cigarette, Circuit, Clay, Clock, Clothes, Coat, Coffee, Coil, Compressor, 
Computer, Concrete, Connector, Container, Conveyor, Cookie, Copper, Cord, Cordage, 
Corn, Costume, Countertop, Cracker, Crane, Curtain, Cutlery, Cylinder, Detergent, Die, 
Doll, Door, Dough, Drapery, Dress, Drum, Dye, Earthenware, Electronic, Elevator, 
Embroidery, Engine, Envelope, Explosives, Fabric, Fan, Fastener, Fertilizer, Fibers, 
Filaments, Fixture, Flatware, Flooring, Flour, Foam, Footwear, Forms, Freezer, Fruit, 
Furnace, Furniture, Game, Garden, Gas, Gasket, Gear, Generator, Glass, Glassware, Glove, 
Graphite, Grease, Gum, Handbag, Handsaw, Handtool, Hat, Heater, Hoist, Hollowware, 
Hoses, Hosiery, Housewares, Ice, Inductor, Ink, Jacket, Jean, Jig, Juice, Lace, Lamp, 
Laundry, Lawn, Lens, Lighting, Linen, Lingerie, Locker, Loungewear, Luggage, Lumber, 
Malt, Mayonnaise, Meat, Medicine, Metals, Milk, Millwork, Missile, Mitten, Mold, 
Monorail, Mop, Motor, Neckwear, Needle, Newsprint, Nightwear, Nuts, Ordnance, 
Outerwear, Oven, Overcoat, Packaging, Pallet, Pan, Paper, Paperboard, Partition, Pasta, 
Pastries, Pen, Pencil, Pesticide, Petrochemical, Pharmaceutical, Pies, Pigment, Pin, Pipe, 
Piston, Plastics, Plumb, Plywood, Polystyrene, Porcelain, Pot, Pottery, Printer, Pulp, Pump, 
Purse, Radio, Refrigerator, Relay, Resin, Resistor, Ribbon, Rice, Rivet, Roof, Rope, 
Rubber, Rug, Sauce, Saw, Sawmill, Screw, Seasoning, Seat, Semiconductor, Shelve,  
Shingle, Shirt, Shirt, Showcase, Sign, Skirt, Slack, Slipper, Snack, Soap, Sock, Spice, 
Stacker, Starch, Stationery, Steer, Sugar, Suspension, Switchboard, Switchgear, Syrup, 
Tablet, Tank, Tea, Telephone, Television, Textile, Thread, Tile, Tire, Tobacco, Tool, 
Tortilla, Toy, Tractor, Trailer, Transformer, Transmission, Trouser, Truck, Truss, Tube, 
Turbine, Twine, Underwear, Urethane, Utensil, Vacuum, Valve, Vegetable, Vehicle, 




The second round of data filtered with 55 concepts (bold face) left 
311 Food Manufacturing 
3112 Grain and Oilseed Milling: Flour, Cereal, Sugar, Chocolate 
3115 Dairy Product Manufacturing: Milk, Butter, Cheese 
3118 Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing: Bread, Cakes, Pies, Cookie, Cracker, Pasta 
312  Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 
3121 Beverage Manufacturing: Beverage, Ice 
314 Textile Product Mills 
3141 Textile Furnishings Mills: Carpet, Curtain 
315 Apparel Manufacturing 
3152 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing: Coat, Jean, Clothing, Jacket 
3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing: Hat, Cap, Glove Mitten 
322 Paper Manufacturing 
3222 Converted Paper Product Manufacturing: Paper, Box, Stationery, Envelope 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 
3251 Basic Chemical Manufacturing: Gas, Gum, Alcohol 
3256 Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Toilet Preparation Manufacturing: Soap, Detergent 
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 
3322 Cutlery and Handtool Manufacturing: Pot, Pan 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 
3334 Ventilation, Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment 
Manufacturing: Air-Conditioner, Fan, Heater  
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing: Telephone, Radio, Television 
3345 Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing: 
Watch, Clock 
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 
3351 Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing: Lamp, Bulb 
3352 Household Appliance Manufacturing: Refrigerator, Freezer, Furnace 
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
3361 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing: Vehicle, Automobile 
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 
3371 Household and Institutional Furniture and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturing: Furniture, 
Cabinet 






The stimuli distribution for experiment one - task 1 
Concept 
set 














1 Hat x             
  Mitten x             
  Butter x             
  Hat Mitten   x           
  Hat Butter     x         
  Mitten Butter       x       
  Mitten Hat         x     
  Butter Hat           x   
  Butter Mitten             x 
2 Telephone   x           
  Television   x           
  Soap   x           
  Telephone Television x             
  Telephone Soap     x         
  Television Soap       x       
  Television Telephone         x     
  Soap Telephone           x   
  Soap Television             x 
3 Cereal     x         
  Chocolate     x         
  Watch     x         
  Cereal Chocolate x             
  Cereal Watch   x           
  Chocolate Watch       x       
  Chocolate Cereal         x     
  Watch Cereal           x   
  Watch Chocolate             x 
4 Bread       x       
  Cookie       x       
  Pasta       x       
  Bread Cookie x             
  Bread Pasta   x           
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  Cookie Pasta     x         
  Cookie Bread         x     
  Pasta Bread           x   
  Pasta Cookie             x 
5 Carpet         x     
  Box         x     
  Envelop         x     
  Carpet Box x             
  Carpet Envelop   x           
  Box Envelop     x         
  Box Carpet       x       
  Envelop Carpet           x   
  Envelop Box             x 
6 Heater           x   
  Air-conditioner           x   
  Furnace             x 
  Refrigerator             x 
  Heater Air-conditioner         x     
  Air-conditioner Heater             x 
  Heater Furnace   x           
  Furnace Heater x             
  Heater Refrigerator       x       
  Refrigerator Heater     x         
  Air-conditioner Furnace       x       
  Furnace Air-conditioner     x         
  Air-conditioner 
Refrigerator 
  x           
  Refrigerator Air-
conditioner 
x             
  Furnace Refrigerator           x   
  Refrigerator Furnace         x     






The Stimuli distribution for experiment one - task 2 
 
S. G. 1* S. G. 2 S. G. 3 S. G. 4 S. G. 5 S. G. 6 S. G. 7 
Telephone 
Soap 

























































































































Experiment One Raw data: the Butter example 
Subject 
code 
Butter Question #1 Butter Question #2 Butter Question #3 
g1v1-1 its soft and usually 
yellow. 'it tastes better 
with butter'. its oily and 
makes u fat! 
This product is categorized as 
food. You use it as an additive 
to food to make it taste better. 
it is yellow and soft and can be 
spread on bread with a knife. It 
is considered to be fattening.. 
It is soft and yellow. It can be 
spread on bread using a knife. 
It can be rubbed on meat or put 
in rice to make it taste better. 
People have it with a whole 
array of different foods.  
g1v1-2 Toast.  Cooking; we can 
use it instead of oil. Easy 
to spread when it is warm. 
Salted or unsalted, 
Margarine is an 
alternative to butter. 
Butter is a type of fat (animal 
fat) that can be used to 
improve the taste of various 
food elements, such as toast, 
potatoes, vegetables, turkey, 
etc. It can also be used to 
cook/fry, instead of cooling  
oil. 
Characteristics are: -Colour: 
Yellow _Taste: Salted or 
unsalted -Texture: Greasy  
This product can be used as 
cooking oil or as a spread on 
toasts. 
g1v1-3 this is a food item that is 
also used in baking. 
Butter is obtained from fats 
and used in different baking 
and also as a spread. 
its solid when cold. Melts to 
oils when heat is applied. It is 
used in baking and as a spread 
for bread and other pastries. 
g1v1-4 Margarine. You see a lot 
more margarine ads on 
TV than you do for butter. 
Besides this, butter 
invokes thoughts about 
food, particularly other 
dairy products like say, 
havarti cheese. The point 
I want to make is that it 
never invokes thoughts of 
itself, ie - butter never 
makes me think of butter 
itself, perhaps because its 
always available, eihter at 
home or in the store.  
Butter is in my words, a dairy 
product, that is readily 
available and commonly used, 
especially in breakfast. 
Characteristics: - needs to be 
refrigerated - looks yellow - 
soft when not in the fridge, 
otherwise hard - tastes creamy  
Usage: - primarily in food as 
added flavour  - in breakfast 
with toast - when cooking, say, 
eggs or any other usage with 
food  - not used beyond the 
scope of food. 
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g1v1-5 The first things that come 
to mind when I think of 
butter are: greasy, shiny, 
slippery, beige, baking, 
toast 
Butter, is churned from milk, 
which is made naturally by 
cows. It is a greasy product 
(grease consisting of fats and 
other natural ingredients) that 
can be used for a wide array of 
things from 'buttering' toast to 
preparing baked goods. 
It is slippery, greasy, shiny, 
yellowish in colour, it can be 
salted or unsalted, it can come 
in different percentages of fat 
content, it is sometimes 
substituted with margarine, a 
similar substance. Butter can 
be used for baking, cooking, it 
can be used as a topping and it 
is even used by some as a 
natural remedy for sore 
muscles. 
g1v2-1 Butter is a spread that is 
often used on toast or 
used in pans to prevent 
the food from sticking 
while cooking.  Butter is 
generally yellow and 
creamy. 
Butter is an oily creamy paste.  
Butter is made from churned 
milk and can be used as a 
spread on toast and to prevent 
food from sticking in the pan. 
Butter is creamy and is a 
churned milk product.  The 
product is used to enhance the 
flavour of toast and bagels.   
g1v2-2 The first thing that comes 
to my mind is a Yellow 
bar of butter that is eaten 
with slices of bread for 
breakfast. 
Butter is a food product that is 
derived from milk. Butter is 
thought of being extremely 
delicious and because of this 
quality it is used in the 
preparation of many different 
kinds of food products. Butter 
is used in cakes, pastries as 
well as curries and rice. 
Derived from Milk - 
Extremely tasty  - Used for 
frying products. frying food 
products in butter gives it a 
great taste - Has very high 
cholestrol, therefore, it is not 
good for health, if too much of 
it is consumed. - Used all over 
the world in different culinary 
items. 
g1v2-3 cooking, toast, cooking 
material 
A dariy product that can be 
made from a variety of 
different animals milk, usually 
cows. It is made from the fat in 
the milk. It is soild and easy to 
spread when needed. 
It is mainly used for cooking 
purposes. It can be used for 
food, butter with toaste to to 
ensure that the food will not 
stick to the pan. 
g1v2-4 It goes on bread or 
muffins 
It is made from cow's/goat's 
milk by turning it 
It is usually found 
refridgerated.  It is usually 
yellow or white.  It is usually 
hard cold and soft warm  It can 
be used as a spread or for 
baking, instaed of oil  
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g1v2-5 Milk, margerine, toast, 
pancakes, fat  
Butter is a milk product made 
from the agitation of milk. It is 
a yellow, thick substance that 
is in solid state when cold. 
Butter has oil-like properties 
and assists in cooking, baking 
and frying. Butter can be used 
to grease up a frying pan or it 
can be used on bread, 
pancakes to improve flavor. 
g1v3-1 A yellow substance 
extracted from milk that is 
used in food to cook or 
add flavour. 
Extracted from milk, it is used 
to enhance the cooking of 
food.  furthermore, it is yellow 
in colour and smooth in 
texture.  When used in food it 
adds flavour but is high in 
chlosterol. 
Yellow in colour, smooth in 
texture.  When heated it 
becomes a liquid.  This 
product is used to cook food.  
It adds flavour to common 
food like bread. 
g1v3-2 Dairy products, and butter 
on toast comes to mind.  I 
also think about melted 
butter. 
Butter is used for a number of 
food related uses, since you eat 
it.  It is generally a yellow 
white colour and tastes good 
on bread.  Can be used to 
make cookies or added in 
different cooking recipies 
Butter is used to be added to 
food.  Usually you do not eat it 
alone, but instead spread it on 
bread or add it to recipies 
g1v4-1 Bread A grease that will add some 
taste to the food when u put it 
on 
oily, made by milk, fat it can 
be used to cook, to eat, to 
bake, to make cake 
g1v4-2 cow dairy oil characteristics: fatty, natural, 
yellow used: cooking, eat with 
bread 
g1v4-3 it's a high calory food, 
and it contains a lot of fat. 
It's an aside food, not a main 
dish, and it's yellow in colour. 
it's really fatteny. We use it to 
add more taste to food, such as 
bread or soup. 
g1v4-4 bread, toaste,  it is used to put on the bread 
and make a breakfast 
milky, tasty,   used to cook , 
used to make sandwitch 
g1v4-5 Butter is a type of food.  It 
tastes great with bread, 
toast and bagel.  Its 
characteristics are that it 
easily melts and it is 
fattening. 
Butter is a type of food.  It 
easily melts and it tastes great 
with bread, toast and bagel. 
Butter easily melts and it is 
fattening.  It is usually eaten 
with bread, toast and bagel.  
Also, melted butter is to be 






Experiment One result: the most prominent associations for each conceptual entity 
Conceptual 
Entity 
Most Prominent Associations Association # 
It is worn on the head 1
It protects the head 2
It is used in different environmental conditions (sun, rain, cold) 3
It adds fashion or style 4
It is used in baseball  5
It is made from different materials 6
It is an article of clothing 7
It has various shapes 8
It has different types such as toques 9
Hat 
It is mass-manufactured 10
It protects the hands 11
It is used in cold weather 12
It is made of wool or cotton 13
It separates thumb from other fingers 14
It is worn on the hands 15
It is a type of glove 16
It is made up of polyester materials 17
It is an article of clothing 18
It is used in some sports 19
Mitten 
It is used primarily by children 20
It is used in cooking, baking and frying 21
It is spread on toast 22
It is yellowish beige 23
It adds flavour to food 24
It is extracted from milk 25
It is a type of food 26
It is fattening 27
It is greasy and oily 28
It is soft when warm 29
Butter 
It is solid when cold 30
It is a type of mitten 31Hat Mitten 
It is a type of hat 32
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It keeps you warm 33
It is used in cold winter weather 34
It is made out of warm materials 35
It has different colours 36
It is used for both head and hand 37
It is for kids or babies 38
It is thick 39
It is comfortable and cozy 40
It is a type of hat 41
It is a type of mitten 42
It keeps you warm 43
It is used in cold weather 44
It is made out of wool 45
It is worn on both head and hands 46
It is colourful 47
It adds fashion and style 48
It is a type of winter clothing 49
Mitten Hat 
It has a universal shape to fit most people 50
It is a type of hat 51
It is a type of butter 52
It is a lubricant 53
It is a sculpture 54
It is worn in cold weather  55
It is yellow 56
It is soft 57
It is used to soften hair  58
It is not easy to melt 59
Hat Butter 
It smells pretty bad 60
It is a type of hat 61
It is a type of butter 62
It cannot be worn 63
It is made of yellow leather 64
It prevents insect damage 65
It is soft 66
It is used for dispensing 67
It is warm 68
It makes dishes more tasty 69
Butter Hat 
It is used for decoration 70
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It is a type of butter 71
It is a type of mitten 72
It is shaped like a glove 73
It is a hand lotion for moisturizing 74
It is a lubricant 75
It is used to serve something warm 76
It is a source of warmth 77
It is yellow coloured 78
It is a stain 79
Mitten Butter 
It is slippery 80
It is a type of mitten 81
It is a type of butter 82
It is sticky 83
It is used to handle slippery objects 84
It is grease-proof 85
It is used when cooking something hot 86
It is a lid for a container 87
It is made of latex or silicone 88
It protects hands from the cold 89
Butter Mitten 
It is easy to clean 90
It is a communication device 91
It is used to talk to people 92
It has a dial pad 93
It requires phone numbers 94
It connects to a cable 95
It could be mobile  96
It is a small, handheld device 97
It rings 98
It comes in different models 99
Telephone 
It comes in different shapes 100
It is an entertainment device 101
It is a source of information  102
It shows various shows, events, etc 103
It has a flat screen 104
It has a large screen 105
It has buttons to change the volume and channel 106
It is connected to cable 107
Television 
It is an electrical device 108
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It has remote control 109
It is a diversion from reality 110
It is used for cleaning 111
It removes dirt 112
It is in the shape of a bar 113
It has an aroma 114
It is liquid or solid 115
It dissolves in water 116
It forms bubbles 117
It is slippery when wet 118
It is used in the shower or bath 119
Soap 
It is antibacterial 120
It is a type of television 121
It is a type of telephone 122
It identifies callers 123
It is used for videoconferencing 124
It has a screen 125
It is used to play videos 126
It is very practical 127
It is small 128
It is ideal for people who can not speak 129
Telephone 
Television 
It is used to participate in polls or surveys 130
It is a type of television 131
It is a type of telephone 132
It uses advanced technology 133
It can view TV shows 134
It has a coloured screen 135
It is used to share and transfer information 136
It is used for entertainment 137
It is easy to use 138
It is plasma or LCD 139
Television 
Telephone 
It is similar to a web cam 140
It is a type of soap 141
It is a type of telephone 142
It cleans electrical appliances 143
It sanitizes and gets rid of germs 144
It is easy to hold 145
Telephone 
Soap 
It is marketed towards younger children 146
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It comes in a liquid gel or spray can 147
It is for decorative purpose  148
It refers to clean talking  149
It is portable 150
It is a type of telephone 151
It is a type of soap 152
It is used in the bathtub or shower 153
It is waterproof  154
It is self cleaning  155
It generate bubbles instead of ringing 156
It is a decorative piece 157
It is has a slippery exterior 158
It is used by kids 159
Soap 
Telephone 
It looks like a bubble 160
It is a type of soap 161
It is a type of television 162
It is a daytime show 163
It is a spray or liquid 164
It is a product advertisement 165
It refers to censorship for filtering programmes 166
It has different colours 167
It has a fragrance like new factory plastic 168
It involve a never-ending drama 169
Television 
Soap 
It is loaded with sex appeal 170
It is a type of soap 171
It is a type of television 172
It refers to soap opera 173
It is a channel for shows  174
It is used in bath rooms 175
It is waterproof 176
It is a way to waste time 177
It is especially big 178
It is very loud 179
Soap 
Television 
It is melodramatic 180
It is a breakfast food 181
It is eaten with milk 182
It is healthy 183
Cereal 
It has sweet taste 184
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It is fast and easy to make 185
It is a light snack 186
It comes in boxes 187
It is an energy booster 188
It is made with wheat, oats, corn, grains, seed or fruits. 189
It is eaten using bowl and spoon 190
It is sweet 191
It is dark brown 192
It is delicious 193
It is an additive to other foods 194
It is loved by everyone especially kids 195
It is milky and creamy 196
It is high in fat and calories 197
It is a gift for all occasions 198
It is romantic 199
Chocolate 
It gets soft when it is warmed 200
It tells and tracks time 201
It is worn on the wrist 202
It is digital or analog 203
It is small and portable 204
It has a circular shape 205
It shows people's stature 206
It is an organizational tool 207
It is a fashionable accessory 208
It has numbers or tick marks 209
Watch 
It has a display for dates 210
It is a type of cereal 211
It is a type of chocolate 212
It is a breakfast item  213
It is sweet 214
It is unhealthy 215
It is eaten with milk 216
It is a snack 217
It is tasty 218
It is nutritious 219
Cereal 
Chocolate 
It is brown 220
It is a type of cereal 221Chocolate 
Cereal It is a type of chocolate 222
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It is a breakfast food 223
It is sweet 224
It is eaten with milk 225
It is tasty 226
It has cocoa flavour 227
It is crunchy 228
It is made from cocoa powder 229
It is for kids 230
It is a type of watch 231
It is a type of cereal 232
It is cheap 233
It is a free gift 234
It is for breakfast 235
It is a toy  236
It has low quality 237
It is designed for children 238
It is made of plastic 239
Cereal Watch 
It is made out of corn flakes 240
It is a type of cereal 241
It is a type of watch 242
It is a toy 243
It is small 244
It is shaped like numbers 245
It helps children to learn to tell time 246
It is colourful 247
It is a marketing tool 248
It has very bad quality 249
Watch Cereal 
It is low in calories 250
It is a type of watch 251
It is a type of chocolate 252
It is brown in colour 253
It is edible 254
It is sweet 255
It is a toy for kids 256
It is a candy necklace 257
It might melt 258
It is sticky and messy 259
Chocolate 
Watch 
It is a novelty snack 260
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It is a type of chocolate 261
It is a type of watch 262
It is made out of cocoa 263
It is a snack 264
It is brown coloured 265
It is sweet 266
It is a piece of decoration 267
It is a novelty gift 268
It is tasty 269
Watch 
Chocolate 
It is a kind of candy 270
It is made from wheat or grain 271
It is used to make sandwiches 272
It is a source of carbohydrates 273
It is eaten with jam 274
It is for breakfast 275
It is soft 276
It is oven baked  277
It is made from dough 278
It is made from flour and yeast 279
Bread 
It is white or brown 280
It is sweet 281
It is a type of dessert 282
It is round in shape 283
It is a snack 284
It is made of oatmeal 285
It is crispy and crunchy 286
It is baked 287
It is tasty and chewy 288
It is sold in large quantities 289
Cookie 
It is used as a reward for children 290
It is an Italian food 291
It has lots of carbohydrates 292
It is easy to cook 293
It is made from flour and water 294
It is eaten with tomato sauce 295
It is used to make spaghetti 296
It is tasty 297
Pasta 
It is cheap to buy 298
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It is soft 299
It is yellow in colour 300
It is a type of bread 301
It is a type of cookie 302
It is sweet 303
It has slices 304
It is round shaped 305
It is crispy 306
It is soft 307
It is a snack or a small meal 308
It has white crumbs 309
Bread Cookie 
It is surrounded by a thick crust 310
It is a type of bread 311
It is a type of cookie 312
It is sweet 313
It is tasty 314
It is round in shape 315
It is crispy and crunchy 316
It is a food product 317
It has chocolate chips 318
It is soft  319
Cookie Bread 
It is chewy 320
It is a type of bread 321
It is a type of pasta 322
It is made from flour 323
It is made from whole wheat 324
It is a food product 325
It provides carbohydrates 326
It is starchy 327
It is like pita 328
It has different colours 329
Bread Pasta 
It has different shapes 330
It is a type of bread 331
It is a type of pasta 332
It is shaped like thin strips 333
It is eaten with sauce 334
It contains very little sugar 335
Pasta Bread 
It is an appetizer 336
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It is something sold at a sub restaurant (e.g., Subway) 337
It has a light brown crust 338
It cooks very easily 339
It is healthy 340
It is a type of pasta 341
It is a type of cookie 342
It is sweet 343
It is a type of dessert 344
It is a snack 345
It is a main dish 346
It is a children's food 347
It is eaten with chocolate sauce 348
It is eaten with tomato or cheese sauce 349
Cookie Pasta 
It is red in colour 350
It is a type of cookie 351
It is a type of pasta 352
It is tasty and delicious 353
It has sugar 354
It is Italian 355
It is a snack 356
It is filling 357
It looks disgusting 358
It is served as an appetizer 359
Pasta Cookie 
It is long in length 360
It covers an area of floor 361
It is soft 362
It is colourful 363
It is used to decorate 364
It is smooth 365
It is dirty 366
It provides warmth 367
It is cleaned by vacuuming  368
It is made of thick fabrics 369
Carpet 
It has floral patterns 370
It stores things 371
It is cubic / rectangular in shape 372
It is made of cardboard 373
Box 
It is brown 374
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It is used to transport / ship items 375
It is heavy 376
It has a rigid exterior 377
It is used for packaging 378
It is wooden 379
It is large 380
It is used to mail things 381
It is white 382
It is made of paper 383
It has a sealable flap 384
It is for safe keeping 385
It has security features 386
It is rectangular 387
It is thin 388
It is light 389
Envelope 
It is cheap 390
It is a type of box 391
It is a type of carpet 392
It is used for storage 393
It is covered by a thick layer 394
It protects something against scratch and damage 395
It is used for shipping  396
It is long 397
It has a rectangular shape 398
It is impact resistant 399
Carpet Box 
It has wheels on the bottom 400
It is a type of box 401
It is a type of carpet 402
It is foldable 403
It is covered with thick material 404
It is small 405
It is aesthetically pleasing 406
It is cheap 407
It is used when christmas approaches 408
It is shaggy 409
Box Carpet 
It is modular 410
It is a type of envelope 411Carpet 
Envelope It is a type of carpet 412
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It is used to hold something 413
It is made of paper 414
It is a plastic wrap to protect something 415
It has colourful designs 416
It is heavy 417
It is thick 418
It is big 419
It adds extra protection to the packaging 420
It is a type of carpet 421
It is a type of envelope 422
It is small in size 423
It has a triangular flap 424
It is folded on the floor 425
It is uncomfortable to walk on 426
It holds things 427
It is large in size 428
It is rectangular in shape 429
Envelope 
Carpet 
It is used on the walls and the ceiling 430
It is a type of box 431
It is a type of envelope 432
It is used for mailing 433
It is thin 434
It is easy to seal and open 435
It is light weight 436
It is made out of paper 437
It has shipping labels 438
It holds something 439
Box Envelope 
It has a large carrying capacity 440
It is a type of box 441
It is a type of envelope 442
It stores mail accessories 443
It is found in an office desk 444
It is used in the post office 445
It holds mail or letters 446
It is small and compact 447
It is red 448
It is rectangular in shape 449
Envelope Box 
It seals up quickly 450
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It cools down a space 451
It circulates cool air 452
It is used in the summer 453
It is expensive to run  454
It uses a lot of electricity 455
It is a relatively large device 456
It has large fans 457
It is used in windows 458
It creates a lot of heat 459
Air-
conditioner 
It provides a comfortable temperature 460
It is used to heat up or warm 461
It is used in cold winters 462
It is small 463
It is a plug-in device  464
It requires gas 465
It uses electricity 466
It has fans or vents behind a grill 467
It is in the basement  468
It is expensive to run 469
Heater 
It hums a little 470
It keeps things cold  471
It keeps things fresh 472
It stores food or drinks 473
It has two sections: fridge and freezer 474
It is white 475
It can be used efficiently as a heat pump 476
It is rectangular shaped 477
It is usually big (not portable) 478
It is an electric appliance 479
Refrigerator 
It has a distinct humming sound 480
It heats or warms a house or building 481
It is in the basement 482
It is used in cold climates, in winter 483
It uses gas 484
It is a bulky appliance 485
It is a metallic device 486
It burns wood 487
Furnace 
It uses electricity 488
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It has a thermostat to control its operations 489
It is white 490
It is a type of heater 491
It is a type of air-conditioner 492
It is an all-in-one appliance 493
It has a ventilation system 494
It heats or warms air 495
It is used in apartments or small offices 496
It is small and portable 497
It provides cool air 498




It is placed in a window 500
It is a type of air-conditioner 501
It is a type of heater 502
It provides hot or cool air 503
It is used in all seasons 504
It is ideal for apartments, houses, buildings 505
It can be used in a car 506
It is economically cheap 507
It is small and portable 508




It is a type of refrigerator 511
It is a type of air-conditioner 512
It keeps things cold 513
It emits cool air 514
It is used in summer 515
It is big 516
It cools a lot of food at once 517
It uses electricity 518




It has improved efficiency 520
It is a type of air-conditioner 521
It is a type of refrigerator 522
It has a large cool-air producing capacity 523
It is ideal in large households, offices, and buildings 524




It has vents to circulate cold air 526
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It is expensive 527
It is not used in houses 528
It expels cold air by fans 529
It is used in the summer 530
It is a type of furnace 531
It is a type of air-conditioner 532
It has heating and cooling capabilities 533
It cleanses air 534
It is a two-way unit 535
It uses heat exchange principles 536
It saves energy 537
It is used in all seasons 538




It requires little maintenance 540
It is a type of air-conditioner 541
It is a type of furnace 542
It is dual function machine 543
Its usage depends on the season 544
It saves space 545
It saves cost 546
It saves energy 547
It is rectangular shaped 548
It can adjust the temperature 549
Furnace Air-
conditioner 
It has a control panel 550
It is a type of refrigerator 551
It is a type of heater 552
It is big and bulky 553
It has three compartments: fridge, freezer, and microwave 554
It produces heat to warm up a space 555
It keeps food warm or cold as desired. 556
It produces heat at the back 557
It is a heavy piece of equipment 558
It heats or cools the air 559
Heater 
Refrigerator 
It raises the electricity bills 560
It is a type of heater 561
It is a type of refrigerator 562
It is an all-in-one device 563
Refrigerator 
Heater 
It is used for travel purposes 564
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It speeds up the rate of defrosting in a fridge 565
It is box shaped 566
It reduces heating costs 567
It is small 568
It cools food and heats food 569
It is hot in the back  570
It is a type of furnace 571
It is a type of heater 572
It warms up a home 573
It has a chamber to produce heat 574
It is used in winter when it is cold outside 575
It consumes lots of energy 576
It is large  577
It is expensive to run 578
It has fire retardant material 579
Heater Furnace 
It provides hot water 580
It is a type of heater 581
It is a type of furnace 582
It is a centralized system 583
It distributes warm air 584
It is portable 585
It is connected to the ventilation system 586
It is big 587
It is used in cold weather 588
It is powered by natural gas or wood 589
Furnace Heater 
It is energy efficient 590
It is a type of furnace 591
It is a type of refrigerator 592
It has dual function 593
It is a great energy saver 594
It utilizes the heat it produces to warm up something 595
It is aimed at protecting the environment 596
It is located in a kitchen 597
It maintains food quality 598
It maintains low temperature 599
Refrigerator 
Furnace 
It is a single box-like unit 600
It is a type of refrigerator 601Furnace 
Refrigerator It is a type of furnace 602
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It is a big machine 603
It cools down something 604
It is an all in one appliance 605
It keeps food hot 606
It prevents excessive heat 607
It is economical to produce and use 608
It is expensive to buy 609















Identical Associations dropped from Experiment Two 
Association Numbers for Identical Associations in Brackets Two-Concept Pair 
(48, 4); (41, 32); (42, 31); (18, 7); (34, 12, 44); (43, 33) Hat – Mitten 
(62, 52); (61, 51); (66, 57); (23, 56) Hat – Butter 
(82, 71); (81, 72); (78, 23) Mitten – Butter 
(132, 122); (131, 121); (107, 95); (137, 101) Telephone - Television 
(152, 141); (151, 142); (119, 153); Telephone – Soap 
(171, 161); (172, 162) Television – Soap 
(223, 181, 213); (221, 211); (222, 212); (225, 182, 216); (224, 
214, 191); (226, 218) 
Cereal – Chocolate 
 
(236, 243); (241, 232); (242, 231); (204, 244) Cereal – Watch 
(261, 252); (262, 251); (253, 265); (266, 191, 255) Chocolate – Watch 
(311, 301); (312, 302); (316, 286); (315, 283, 305); (319, 276, 
307); (313, 281, 303) 
Bread – Cookie 
 
(273, 326); (331, 321); (332, 322); (293, 339); (299, 276) Bread – Pasta 
(356, 284, 345); (351, 342); (344, 282); (352, 341); (343, 281); 
(297, 353) 
Cookie – Pasta 
 
(401, 391); (402, 392); (372, 398); (393, 371) Carpet – Box 
(421, 412); (422, 411); (414, 383); (429, 387) Carpet – Envelope 
(441, 431); (442, 432);  (436, 389); (383, 437); (449, 387); (434, 
388); (433, 381) 
Box – Envelope 
 
(501, 492); (502, 491); (454, 469); (500, 458); (508, 497) Air-conditioner - Heater 
(521, 512); (522, 511); (530, 515, 453); (478, 516); (471, 513) Air-conditioner – Refrigerator 
(541, 532); (542, 531); (547, 537) Air-conditioner - Furnace 
(480, 470); (561, 552); (562, 551); (568, 463) Heater - Refrigerator 
(481, 573); (582, 571); (572, 581); (587, 577); (578, 469); (468, 
482); (588, 483, 462); (488, 466); (484, 465) Heater – Furnace 




Information Letter and Consent Form for the Experiment Two 
Title of the study:  Meaning Construction in Novel Conceptual Combinations  
Student Investigator:  Bing Ran 
   University of Waterloo, Department of Management Sciences 
   (519) 884-4567 Ext. 2974 
Faculty Supervisor: Professor Rob Duimering 
   University of Waterloo, Department of Management Sciences 
   (519) 888-4567 Ext.2831 
You are being invited to participate in a survey that investigates the meaning of the 
conceptual combinations. In the survey, you will be asked to write down your description 
of certain products, either the familiar products, such as “table” or “coat”, or creatively new 
products, such as “table coat” or “coat table”.  
Participation in this survey is voluntary, and will take approximately one hour of your 
time. By volunteering for participating the survey, you will learn about research in 
Organizational Behaviour sciences in general and the topic of creativity, innovation, and 
communication in particular. In addition, you will receive a detailed feedback sheet about 
the study when the study is complete, and 1% bonus mark towards your final grade. Or 
alternatively, you could earn the same bonus mark by doing an assignment. You may 
decline to answer any questions presented in the survey if you so wish. You may decide to 
withdraw from this survey at any time, and may do so without any penalty or loss of the 
bonus marks.  All information you provide is considered completely confidential; indeed, 
your name will not be included or in any other way associated, with the data collected in 
the survey.  Furthermore, because the interest of this study is in the average responses of 
the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any way in any 
written reports of this research. All the date obtained in this survey will be retained 
indefinitely, in a locked office to which only researchers associated with the study have 
access.  There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this survey. 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics 
clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, 
the final decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns 
resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes at this office 
at (519) 888-4567 Ext. 6005. 
If you have any questions about participation in this survey, please feel free to ask 
me. If you have additional questions at a later date, please contact Bing Ran at (519) 888-
4567 ext. 2974 or by email at bran@engmail.uwaterloo.ca 




Informed Consent Form 
  
I agree to participate in a survey being conducted by Dr. R. Duimering and Bing Ran, 
Department of Management Sciences, Faculty of Engineering, University of Waterloo. I 
have made this decision based on the information I have read in the Information-Consent 
Letter and have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I wanted about the 
study.  I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time without penalty or lose of 
the bonus marks. My participation or non-participation will have no impact on my 
relationship with the University of Waterloo. If I decline to participate in this survey, I 
could do an alternative assignment to earn the same bonus mark.  
  
I also understand that this survey has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance 
through, the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. I was informed that if 
I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may 
contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics, at (519) 888-4567 ext. 6005.   
  
With full knowledge of foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
survey. 
 
Yes      No 
 




Student ID number: 
 
 



















Concept #2 t value p value 
s1 c1 1 c1c2 c1c3 4.17 0.00
s1 c1 1 c3c1 c2c1 3.20 0.00
s1 c1 2 c1c2 c1c3 2.32 0.03
s1 c1 2 c3c1 c2c1 3.09 0.00
s1 c1 3 c1c2 c1c3 2.59 0.02
s1 c1 3 c3c1 c2c1 3.52 0.00
s1 c1 4 c1c2 c1c3 3.09 0.01
s1 c1 4 c3c1 c2c1 2.27 0.03
s1 c1 5 c1c2 c1c3 4.78 0.00
s1 c1 5 c3c1 c2c1 4.12 0.00
s1 c1 6 c1c2 c1c3 1.68 0.10
s1 c1 6 c3c1 c2c1 2.72 0.01
s1 c1 7 c1c2 c1c3 4.72 0.00
s1 c1 7 c3c1 c2c1 3.46 0.00
s1 c1 8 c1c2 c1c3 3.40 0.00
s1 c1 8 c3c1 c2c1 1.60 0.11
s1 c1 9 c1c2 c1c3 2.09 0.05
s1 c1 9 c3c1 c2c1 2.41 0.02
s1 c1 10 c1c2 c1c3 4.64 0.00
s1 c1 10 c3c1 c2c1 3.29 0.00
s1 c2 11 c1c2 c3c2 1.55 0.12
s1 c2 11 c2c1 c2c3 3.01 0.01
s1 c2 12 c1c2 c3c2 4.63 0.00
s1 c2 12 c2c1 c2c3 5.56 0.00
s1 c2 13 c1c2 c3c2 5.34 0.00
s1 c2 13 c2c1 c2c3 7.40 0.00
s1 c2 14 c1c2 c3c2 1.24 0.18
s1 c2 14 c2c1 c2c3 0.10 0.39
s1 c2 15 c1c2 c3c2 1.10 0.22
s1 c2 15 c2c1 c2c3 2.96 0.01
s1 c2 16 c1c2 c3c2 0.07 0.40
s1 c2 16 c2c1 c2c3 1.88 0.07
s1 c2 17 c1c2 c3c2 0.25 0.38
s1 c2 17 c2c1 c2c3 5.33 0.00
s1 c2 18 c1c2 c3c2 3.16 0.00
                                                     
15  The coding scheme used in this appendix is listed in Table 4-11. 
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s1 c2 18 c2c1 c2c3 7.97 0.00
s1 c2 19 c1c2 c3c2 0.86 0.27
s1 c2 19 c2c1 c2c3 0.36 0.37
s1 c2 20 c1c2 c3c2 2.71 0.01
s1 c2 20 c2c1 c2c3 1.22 0.19
s1 c3 21 c2c3 c1c3 2.55 0.02
s1 c3 21 c3c1 c3c2 2.90 0.01
s1 c3 22 c2c3 c1c3 0.89 0.26
s1 c3 22 c3c1 c3c2 4.45 0.00
s1 c3 23 c2c3 c1c3 0.96 0.25
s1 c3 23 c3c1 c3c2 2.51 0.02
s1 c3 24 c2c3 c1c3 1.47 0.13
s1 c3 24 c3c1 c3c2 1.26 0.18
s1 c3 25 c2c3 c1c3 0.09 0.39
s1 c3 25 c3c1 c3c2 1.30 0.17
s1 c3 26 c2c3 c1c3 1.34 0.16
s1 c3 26 c3c1 c3c2 0.42 0.36
s1 c3 27 c2c3 c1c3 0.32 0.38
s1 c3 27 c3c1 c3c2 3.30 0.00
s1 c3 28 c2c3 c1c3 0.29 0.38
s1 c3 28 c3c1 c3c2 3.86 0.00
s1 c3 29 c2c3 c1c3 0.63 0.32
s1 c3 29 c3c1 c3c2 0.50 0.35
s1 c3 30 c2c3 c1c3 1.11 0.21
s1 c3 30 c3c1 c3c2 2.15 0.04
s2 c1 91 c1c2 c1c3 9.42 0.00
s2 c1 91 c3c1 c2c1 4.95 0.00
s2 c1 92 c1c2 c1c3 6.68 0.00
s2 c1 92 c3c1 c2c1 4.12 0.00
s2 c1 93 c1c2 c1c3 4.38 0.00
s2 c1 93 c3c1 c2c1 2.86 0.01
s2 c1 94 c1c2 c1c3 3.97 0.00
s2 c1 94 c3c1 c2c1 3.99 0.00
s2 c1 95 c1c2 c1c3 4.41 0.00
s2 c1 95 c3c1 c2c1 2.85 0.01
s2 c1 96 c1c2 c1c3 2.87 0.01
s2 c1 96 c3c1 c2c1 2.69 0.01
s2 c1 97 c1c2 c1c3 3.09 0.01
s2 c1 97 c3c1 c2c1 3.02 0.01
s2 c1 98 c1c2 c1c3 6.23 0.00
s2 c1 98 c3c1 c2c1 4.13 0.00
s2 c1 99 c1c2 c1c3 3.90 0.00
s2 c1 99 c3c1 c2c1 2.55 0.02
s2 c1 100 c1c2 c1c3 2.37 0.03
s2 c1 100 c3c1 c2c1 2.88 0.01
s2 c2 101 c1c2 c3c2 1.05 0.23
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s2 c2 101 c2c1 c2c3 2.26 0.03
s2 c2 102 c1c2 c3c2 1.56 0.12
s2 c2 102 c2c1 c2c3 3.02 0.01
s2 c2 103 c1c2 c3c2 0.38 0.37
s2 c2 103 c2c1 c2c3 1.14 0.21
s2 c2 104 c1c2 c3c2 1.78 0.08
s2 c2 104 c2c1 c2c3 4.00 0.00
s2 c2 105 c1c2 c3c2 0.80 0.29
s2 c2 105 c2c1 c2c3 3.72 0.00
s2 c2 106 c1c2 c3c2 3.88 0.00
s2 c2 106 c2c1 c2c3 3.87 0.00
s2 c2 107 c1c2 c3c2 0.36 0.37
s2 c2 107 c2c1 c2c3 4.47 0.00
s2 c2 108 c1c2 c3c2 4.38 0.00
s2 c2 108 c2c1 c2c3 4.79 0.00
s2 c2 109 c1c2 c3c2 0.65 0.32
s2 c2 109 c2c1 c2c3 1.48 0.13
s2 c2 110 c1c2 c3c2 1.40 0.15
s2 c2 110 c2c1 c2c3 3.43 0.00
s2 c3 111 c2c3 c1c3 2.88 0.01
s2 c3 111 c3c1 c3c2 2.11 0.05
s2 c3 112 c2c3 c1c3 3.97 0.00
s2 c3 112 c3c1 c3c2 1.21 0.19
s2 c3 113 c2c3 c1c3 2.37 0.03
s2 c3 113 c3c1 c3c2 2.28 0.03
s2 c3 114 c2c3 c1c3 3.41 0.00
s2 c3 114 c3c1 c3c2 3.96 0.00
s2 c3 115 c2c3 c1c3 1.12 0.21
s2 c3 115 c3c1 c3c2 3.07 0.01
s2 c3 116 c2c3 c1c3 3.44 0.00
s2 c3 116 c3c1 c3c2 2.09 0.05
s2 c3 117 c2c3 c1c3 3.70 0.00
s2 c3 117 c3c1 c3c2 1.34 0.16
s2 c3 118 c2c3 c1c3 3.49 0.00
s2 c3 118 c3c1 c3c2 3.19 0.00
s2 c3 119 c2c3 c1c3 2.69 0.01
s2 c3 119 c3c1 c3c2 3.26 0.00
s2 c3 120 c2c3 c1c3 4.08 0.00
s2 c3 120 c3c1 c3c2 1.28 0.17
s3 c1 181 c1c2 c1c3 3.53 0.00
s3 c1 181 c3c1 c2c1 2.05 0.05
s3 c1 182 c1c2 c1c3 4.26 0.00
s3 c1 182 c3c1 c2c1 3.99 0.00
s3 c1 183 c1c2 c1c3 5.16 0.00
s3 c1 183 c3c1 c2c1 2.31 0.03
s3 c1 184 c1c2 c1c3 5.24 0.00
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s3 c1 184 c3c1 c2c1 2.54 0.02
s3 c1 185 c1c2 c1c3 2.17 0.04
s3 c1 185 c3c1 c2c1 1.90 0.07
s3 c1 186 c1c2 c1c3 3.51 0.00
s3 c1 186 c3c1 c2c1 3.86 0.00
s3 c1 187 c1c2 c1c3 1.34 0.16
s3 c1 187 c3c1 c2c1 1.05 0.23
s3 c1 188 c1c2 c1c3 3.02 0.01
s3 c1 188 c3c1 c2c1 2.81 0.01
s3 c1 189 c1c2 c1c3 3.30 0.00
s3 c1 189 c3c1 c2c1 3.32 0.00
s3 c1 190 c1c2 c1c3 2.04 0.05
s3 c1 190 c3c1 c2c1 2.41 0.02
s3 c2 191 c1c2 c3c2 2.26 0.03
s3 c2 191 c2c1 c2c3 2.25 0.03
s3 c2 192 c1c2 c3c2 0.63 0.32
s3 c2 192 c2c1 c2c3 1.48 0.13
s3 c2 193 c1c2 c3c2 0.70 0.31
s3 c2 193 c2c1 c2c3 2.78 0.01
s3 c2 194 c1c2 c3c2 1.70 0.10
s3 c2 194 c2c1 c2c3 2.37 0.03
s3 c2 195 c1c2 c3c2 0.69 0.31
s3 c2 195 c2c1 c2c3 0.31 0.38
s3 c2 196 c1c2 c3c2 0.21 0.39
s3 c2 196 c2c1 c2c3 1.89 0.07
s3 c2 197 c1c2 c3c2 0.36 0.37
s3 c2 197 c2c1 c2c3 1.05 0.23
s3 c2 198 c1c2 c3c2 2.03 0.05
s3 c2 198 c2c1 c2c3 7.74 0.00
s3 c2 199 c1c2 c3c2 1.42 0.15
s3 c2 199 c2c1 c2c3 3.36 0.00
s3 c2 200 c1c2 c3c2 1.34 0.16
s3 c2 200 c2c1 c2c3 2.46 0.02
s3 c3 201 c2c3 c1c3 0.76 0.30
s3 c3 201 c3c1 c3c2 2.89 0.01
s3 c3 202 c2c3 c1c3 0.71 0.31
s3 c3 202 c3c1 c3c2 2.18 0.04
s3 c3 203 c2c3 c1c3 2.28 0.03
s3 c3 203 c3c1 c3c2 4.12 0.00
s3 c3 204 c2c3 c1c3 0.63 0.32
s3 c3 204 c3c1 c3c2 0.56 0.34
s3 c3 205 c2c3 c1c3 2.06 0.05
s3 c3 205 c3c1 c3c2 1.13 0.21
s3 c3 206 c2c3 c1c3 0.09 0.39
s3 c3 206 c3c1 c3c2 0.27 0.38
s3 c3 207 c2c3 c1c3 0.96 0.25
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s3 c3 207 c3c1 c3c2 3.02 0.01
s3 c3 208 c2c3 c1c3 1.75 0.09
s3 c3 208 c3c1 c3c2 1.15 0.20
s3 c3 209 c2c3 c1c3 1.15 0.20
s3 c3 209 c3c1 c3c2 0.35 0.37
s3 c3 210 c2c3 c1c3 0.61 0.33
s3 c3 210 c3c1 c3c2 0.29 0.38
s4 c1 271 c1c2 c1c3 3.35 0.00
s4 c1 271 c3c1 c2c1 1.10 0.22
s4 c1 272 c1c2 c1c3 4.61 0.00
s4 c1 272 c3c1 c2c1 3.24 0.00
s4 c1 273 c1c2 c1c3 0.20 0.39
s4 c1 273 c3c1 c2c1 0.14 0.39
s4 c1 274 c1c2 c1c3 5.56 0.00
s4 c1 274 c3c1 c2c1 3.52 0.00
s4 c1 275 c1c2 c1c3 2.68 0.01
s4 c1 275 c3c1 c2c1 4.56 0.00
s4 c1 276 c1c2 c1c3 0.80 0.29
s4 c1 276 c3c1 c2c1 0.48 0.35
s4 c1 277 c1c2 c1c3 3.01 0.01
s4 c1 277 c3c1 c2c1 2.93 0.01
s4 c1 278 c1c2 c1c3 0.44 0.36
s4 c1 278 c3c1 c2c1 2.20 0.04
s4 c1 279 c1c2 c1c3 0.59 0.33
s4 c1 279 c3c1 c2c1 3.07 0.01
s4 c1 280 c1c2 c1c3 2.28 0.03
s4 c1 280 c3c1 c2c1 4.05 0.00
s4 c2 281 c1c2 c3c2 2.10 0.05
s4 c2 281 c2c1 c2c3 1.20 0.19
s4 c2 282 c1c2 c3c2 0.50 0.35
s4 c2 282 c2c1 c2c3 3.75 0.00
s4 c2 283 c1c2 c3c2 1.53 0.12
s4 c2 283 c2c1 c2c3 0.18 0.39
s4 c2 284 c1c2 c3c2 1.62 0.11
s4 c2 284 c2c1 c2c3 4.45 0.00
s4 c2 285 c1c2 c3c2 0.09 0.39
s4 c2 285 c2c1 c2c3 0.00 0.40
s4 c2 286 c1c2 c3c2 1.18 0.20
s4 c2 286 c2c1 c2c3 1.49 0.13
s4 c2 287 c1c2 c3c2 3.54 0.00
s4 c2 287 c2c1 c2c3 3.60 0.00
s4 c2 288 c1c2 c3c2 0.63 0.32
s4 c2 288 c2c1 c2c3 1.90 0.07
s4 c2 289 c1c2 c3c2 1.45 0.14
s4 c2 289 c2c1 c2c3 1.39 0.15
s4 c2 290 c1c2 c3c2 0.34 0.37
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s4 c2 290 c2c1 c2c3 0.74 0.30
s4 c3 291 c2c3 c1c3 2.99 0.01
s4 c3 291 c3c1 c3c2 2.57 0.02
s4 c3 292 c2c3 c1c3 2.97 0.01
s4 c3 292 c3c1 c3c2 0.30 0.38
s4 c3 293 c2c3 c1c3 2.30 0.03
s4 c3 293 c3c1 c3c2 1.51 0.13
s4 c3 294 c2c3 c1c3 0.80 0.29
s4 c3 294 c3c1 c3c2 0.75 0.30
s4 c3 295 c2c3 c1c3 1.74 0.09
s4 c3 295 c3c1 c3c2 5.17 0.00
s4 c3 296 c2c3 c1c3 2.07 0.05
s4 c3 296 c3c1 c3c2 0.24 0.38
s4 c3 297 c2c3 c1c3 1.23 0.18
s4 c3 297 c3c1 c3c2 3.96 0.00
s4 c3 298 c2c3 c1c3 0.27 0.38
s4 c3 298 c3c1 c3c2 0.39 0.37
s4 c3 299 c2c3 c1c3 0.85 0.27
s4 c3 299 c3c1 c3c2 4.56 0.00
s4 c3 300 c2c3 c1c3 1.95 0.06
s4 c3 300 c3c1 c3c2 1.53 0.12
s5 c1 361 c1c2 c1c3 4.04 0.00
s5 c1 361 c3c1 c2c1 3.32 0.00
s5 c1 362 c1c2 c1c3 2.21 0.04
s5 c1 362 c3c1 c2c1 3.73 0.00
s5 c1 363 c1c2 c1c3 3.79 0.00
s5 c1 363 c3c1 c2c1 2.15 0.04
s5 c1 364 c1c2 c1c3 1.22 0.19
s5 c1 364 c3c1 c2c1 1.76 0.09
s5 c1 365 c1c2 c1c3 3.86 0.00
s5 c1 365 c3c1 c2c1 1.60 0.11
s5 c1 366 c1c2 c1c3 1.42 0.14
s5 c1 366 c3c1 c2c1 4.58 0.00
s5 c1 367 c1c2 c1c3 3.23 0.00
s5 c1 367 c3c1 c2c1 0.67 0.31
s5 c1 368 c1c2 c1c3 3.85 0.00
s5 c1 368 c3c1 c2c1 3.48 0.00
s5 c1 369 c1c2 c1c3 3.48 0.00
s5 c1 369 c3c1 c2c1 3.44 0.00
s5 c1 370 c1c2 c1c3 3.32 0.00
s5 c1 370 c3c1 c2c1 2.75 0.01
s5 c2 371 c1c2 c3c2 1.03 0.23
s5 c2 371 c2c1 c2c3 3.12 0.00
s5 c2 372 c1c2 c3c2 0.73 0.30
s5 c2 372 c2c1 c2c3 0.32 0.38
s5 c2 373 c1c2 c3c2 0.51 0.35
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s5 c2 373 c2c1 c2c3 3.32 0.00
s5 c2 374 c1c2 c3c2 0.24 0.39
s5 c2 374 c2c1 c2c3 0.09 0.39
s5 c2 375 c1c2 c3c2 2.01 0.06
s5 c2 375 c2c1 c2c3 3.94 0.00
s5 c2 376 c1c2 c3c2 2.08 0.05
s5 c2 376 c2c1 c2c3 1.69 0.10
s5 c2 377 c1c2 c3c2 0.87 0.27
s5 c2 377 c2c1 c2c3 2.92 0.01
s5 c2 378 c1c2 c3c2 1.67 0.10
s5 c2 378 c2c1 c2c3 3.10 0.00
s5 c2 379 c1c2 c3c2 1.40 0.15
s5 c2 379 c2c1 c2c3 2.13 0.04
s5 c2 380 c1c2 c3c2 1.12 0.21
s5 c2 380 c2c1 c2c3 4.25 0.00
s5 c3 381 c2c3 c1c3 4.06 0.00
s5 c3 381 c3c1 c3c2 3.06 0.01
s5 c3 382 c2c3 c1c3 1.67 0.10
s5 c3 382 c3c1 c3c2 5.05 0.00
s5 c3 383 c2c3 c1c3 4.71 0.00
s5 c3 383 c3c1 c3c2 5.64 0.00
s5 c3 384 c2c3 c1c3 0.44 0.36
s5 c3 384 c3c1 c3c2 1.58 0.12
s5 c3 385 c2c3 c1c3 1.16 0.20
s5 c3 385 c3c1 c3c2 5.49 0.00
s5 c3 386 c2c3 c1c3 0.17 0.39
s5 c3 386 c3c1 c3c2 0.66 0.32
s5 c3 387 c2c3 c1c3 2.32 0.03
s5 c3 387 c3c1 c3c2 2.81 0.01
s5 c3 388 c2c3 c1c3 0.08 0.39
s5 c3 388 c3c1 c3c2 0.52 0.35
s5 c3 389 c2c3 c1c3 3.97 0.00
s5 c3 389 c3c1 c3c2 0.61 0.33
s5 c3 390 c2c3 c1c3 0.44 0.36
s5 c3 390 c3c1 c3c2 1.54 0.12
s6 c1 451 c1c2 c1c3 3.59 0.00
s6 c1 451 c1c2 c1c4 3.92 0.00
s6 c1 451 c1c3 c1c4 0.54 0.34
s6 c1 451 c2c1 c3c1 2.65 0.01
s6 c1 451 c2c1 c4c1 2.35 0.03
s6 c1 451 c3c1 c4c1 0.11 0.39
s6 c1 452 c1c2 c1c3 0.00 0.40
s6 c1 452 c1c2 c1c4 0.11 0.39
s6 c1 452 c1c3 c1c4 0.13 0.39
s6 c1 452 c2c1 c3c1 2.35 0.03
s6 c1 452 c2c1 c4c1 0.26 0.38
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s6 c1 452 c3c1 c4c1 2.00 0.06
s6 c1 453 c1c2 c1c3 2.28 0.03
s6 c1 453 c1c2 c1c4 1.81 0.08
s6 c1 453 c1c3 c1c4 0.61 0.33
s6 c1 453 c2c1 c3c1 0.28 0.38
s6 c1 453 c2c1 c4c1 0.83 0.28
s6 c1 453 c3c1 c4c1 0.49 0.35
s6 c1 454 c1c2 c1c3 2.62 0.02
s6 c1 454 c1c2 c1c4 0.29 0.38
s6 c1 454 c1c3 c1c4 3.48 0.00
s6 c1 454 c2c1 c3c1 0.17 0.39
s6 c1 454 c2c1 c4c1 1.35 0.16
s6 c1 454 c3c1 c4c1 1.45 0.14
s6 c1 455 c1c2 c1c3 0.80 0.29
s6 c1 455 c1c2 c1c4 2.11 0.05
s6 c1 455 c1c3 c1c4 2.95 0.01
s6 c1 455 c2c1 c3c1 2.08 0.05
s6 c1 455 c2c1 c4c1 1.14 0.21
s6 c1 455 c3c1 c4c1 0.95 0.25
s6 c1 456 c1c2 c1c3 3.54 0.00
s6 c1 456 c1c2 c1c4 2.25 0.03
s6 c1 456 c1c3 c1c4 1.80 0.08
s6 c1 456 c2c1 c3c1 2.36 0.03
s6 c1 456 c2c1 c4c1 1.95 0.06
s6 c1 456 c3c1 c4c1 0.50 0.35
s6 c1 457 c1c2 c1c3 2.04 0.05
s6 c1 457 c1c2 c1c4 1.51 0.13
s6 c1 457 c1c3 c1c4 3.14 0.00
s6 c1 457 c2c1 c3c1 3.52 0.00
s6 c1 457 c2c1 c4c1 2.74 0.01
s6 c1 457 c3c1 c4c1 0.45 0.36
s6 c1 458 c1c2 c1c3 3.42 0.00
s6 c1 458 c1c2 c1c4 2.10 0.05
s6 c1 458 c1c3 c1c4 1.39 0.15
s6 c1 458 c2c1 c3c1 3.11 0.00
s6 c1 458 c2c1 c4c1 1.75 0.09
s6 c1 458 c3c1 c4c1 1.16 0.20
s6 c1 459 c1c2 c1c3 2.36 0.03
s6 c1 459 c1c2 c1c4 0.29 0.38
s6 c1 459 c1c3 c1c4 1.99 0.06
s6 c1 459 c2c1 c3c1 2.28 0.03
s6 c1 459 c2c1 c4c1 0.62 0.33
s6 c1 459 c3c1 c4c1 2.96 0.01
s6 c1 460 c1c2 c1c3 4.13 0.00
s6 c1 460 c1c2 c1c4 1.37 0.15
s6 c1 460 c1c3 c1c4 2.99 0.01
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s6 c1 460 c2c1 c3c1 0.20 0.39
s6 c1 460 c2c1 c4c1 2.06 0.05
s6 c1 460 c3c1 c4c1 2.19 0.04
s6 c2 461 c2c1 c2c3 3.35 0.00
s6 c2 461 c2c1 c2c4 1.24 0.18
s6 c2 461 c2c3 c2c4 4.01 0.00
s6 c2 461 c1c2 c3c2 2.07 0.05
s6 c2 461 c1c2 c4c2 1.75 0.09
s6 c2 461 c3c2 c4c2 4.15 0.00
s6 c2 462 c2c1 c2c3 3.83 0.00
s6 c2 462 c2c1 c2c4 0.69 0.31
s6 c2 462 c2c3 c2c4 3.95 0.00
s6 c2 462 c1c2 c3c2 3.97 0.00
s6 c2 462 c1c2 c4c2 2.40 0.03
s6 c2 462 c3c2 c4c2 9.78 0.00
s6 c2 463 c2c1 c2c3 0.38 0.37
s6 c2 463 c2c1 c2c4 1.45 0.14
s6 c2 463 c2c3 c2c4 0.94 0.25
s6 c2 463 c1c2 c3c2 0.57 0.34
s6 c2 463 c1c2 c4c2 0.37 0.37
s6 c2 463 c3c2 c4c2 0.15 0.39
s6 c2 464 c2c1 c2c3 2.99 0.01
s6 c2 464 c2c1 c2c4 0.18 0.39
s6 c2 464 c2c3 c2c4 2.56 0.02
s6 c2 464 c1c2 c3c2 0.49 0.35
s6 c2 464 c1c2 c4c2 1.74 0.09
s6 c2 464 c3c2 c4c2 2.00 0.06
s6 c2 465 c2c1 c2c3 0.09 0.39
s6 c2 465 c2c1 c2c4 2.81 0.01
s6 c2 465 c2c3 c2c4 2.64 0.01
s6 c2 465 c1c2 c3c2 1.31 0.17
s6 c2 465 c1c2 c4c2 3.18 0.00
s6 c2 465 c3c2 c4c2 2.28 0.03
s6 c2 466 c2c1 c2c3 1.68 0.10
s6 c2 466 c2c1 c2c4 1.29 0.17
s6 c2 466 c2c3 c2c4 3.54 0.00
s6 c2 466 c1c2 c3c2 0.92 0.26
s6 c2 466 c1c2 c4c2 2.18 0.04
s6 c2 466 c3c2 c4c2 1.44 0.14
s6 c2 467 c2c1 c2c3 3.98 0.00
s6 c2 467 c2c1 c2c4 1.26 0.18
s6 c2 467 c2c3 c2c4 2.08 0.05
s6 c2 467 c1c2 c3c2 0.09 0.39
s6 c2 467 c1c2 c4c2 1.31 0.17
s6 c2 467 c3c2 c4c2 1.61 0.11
s6 c2 468 c2c1 c2c3 0.76 0.30
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s6 c2 468 c2c1 c2c4 3.22 0.00
s6 c2 468 c2c3 c2c4 4.12 0.00
s6 c2 468 c1c2 c3c2 0.59 0.33
s6 c2 468 c1c2 c4c2 5.64 0.00
s6 c2 468 c3c2 c4c2 6.04 0.00
s6 c2 469 c2c1 c2c3 0.30 0.38
s6 c2 469 c2c1 c2c4 0.42 0.36
s6 c2 469 c2c3 c2c4 0.81 0.28
s6 c2 469 c1c2 c3c2 0.74 0.30
s6 c2 469 c1c2 c4c2 0.81 0.28
s6 c2 469 c3c2 c4c2 1.96 0.06
s6 c2 470 c2c1 c2c3 1.48 0.13
s6 c2 470 c2c1 c2c4 2.16 0.04
s6 c2 470 c2c3 c2c4 0.94 0.25
s6 c2 470 c1c2 c3c2 1.30 0.17
s6 c2 470 c1c2 c4c2 2.46 0.02
s6 c2 470 c3c2 c4c2 1.24 0.18
s6 c3 471 c3c1 c3c2 2.11 0.05
s6 c3 471 c3c1 c3c4 1.53 0.12
s6 c3 471 c3c2 c3c4 0.58 0.33
s6 c3 471 c1c3 c2c3 2.69 0.01
s6 c3 471 c1c3 c4c3 3.11 0.00
s6 c3 471 c2c3 c4c3 0.58 0.33
s6 c3 472 c3c1 c3c2 3.58 0.00
s6 c3 472 c3c1 c3c4 0.32 0.38
s6 c3 472 c3c2 c3c4 2.89 0.01
s6 c3 472 c1c3 c2c3 0.44 0.36
s6 c3 472 c1c3 c4c3 1.03 0.23
s6 c3 472 c2c3 c4c3 0.56 0.34
s6 c3 473 c3c1 c3c2 0.80 0.29
s6 c3 473 c3c1 c3c4 0.14 0.39
s6 c3 473 c3c2 c3c4 0.62 0.32
s6 c3 473 c1c3 c2c3 1.42 0.14
s6 c3 473 c1c3 c4c3 0.29 0.38
s6 c3 473 c2c3 c4c3 1.66 0.10
s6 c3 474 c3c1 c3c2 2.61 0.02
s6 c3 474 c3c1 c3c4 0.27 0.38
s6 c3 474 c3c2 c3c4 2.09 0.05
s6 c3 474 c1c3 c2c3 4.18 0.00
s6 c3 474 c1c3 c4c3 2.27 0.03
s6 c3 474 c2c3 c4c3 1.41 0.15
s6 c3 475 c3c1 c3c2 4.74 0.00
s6 c3 475 c3c1 c3c4 2.64 0.01
s6 c3 475 c3c2 c3c4 2.44 0.02
s6 c3 475 c1c3 c2c3 0.00 0.40
s6 c3 475 c1c3 c4c3 1.31 0.17
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s6 c3 475 c2c3 c4c3 1.19 0.19
s6 c3 476 c3c1 c3c2 3.87 0.00
s6 c3 476 c3c1 c3c4 1.80 0.08
s6 c3 476 c3c2 c3c4 1.88 0.07
s6 c3 476 c1c3 c2c3 3.08 0.01
s6 c3 476 c1c3 c4c3 4.04 0.00
s6 c3 476 c2c3 c4c3 0.88 0.27
s6 c3 477 c3c1 c3c2 0.52 0.35
s6 c3 477 c3c1 c3c4 1.26 0.18
s6 c3 477 c3c2 c3c4 1.93 0.06
s6 c3 477 c1c3 c2c3 0.39 0.37
s6 c3 477 c1c3 c4c3 0.32 0.38
s6 c3 477 c2c3 c4c3 0.09 0.39
s6 c3 478 c3c1 c3c2 3.19 0.00
s6 c3 478 c3c1 c3c4 0.48 0.35
s6 c3 478 c3c2 c3c4 2.28 0.03
s6 c3 478 c1c3 c2c3 0.61 0.33
s6 c3 478 c1c3 c4c3 1.95 0.06
s6 c3 478 c2c3 c4c3 1.37 0.15
s6 c3 479 c3c1 c3c2 0.67 0.31
s6 c3 479 c3c1 c3c4 0.15 0.39
s6 c3 479 c3c2 c3c4 0.62 0.33
s6 c3 479 c1c3 c2c3 2.65 0.01
s6 c3 479 c1c3 c4c3 2.66 0.01
s6 c3 479 c2c3 c4c3 0.35 0.37
s6 c3 480 c3c1 c3c2 0.00 0.40
s6 c3 480 c3c1 c3c4 0.16 0.39
s6 c3 480 c3c2 c3c4 0.19 0.39
s6 c3 480 c1c3 c2c3 1.43 0.14
s6 c3 480 c1c3 c4c3 1.27 0.18
s6 c3 480 c2c3 c4c3 0.00 0.40
s6 c4 481 c4c1 c4c2 2.32 0.03
s6 c4 481 c4c1 c4c3 1.15 0.20
s6 c4 481 c4c2 c4c3 4.02 0.00
s6 c4 481 c1c4 c2c4 3.31 0.00
s6 c4 481 c1c4 c3c4 2.08 0.05
s6 c4 481 c2c4 c3c4 5.00 0.00
s6 c4 482 c4c1 c4c2 3.22 0.00
s6 c4 482 c4c1 c4c3 1.02 0.23
s6 c4 482 c4c2 c4c3 4.60 0.00
s6 c4 482 c1c4 c2c4 1.52 0.13
s6 c4 482 c1c4 c3c4 2.01 0.05
s6 c4 482 c2c4 c3c4 3.38 0.00
s6 c4 483 c4c1 c4c2 3.09 0.01
s6 c4 483 c4c1 c4c3 4.19 0.00
s6 c4 483 c4c2 c4c3 6.67 0.00
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s6 c4 483 c1c4 c2c4 2.13 0.04
s6 c4 483 c1c4 c3c4 1.64 0.10
s6 c4 483 c2c4 c3c4 4.37 0.00
s6 c4 484 c4c1 c4c2 0.09 0.39
s6 c4 484 c4c1 c4c3 2.83 0.01
s6 c4 484 c4c2 c4c3 2.85 0.01
s6 c4 484 c1c4 c2c4 1.53 0.12
s6 c4 484 c1c4 c3c4 0.55 0.34
s6 c4 484 c2c4 c3c4 2.09 0.05
s6 c4 485 c4c1 c4c2 3.52 0.00
s6 c4 485 c4c1 c4c3 0.09 0.39
s6 c4 485 c4c2 c4c3 2.90 0.01
s6 c4 485 c1c4 c2c4 0.48 0.35
s6 c4 485 c1c4 c3c4 0.74 0.30
s6 c4 485 c2c4 c3c4 1.05 0.23
s6 c4 486 c4c1 c4c2 0.79 0.29
s6 c4 486 c4c1 c4c3 0.98 0.24
s6 c4 486 c4c2 c4c3 1.72 0.09
s6 c4 486 c1c4 c2c4 0.44 0.36
s6 c4 486 c1c4 c3c4 0.31 0.38
s6 c4 486 c2c4 c3c4 0.74 0.30
s6 c4 487 c4c1 c4c2 2.78 0.01
s6 c4 487 c4c1 c4c3 0.44 0.36
s6 c4 487 c4c2 c4c3 2.50 0.02
s6 c4 487 c1c4 c2c4 3.13 0.00
s6 c4 487 c1c4 c3c4 2.01 0.06
s6 c4 487 c2c4 c3c4 0.85 0.27
s6 c4 488 c4c1 c4c2 1.69 0.10
s6 c4 488 c4c1 c4c3 1.16 0.20
s6 c4 488 c4c2 c4c3 0.44 0.36
s6 c4 488 c1c4 c2c4 2.89 0.01
s6 c4 488 c1c4 c3c4 0.36 0.37
s6 c4 488 c2c4 c3c4 2.32 0.03
s6 c4 489 c4c1 c4c2 2.24 0.04
s6 c4 489 c4c1 c4c3 1.19 0.19
s6 c4 489 c4c2 c4c3 0.61 0.33
s6 c4 489 c1c4 c2c4 0.18 0.39
s6 c4 489 c1c4 c3c4 0.29 0.38
s6 c4 489 c2c4 c3c4 0.13 0.39
s6 c4 490 c4c1 c4c2 0.11 0.39
s6 c4 490 c4c1 c4c3 0.37 0.37
s6 c4 490 c4c2 c4c3 0.28 0.38
s6 c4 490 c1c4 c2c4 0.11 0.39
s6 c4 490 c1c4 c3c4 2.85 0.01






Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Hypothesis 2 testing16 
Concept Pairing Evaluated Against Concept Set Pearson r p 
C1 – C2  C1 C1C2 1 0.107 0.552 
   2 0.242 0.156 
   3 0.408 0.023 
   4 0.263 0.167 
   5 -0.282 0.095 
   6 0.413 0.026 
 C1 C2C1 1 0.566 0.001 
   2 0.582 0.000 
   3 0.544 0.002 
   4 0.342 0.069 
   5 0.679 0.000 
   6 0.409 0.028 
 C2 C1C2 1 0.464 0.007 
   2 0.242 0.154 
   3 0.245 0.183 
   4 0.756 0.000 
   5 0.652 0.000 
   6 0.381 0.041 
 C2 C2C1 1 0.149 0.407 
   2 -0.027 0.877 
   3 0.010 0.959 
   4 0.596 0.001 
   5 -0.228 0.182 
   6 0.337 0.074 
C1 – C3 C1 C1C3 1 -0.449 0.009 
   2 -0.535 0.001 
   3 -0.254 0.148 
   4 0.062 0.725 
   5 0.029 0.873 
   6 0.453 0.009 
 C1 C3C1 1 0.478 0.005 
   2 0.273 0.107 
   3 0.837 0.000 
   4 0.444 0.008 
                                                     
16  The coding scheme used in this appendix is listed in Table 4-11. 
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   5 0.232 0.193 
   6 0.669 0.000 
 C3 C1C3 1 0.820 0.000 
   2 0.867 0.000 
   3 0.561 0.001 
   4 0.803 0.000 
   5 0.371 0.033 
   6 0.636 0.000 
 C3 C3C1 1 0.058 0.748 
   2 0.247 0.147 
   3 -0.520 0.002 
   4 0.468 0.005 
   5 0.178 0.321 
   6 0.376 0.034 
C2 – C3  C2 C2C3 1 -0.557 0.000 
   2 -0.058 0.732 
   3 0.633 0.000 
   4 0.646 0.000 
   5 0.594 0.000 
   6 0.210 0.257 
 C2 C3C2 1 0.347 0.038 
   2 0.534 0.001 
   3 0.730 0.000 
   4 0.636 0.000 
   5 0.697 0.000 
   6 0.303 0.098 
 C3 C2C3 1 0.822 0.000 
   2 0.021 0.900 
   3 -0.374 0.027 
   4 -0.115 0.537 
   5 0.509 0.003 
   6 0.495 0.005 
 C3 C3C2 1 0.155 0.368 
   2 -0.555 0.000 
   3 -0.444 0.008 
   4 0.010 0.957 
   5 0.416 0.020 
   6 0.640 0.000 
C1 – C4 C1 C1C4 6 0.716 0.000 
 C1 C4C1 6 0.683 0.000 
 C4 C1C4 6 0.436 0.011 
 C4 C4C1 6 0.492 0.004 
C2 – C4 C2 C2C4 6 0.718 0.000 
 C2 C4C2 6 0.641 0.000 
 C4 C2C4 6 0.912 0.000 
 C4 C4C2 6 0.872 0.000 
C3 – C4 C3 C3C4 6 0.670 0.000 
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 C3 C4C3 6 0.575 0.000 
 C4 C3C4 6 0.193 0.274 





The linear regression test design for hypothesis 317 
Concept Set Concept Pair Evaluated Against Regression Model (RM) 
Set 1 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM1 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM2 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM3 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM4 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM5 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM6 
Set 2 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM7 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM8 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM9 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM10 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM11 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM12 
Set 3 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM13 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM14 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM15 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM16 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM17 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM18 
Set 4 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM19 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM20 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM21 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM22 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM23 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM24 
Set 5 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM25 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM26 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM27 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM28 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM29 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM30 
Set 6 C1 – C2 B (C1*C2) C1C2 RM31 
  B (C1*C2) C2C1 RM32 
 C1 – C3  B (C1*C3) C1C3 RM33 
  B (C1*C3) C3C1 RM34 
                                                     
17 The coding scheme used in this appendix is listed in Table 4-11. 
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 C1 – C4  B (C1*C4) C1C4 RM35 
  B (C1*C4) C4C1 RM36 
 C2 – C3 B (C2*C3) C2C3 RM37 
  B (C2*C3) C3C2 RM38 
 C2 – C4 B (C2*C4) C2C4 RM39 
  B (C2*C4) C4C2 RM40 
 C3 – C4 B (C3*C4) C3C4 RM41 










The results of the linear regression models for H318 
 
  Linear Regression Model 1 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.197 .171 7.599 1 .010 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.903 12.574 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.039 .444 2.757 .010 
 
 Linear Regression Model 2 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.302 .279 13.394 1 .001 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.458 9.475 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.061 .549 3.660 .001 
 
 Linear Regression Model 3 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.096 .067 3.300 1 .079 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.337 14.451 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.033 .310 1.817 .079 
 
 Linear Regression Model 4 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.302 .279 13.408 1 .001 
Parameter Estimates 
                                                     
18  See Appendix 12 for the test design details. 
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 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 2.986 17.479 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.049 .549 3.662 .001 
 
 Linear Regression Model 5 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.072 .044 2.629 1 .114 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.220 9.674 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.051 .268 1.621 .114 
 
 Linear Regression Model 6 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.198 .175 8.406 1 .007 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.122 12.030 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.071 .445 2.899 .007 
 
 Linear Regression Model 7 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.123 .097 4.770 1 .036 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 4.570 17.205 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.027 .351 2.184 .036 
 
 Linear Regression Model 8 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.146 .121 5.806 1 .022 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 




0.035 .382 2.410 .022 
 
 Linear Regression Model 9 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.018 -.011 .629 1 .433 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.889 11.131 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.022 .135 .793 .433 
 
Linear Regression Model 10 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.237 .215 10.585 1 .003 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.472 16.403 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.055 .487 3.254 .003 
 
 Linear Regression Model 11 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.005 -.024 .160 1 .691 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.138 8.829 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.015 .068 .400 .691 
 
 Linear Regression Model 12 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.003 -.026 .104 1 .749 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.719 8.475 .000 
Balance 
score 
-0.015 -.054 -.322 .749 
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 Linear Regression Model 13 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.395 .374     18.961 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.475 9.687 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.070 .629 4.354 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 14 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.232 .205 8.742 1 .006 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.384 5.498 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.081 .481 2.957 .006 
 
 Linear Regression Model 15 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.128 .101 4.698 1 .038 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.516 14.912 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.046 .358 2.168 .038 
 
 Linear Regression Model 16 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.166 .140 6.367 1 .017 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.235 9.993 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.073 .407 2.523 .017 
 
 Linear Regression Model 17 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.032 .003 1.088 1 .305 
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Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 4.424 11.300 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.033 .179 1.043 .305 
 
 Linear Regression Model 18 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.063 .034 2.202 1 .147 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.983 11.936 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.040 .250 1.484 .147 
 
 Linear Regression Model 19 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.546 .529 32.415 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 2.982 9.131 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.071 .739 5.693 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 20 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.510 .491 28.056 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.059 8.160 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.076 .714 5.297 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 21 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.436 .419 25.498 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
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Constant 2.970 8.054 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.074 .660 5.050 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 22 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.449 .432 26.911 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.375 11.595 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.060 .670 5.188 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 23 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.198 .170 7.163 1 .012 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.636 13.763 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.038 .445 2.676 .012 
 
 Linear Regression Model 24 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.343 .320 15.130 1 .001 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.687 16.298 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.047 .586 3.890 .001 
 
 Linear Regression Model 25 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.099 .073 3.747 1 .061 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.388 9.817 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.047 .315 1.936 .061 
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 Linear Regression Model 26 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.159 .134 6.425 1 .016 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.545 14.391 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.044 .399 2.535 .016 
 
 Linear Regression Model 27 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.205 .179 7.976 1 .008 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.129 9.826 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.070 .452 2.824 .008 
 
 Linear Regression Model 28 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.106 .078 3.690 1 .064 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.449 14.021 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.037 .326 1.921 .064 
 
 Linear Regression Model 29 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.453 .434 23.976 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.238 10.010 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.067 .673 4.897 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 30 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
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.446 .426 23.302 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 2.967 8/035 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.075 .667 4.827 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 31 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.215 .186 7.394 1 .011 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.849 10.310 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.046 .464 2.719 .011 
 
 Linear Regression Model 32 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.129 .097 4.004 1 .056 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 4.218 11.920 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.032 .359 2.001 .056 
 
 Linear Regression Model 33 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.516 .500 32.035 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.368 11.137 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.074 .719 5.660 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 34 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.480 .463 27.713 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta t Sig. 
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 B Beta 
Constant 3.697 12.476 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.067 .693 5.264 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 35 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.475 .458 28.050 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.657 12.779 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.068 .689 5.296 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 36 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.457 .440 26.093 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.558 11.457 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.071 .676 5.108 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 37 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.250 .224 9.672 1 .004 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.976 14.528 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.047 .500 3.110 .004 
 
 Linear Regression Model 38 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.395 .374 18.956 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.743 17.160 .000 




 Linear Regression Model 39 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.773 .764 88.412 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 2.617 9.005 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.095 .879 9.403 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 40 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.673 .661 53.535 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 2.734 7.296 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.096 .820 7.317 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 41 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.358 .338 17.869 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 3.754 14.441 .000 
Balance 
score 
0.057 .599 4.227 .000 
 
 Linear Regression Model 42 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1       Sig. 
.421 .403 23.274 1 .000 
Parameter Estimates 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Beta 
 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.583 15.249 .000 
Balance 
score 





The distribution of Pearson’s coefficients for hypothesis 4 testing 
Concept Pair Concept Set C1&C1C2 Pearson r C2&C1C2 Pearson r  
C1 – C2  1 0.107 0.464 
 2 0.242 0.242 
 3 0.408 0.245 
 4 0.263 0.756 
 5 -0.282 0.652 
 6 0.413 0.381 
 Concept Set  C2&C2C1 Pearson r  C1&C2C1 Pearson r  
 1 0.149 0.566 
 2 -0.027 0.582 
 3 0.010 0.544 
 4 0.596 0.342 
 5 -0.228 0.679 
 6 0.337 0.409 
 Concept Set C1&C1C3 Pearson r C3&C1C3 Pearson r 
C1 – C3 1 -0.449 0.820 
 2 -0.535 0.867 
 3 -0.254 0.561 
 4 0.062 0.803 
 5 0.029 0.371 
 6 0.453 0.636 
 Concept Set C3&C3C1 Pearson r C1&C3C1 Pearson r 
 1 0.058 0.478 
 2 0.247 0.273 
 3 -0.520 0.837 
 4 0.468 0.444 
 5 0.178 0.232 
 6 0.376 0.669 
 Concept Set C2&C2C3 Pearson r C3&C2C3 Pearson r 
C2 – C3  1 -0.557 0.822 
 2 -0.058 0.021 
 3 0.633 -0.374 
 4 0.646 -0.115 
 5 0.594 0.509 
 6 0.210 0.495 
  Concept Set C3&C3C2 Pearson r  C2&C3C2 Pearson r 
 1 0.155 0.347 
 2 -0.555 0.534 
 3 -0.444 0.730 
 4 0.010 0.636 
 5 0.416 0.697 
 6 0.640 0.303 
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 Concept Set C1&C1C4 Pearson r C4&C1C4 Pearson r 
C1 – C4 6 0.716 0.436 
 Concept Set C4&C4C1 Pearson r C1&C4C1 Pearson r 
 6 0.492 0.683 
 Concept Set C2&C2C4 Pearson r C4&C2C4 Pearson r 
C2 – C4 6 0.718 0.912 
  Concept Set C4&C4C2 Pearson r C2&C4C2 Pearson r 
 6 0.872 0.641 
 Concept Set C3&C3C4 Pearson r C4&C3C4 Pearson r 
C3 – C4 6 0.670 0.193 
 Concept Set C4&C4C3 Pearson r C3&C4C3 Pearson r 









Regression analyses on the relative contribution of prototypicality and balance 
conducted for the other half of the data subset  
1. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*mean_rating_head 
2. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*balance_score 
3. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1* mean_rating_head + 
Beta2*balance_score 
4. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*mean_rating_modifier 
5. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1*balance_score 
6. Mean_rating_combination = a0 + Beta1* mean_rating_modifier + 
Beta2*balance_score 
Model #7 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.289  35.968 .000
Mean_rating_head 0.278 .462 13.697 .000
Model #8 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.449  53.388 .000
Balance_score 0.061 .566 18.048 .000
Model #9 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.165  37.609 .000
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Mean_rating_head 0.118 .196 5.131 .000
Balance_score 0.049 0.450 11.786 .000
Model #10 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.808  37.767 .000
Mean_rating_modifier 0.152 .250 6.780 .000
Model #11 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.449  53.388 .000
Balance_score 0.061 .566 18.048 .000
Model #12 Summary 
R Square Adjusted R Square F df1      Sig. 






 B Beta 
T Sig. 
Constant 3.624  42.120 .000
Mean_rating_modifier -0.071 -0.117 -3.061 .002
Balance_score 0.068 0.634 16.579 .000
 
